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This book critically examines the range of policies and programmes that
attempt to manage economic activity that contributes to political violence.
Beginning with an overview of over a dozen policies aimed at transforming
these activities into economic relationships which support peace, not war,
the book then offers a sustained critique of the reasons for limited success in
this policy field. The inability of the range of international actors involved in
this policy area, the development-security industry (DSI), to bring about
more peaceful political-economic relationships is shown to be a result of
liberal biases, resulting conceptual lenses and operational tendencies within
the industry. A detailed case study of responses to organised crime in Kosovo
offers an in-depth exploration of these problems, but also highlights
opportunities for policy innovation.
This book offers a new framework for understanding both the problem of
economic activity in conflict zones, and the programmes aimed at managing
them. Summaries of key arguments and frameworks, found within each
chapter, provide accessible templates for both students and aid practitioners
seeking to understand war economies and policy reactions in a range of other
contexts. It also offers insight into how to alter and improve policy responses
in other cases. As such, the book is accessible to a range of readers, including
students interested in peace, conflict and international development as well as
policy makers and practitioners seeking new ways of understanding war
economies and improving responses to them.
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1
Introduction: war economies, peace economies
and transformation
Since the end of the Cold War, economic greed and profit-seeking have become a
significant motivation for the perpetuation and deepening of conflict in some parts
of the developing world. The most acute economic motivation in armed conflict
has been the illicit exploitation of lucrative natural resources such as diamonds,
timber, gold, oil, precious gems, and minerals like coltan, which have provided
both the means and incentive for some warring parties to wage campaigns of
violence and human rights abuses. (Government of Canada, 2009)
BLOOD DIAMONDS in Africa, drug cartels in Latin America and the partici-pation of warlords in Afghanistan’s illicit opium trade have heightenedboth public and academic awareness of the problem of war economies –
systems in which economic incentives either motivate actors to instigate and
participate in political violence or which facilitate ongoing conflict by
providing a means of financing violent struggle. Policy statements such as the
one presented above, along with explosive media reports, dramatic Hollywood
recreations, countless non-governmental organisation (NGO) programmes
and masses of academic research reveal an increasing concern over these
economies, and have in turn led to a growing interest in and need for policies
which limit the degree to which commodities can be used to either finance
war, or become a dominant motivation for individuals to take up arms. Seen
as a major threat to peace, stability and development, the international
community has increased its focus on creating and improving upon policies
which can eradicate or transform these ‘economies of war’ into ‘economies of
peace’. Unfortunately, success on this front has been largely elusive, with
violent economic activities continuing to fuel and feed off war and insecurity
in many parts of the world. 
While the relationship between economic activities or incentives and
instances of political violence have been well documented and analysed from
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multiple perspectives, there is a notable lack of a more general reflection on the
policies through which these activities are managed or transformed. The
processes through which development and security actors, tasked with recon-
structing war affected societies into peaceful liberal states, engage with or tackle
the problem of war economies remains under-scrutinised. Discussed in greater
detail in upcoming chapters, much of the work in this regard looks narrowly at
the problem, evaluating specific projects or the trade of a specific commodity.
Victories are often measured quantitatively, with overall reductions in the cross-
border trade of illicit diamonds, or the number of drug-free provinces defining
progress. Assessments of broader approaches tend to be classified as serious fail-
ures of ultimately unachievable tasks, as illustrated by analysis of the decades-
long American War on Drugs. While there has been some more substantial and
nuanced analysis of the dynamics and flaws of specific programmes, for example
the Kimberly Process which seeks to prevent diamonds from fuelling political vio-
lence, the transformation of war economies into peace economies has rarely been
considered holistically. Programmes are analysed separately as opposed to being
approached as a broader reform area and studies often fail to combine a concern
for the practical policy-related issues with the more substantive conceptual and
political dynamics of programming. 
Through a critical exploration of the mechanisms and political relation-
ships which are involved in transformations of war economies into peace
economies, this book provides a more holistic mode of analysis, offering a
multi-layered examination of the processes through which security and devel-
opment actors attempt to manage war economies in conflict-affected states.
As the methods and politics of war economy transformation are assessed,
what becomes apparent is that current transformation attempts have become
both illustrative of and central to the liberal peacebuilding agenda. This
agenda, led by international development and security actors, has the
ultimate goal of constructing liberal peaces from the vestiges of what they
define as weak, failed and collapsed states. It is in the dominance of the liberal
peacebuilding agenda that the broader explanation for the failure of transfor-
mation projects across time and place can be found, as the ideological,
conceptual and resultant operational practices of this project complicate and
create barriers for transformation. As shown through analyses of several
reform areas central to war economy transformation, paradoxes and
problems found within the liberal peacebuilding project itself hinder the
ability to effectively manage the dysfunctional political-economic practices
which threaten security. The lack of success seen in this programme area is
not merely a function of poor project planning and implementation, but
rather indicative of a faltering project of global governance which imperils its
own success through its reliance of faulty, narrow conceptions and ideologi-
cal commitments. 
2
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While examining the failure of one particular policy area, war economy
transformation, what emerges are wider conclusions applicable to the
practices of development aid and peacebuilding more generally. At issue are
the fundamental practices and theories of international intervention, which
are exposed as operationally flawed, conceptually defective and deeply ideo-
logical. Taken as a whole, these interrelated layers of critique offer a
significant challenge to the dominance of the current liberal peacebuilding
agenda. Through this challenge, however, comes the opportunity to adapt
and reformulate the theory and practice of peacebuilding. As actors attempt to
build economies of peace, we witness challenges to the dominance of the
liberal agenda. Examples of actors utilising their agency and power to
challenge dominant processes suggests that security and development actors
need not always operate under the limitations of the current liberal peace-
building consensus and can, through a greater understanding of the problems
and politics involved, work towards less destructive and more just forms of
political-economic relationships specifically and more just modes of peace
generally.
War economies, peace economies and transformation 
Before engaging with the above debates, it is useful to explore the terminolo-
gy involved and place the discussion within a wider context of international
aid and interventions. War economy transformation is one of the many goals
of what is referred to as peacebuilding. Seen as both a way of preventing latent
tensions from turning into violent political conflict and of rebuilding societies
already affected by such hostilities, peacebuilding programming involves
states and local communities being treated with a range of reforms and policy
prescriptions. Often led by external actors, but in coordination with national
and local actors, peacebuilding acts as an umbrella for a wide range of activi-
ties. Local governance reform, including decentralisation, addressing rural
poverty, gender empowerment, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegra-
tion (DDR) of ex-combatants along with a multitude of other programmes are
implemented with the aim of preventing future conflict, rebuilding what was
destroyed during conflict, and creating new processes and relationships
which will prevent a return to violence.
At the centre of this peacebuilding agenda is the need to create modes of
economic interaction which facilitate and support peace. Economic reform
involves a wide variety of practices, from macro-economic stabilisation
programming led by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank, to rural poverty reduction led by international
NGOs and local community-based organisations (CBOs). In war-affected
areas, however, it is increasingly recognised that attention needs to be paid to
3
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the illicit and illegal economic activities which often come to support and feed
off violence. Standard economic reforms fail to adequately address these activ-
ities, and thus tailored policies are needed to transform them into
relationships which no longer pose a threat to peace and security. It is these
specific reforms, a subset of peacebuilding and economic reforms, which this
book will explore. 
These policies, discussed in greater detail in forthcoming chapters, aim to
manage or transform what are often colloquially referred to as war
economies. Often studied under the rubric of political economies of violence,
these forms of economic activity are considered to be antithetical to the
creation of peace. They refer to occasions where economic incentives either
motivate actors to instigate, participate in or prolong violence or where profits
from the trade of resources acts primarily as a source of funding for ongoing
political struggles (though these two functions can exist simultaneously or
become more and less dominant throughout the course of a conflict). The
trade of a commodity or an economic exchange may not be the sole cause of
conflict, but does become a fundamental part of the conflict dynamic,
impacting the nature and/or trajectory of political violence. In this sense, war
economies do not simply refer to the state of an economy in times of conflict,
but are defined as the economic relationships and transactions which cause,
sustain or prolong periods of physical political violence or instances where
actors take advantage of political violence for financial gain.
The most notorious examples of war economies come from the African
continent where the illegal diamond trade was seen as fuelling conflicts in
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola. Such infamous cases have led to an
increased focus on the role of natural resources in conflict-affected areas with
other conflicts being analysed through the lens of economic opportunities,
including Cambodia where the trade in timber was a factor in funding
continued insurrection and in Afghanistan where the opium industry is seen
as contributing to ongoing instability. The notion of a resource curse is
commonly invoked, implying that the abundance of resources has actually
hindered, rather than helped, countries’ development by fuelling violent
conflicts (see Basedau and Lay 2009 for a good review of the literature). War
economies involve a wide range of commodities including the sale of both licit
(such as timber and coltan) and illicit goods (including arms and drugs) and
activities such as human trafficking, organised crime, diasporic funding
(either through voluntary contributions or extortion), money laundering, tax
evasion, corruption, and even the use and manipulation of foreign aid. Besides
a diversity of commodities and activities, war economies are also known to
involve a range of actors, from rebel groups and organised criminal gangs to
state agencies and democratically elected leaders. In some cases, opposing
factions cooperate in order to allow both sides to continue their economic
4
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endeavours. Private companies in ‘peaceful’ states also have a position in
these commodity chains, with conflict goods such as diamonds, oil and timber
being traded through multinational corporations. The consumption of these
otherwise licit goods occurs primarily in ‘peaceful’ developed nations, as does
the consumption of illicit goods associated with conflicts, including cocaine
and heroin. Private security firms from within the conflict-affected country or
from abroad are also known to have become central actors in war economies.
For example, the South African firm Executive Outcomes was hired to fight
rebels operating in and around the diamond fields in Sierra Leone, while
Branch Energy, a UK firm (with contested links to Executive Outcomes),
received generous contracts in these newly liberated diamond fields (Francis,
1999; Howe, 1998). The profits from such activities often find their way
either legally, or illegally through money laundering, into the world’s largest
financial institutions and banks, making use of modern banking systems and
communications technology. These processes and relationships point to the
complex and globally integrated nature of war economies, challenging images
of war economies as simply being the direct economic transactions between
combatants and traders within a given conflict zone – a complexity that will
be further considered throughout this book.
Conceptualising a peace economy and transformation
At this point, it is useful to consider how a war economy can be distinguished
from its natural antonym – a peace economy. In the most basic sense, the two
can be differentiated on the basis that the former, as defined previously, is
either a result of, directly causes, or directly contributes to physical,
organised, political violence while peace economies are constituted by
economic relationships which neither benefit from nor have a causal rela-
tionship with physical, organised political violence. By this criteria, and given
the aforementioned interdependence and global scope of economic activities,
it is impossible to classify any economic system as a clear example of a peace
economy. While geographically detached from the physical violence associat-
ed with war economies, or having the appearance of being far removed from
the political economy of violence due to their involvement only at a seemingly
distant node in a commodity chain, what are often (wrongly) classified as
peace economies are in fact clearly connected to political economies of
violence. Though an actor’s distance in terms of geography and role in the
commodity chain does place it nearer to the category of peace economy on the
spectrum, one should not dismiss the need to address activities occurring in
these areas in transformation projects. 
Further, in order to move towards a peace economy, one must also
conceive of peace in a much broader sense, one that goes beyond concerns
5
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regarding overt physical violence. If one judges peace also in terms of the
prevalence and role of structural violence (Galtung, 1969) at both local and
international levels, the task of creating a peace economy becomes a much
wider and more substantial project. Eradicating direct or personal violence,
the physical acts of violence committed by identifiable actors, is not sufficient
as this can at best only facilitate a negative peace – simply an absence of war
as opposed to a positive peace which focuses on the eradication of structural
forms of violence as well. Manifest forms of structural violence (less tangible
forms of inequality and justice) can be considered as a precursor or potential
trigger for latent, as of yet unobservable, forms of physical violence. Of course,
there are critiques of this simple binary with concerns that such definitions
expand understandings of peace to such a degree that the category itself
becomes meaningless, analytically useless, that it is far too normative and
that violence becomes characterised simply as anything that ‘Galtung doesn’t
like’ (Boulding, 1977: 84; Lawler, 2002). However, the distinction between
creating positive and negative forms of peace is adopted here to clarify and
reinforce Galtung’s largely accepted notion that what is generally defined as
peace often entails much injustice, continued suffering and the roots of future
conflict. 
In order to transform economies of war into economies of peace, both the
structural facets (for example global inequalities and power relations which
facilitate and encourage illicit economic activity) and physical facets of
violence related to war economies (the more observable and tangible
processes of economic exchange) must be addressed. This suggests the need
for much larger and more diverse projects than we see in current transforma-
tion strategies that tend to be based on narrowly conceived policies which
attempt to merely prevent resources or a specific economic activity from
contributing to physical violence. Such an approach forces us to recognise
that the process of capital accumulation and power relations and imbalances
in the geopolitical landscape can themselves be seen as forms of structural
violence insofar as periphery regions or persons are exploited in order to
ensure the status quo for more dominant, powerful actors. For example, the
geopolitical relationships involved in the trade of oil cannot be subtracted
from the equation in our consideration of violence witnessed around the
drilling of oil in Angola and Nigeria. Thus, in order to transform war
economies, the structures which permit, encourage and facilitate war
economies must also be addressed, meaning one must also consider the wider
structural factors which have facilitated, and which perhaps prompt, actors’
participation in political economies of direct violence. 
For this reason, it is useful to add a third category of economy to the
discussion, that of a ‘positive peace economy’ whereby economic relationships
not only have no obvious association with direct/physical violence, but also
6
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are free of structural violence and support a just and sustainable peace. In this
regard, it is useful to consider the transformation of war economies not in
terms of an either-or dichotomy, but along a scale with various shades of grey.
Therefore, when arguing for the transformation of war economies, two stages
are envisioned. The first entails transforming economic relationships so that
at a minimum, they are no longer attached to or reliant on overt physical
violence – a negative peace economy. The second stage, and what this book
refers to when calling for transformation, is a more progressive form of
positive transformation, whereby physical violence is not only eradicated, but
other forms of injustice (such as discrimination, fear, intimidation, or unfair
and dangerous labour practices) are also reduced. What is meant by positive
transformation or moves towards an economy of peace therefore hinges not
only on removing violence from the equation, but also inserting norms of
equality, fairness and well-being into political-economic life into our defini-
tion of a peace economy. Thus a war economy can be considered transformed
along a qualitative line – the first step being to remove overt physical violence
from economic life, and the second step involving transforming relationships
in such a way as to support a move towards a positive form of peace.
Transformation should be seen as an ongoing process, not easily measured in
terms of quantitative progress, but in terms of qualitative changes which seek
to remove all forms of violence from economic life. 
What emerges through the forthcoming analysis of current practice,
however, is that there is little if any movement towards positive transforma-
tion. Instead, what we witness is a focus on the creation of a very narrowly
conceived (negative) peace economy, which prioritises stability and an
absence of immediate physical violence, and that even in this regard, there
has been limited success. Such an approach is indicative of the liberal peace-
building project which appears either unwilling or unable to consider or
attempt to resolve instances of injustice, both local and international, which
would need to be addressed to move towards either negative or positive peace
7
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economies. It is important to highlight that the call for positive transformation
does not envisage any particular predefined endpoint. It does not suggest
replacing liberalism with anything in particular and what are deemed
progressive policy decisions in case study material should not be taken as a
new set of blueprints. Instead, what is progressive and what will further the
goals of positive transformation are the lessons related to challenging the
liberal system and negotiating in non-hegemonic ways with a variety of stake-
holders in each context. These negotiations should not privilege security and
economic growth above social, political and economic justice (which should
be at the forefront of creating sustainable and just transformations). This may
sound a difficult task, but examples of the opportunities for engaging in and
supporting such processes can be found throughout this book.
Transforming war economies: the role of the development-security
industry (DSI)
The responsibility for the transformation of war economies called for above
rests with an assortment of actors who are simultaneously tasked with
resolving global issues related to peace and development more broadly. In
tracing the ways in which these actors operate and interact, one witnesses the
emergence of a diverse but structured network of actors which create and
implement the peacebuilding programming of which war economy transfor-
mation is now a part. In terms of these actors’ theoretical and conceptual
underpinnings and beliefs, as well as their modus operandi, development and
security actors have become so entwined that it is possible to speak of a devel-
opment-security industry (DSI). The DSI encompasses a broad range of actors
who engage collectively in activities which aim to simultaneously promote
peace, security and development. This industry can be likened to what
Duffield refers to as strategic complexes, whereby we can identify ‘growing
strategic networks, linking development and security actors – academics,
military establishments, NGOs, private security companies and so on’ (2001:
36). Like strategic complexes, the DSI consists of numerous actors including
donor states, bilateral and multilateral organisations, militaries and military
alliances, local and international NGOs and private companies. 
While Duffield is quite specific regarding the role each of these actors has
to play in the global governance project (Duffield, 2001: 53–73), the DSI can
usefully be divided into two broad categories – guiding actors and operational
actors. Guiding actors can be seen as the most powerful institutions within the
network, actors who have the power to shape and guide political and
economic policy at a broad, systemic level. They are not only central in influ-
encing the nature of interventions, but also remain largely in control of the
funding for development-security endeavours. Guiding actors include donor
8
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governments and their militaries, powerful multi-lateral actors (such as the
EU and the UN Security Council) as well as powerful international financial
institutions (IFIs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). Alternatively,
operational actors can be defined as actors and institutions responsible for
carrying out the directives and implementing the aims of the guiding actors.
These actors include NGOs, specialised UN agencies (such as the UNHCR or
UNICEF) and small private companies. These institutions and the individuals
working within them can be seen as responsible for the day-to-day function-
ing of the DSI at the meso and micro levels. Of course, the division is not
always so clear – actors may engage in both guiding and operating activities.
NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch can be seen
as both attempting to alter policy at a macro level while engaging and imple-
menting policy at the micro level. 
The separation between those with high levels of diplomatic and policy-
making power as opposed to those whose mandates are limited to implemen-
tation at the micro level is lent support by Duffield’s assessment of strategic
complexes, where he determines that through their interaction and relation-
ships with other actors in the network, ‘governments are acquiring the ability
to project power’ (2001: 72). Tracing the division of labour within the DSI by
separating the industry in such a way will prove a useful tool in disaggregat-
ing and more clearly defining some of the issues and problems related to
development-security programming. As will become clear in forthcoming
chapters, such a distinction will contribute to a more nuanced reflection on
the role of various actors and move us away from a rather unhelpful percep-
tion of a homogenous ‘international community’. Nonetheless, it must also be
taken into account that despite the DSI appearing to be made up of multiple
connected but independent actors, it is an industry still very much led by
dominant global institutions – states and the large international institutions
whose agendas they control. Because of this high degree of control, it is
possible to argue that the DSI’s activities remain guided by the dominant
liberal peacebuilding consensus which will be described in greater detail in
forthcoming sections. 
It is essential to clarify the justification for placing this network at the
centre of analyses of war economy transformation. From a pragmatic point of
view, grouping development and security actors together as the key actor is
essential as actors on both sides of the dichotomy have prominent roles in the
creation and implementation of these political-economic programmes. The
responsibility for policies which seek to transform war economies is now given
both to traditional security actors such as law enforcement agencies and the
military, as well as to more developmental actors, such as NGOs, civil society
groups and various legal actors. As development and security actors are now
often required to work together in solving this facet of modern conflict it is
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useful to consider them as a solitary actor, despite differences between them.
Beyond this, the increasing merger between these actors and the blending of
the security and development agendas has proved to be one of the greatest
legitimising forces in terms of justifying the broad and intensive modes of
intervention that the liberal peacebuilding paradigm requires generally, and
that in turn facilitates the strong and invasive forms of intervention required
to transform war economies specifically. Liberal peacebuilding (discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 3) now requires the transformation of entire societies
– intervention in the political, economic and social realms, which requires a
linking of security actors in theory and in practice. 
The history and nature of the development-security nexus
The rebuilding of Europe and Japan following the world wars reveals a histor-
ical merging of international security and development goals which cautions
against treating the merger of development and security, and therefore its role
in liberal peacebuilding, as an entirely new or innovative phenomenon
(Duffield, 2001; 2005). However, despite there being substantial historical
record of the blending of these two agendas and discourses, it is argued that
since the end of the Cold War there has been a broadening and strengthening
of the relationship between development and security actors. The two fields
have become increasingly and overtly linked in ways not seen in previous
decades. As Neclâ Tschirgi notes, ‘Only some 15 years ago it was unusual for
policy makers to talk of development and security policies in the same breath.
Today the reverse is true’ (2006: 39). 
This increasingly strong merger has several roots. The end of the Cold
War is seen as having a strong impact. No longer constrained by the divisions
and limitations resulting from the struggle between East and West, develop-
ment and security actors have found themselves freer to intervene, creating
increased political space for both sets of actors and thus more opportunity for
simultaneous engagement. This freedom has since been transformed into a
right to intervene (Allen and Styan, 2000) and finally into an idea of a respon-
sibility to intervene (Shaw, 2003), whereby the DSI is expected to engage with
conflict-affected areas or insecure environments in order to protect individu-
als from the negative effects of violence. The end of the Cold War also signalled
a relative end to the ideological battle with liberal institutionalism emerging
as the dominant guiding principle of international development and security
apparatus. Key principles within liberal international relations theory and
neo-liberal economics have fused the areas of security and development by
suggesting that there is a positive relationship between economic and social
development on the one hand and stability and peace on the other. This rela-
tionship is based on two complementary assumptions, the first being that
10
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peace brings development, and conflict brings underdevelopment (Fitzgerald,
2001). The second assumption simply reverses the above axiom, concluding
that development brings peace and underdevelopment brings conflict. War
and poverty are perceived to be in a ‘dynamic and mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship’ (Luckham et al., 2001: 3). Though highly debated on empirical and
theoretical grounds, the democratic peace hypothesis, another key tenet of
liberal theory which suggests that democracies do not fight other democracies
and are also less likely to suffer from civil wars, has also aided in the fusing of
development and security agendas with the former promoting it as a mode of
political development and the latter supporting it for reasons of security. 
The adoption of liberal political and economic approaches by both devel-
opment and security actors over the past several decades has led to a common
agenda and legitimising discourse – economically developed and democratic
societies have emerged as the recipe for a peaceful and prosperous interna-
tional arena. Of course, normative liberal ideals do not fully define
international relations. Realist concerns still exist, but even these concerns
now support similar liberal-based interventions, ‘based on a pervasive fear
that impoverished people will threaten institutions of neo liberal global gover-
nance’ (Wilkin, 2002: 634). Thus, both liberals and realists have merged
concerning the solution to global instability – the former for normative ideal-
istic reasons, the latter for reasons of self preservation. This coming together
of development and security actors from both realist and liberal camps has
resulted in a specific and ideologically driven mode of intervention known as
liberal peacebuilding. Under this model, actors operate under a distinctly
liberal framework which favours liberal democratic governance systems, free
and open markets and individual human rights. This model is now seen as the
primary, if not the only, model for rebuilding states after conflict, with actors
as diverse as local NGOs and powerful international institutions coming to
accept what some have termed a ‘peacebuilding consensus’ (Richmond,
2007). The details and impacts of this ideologically driven foundation of the
DSI on war economy transformation will be further discussed in several of the
forthcoming chapters as they are fundamental to understanding both the
practices and failings of transformation.
Exploring the role of the DSI in the building of peace economies:
book structure
Through an examination of this industry’s ideological, conceptual and opera-
tional underpinnings, a clearer understanding of the processes, successes and
failures of war economy transformation is gained. The nature of the DSI and
its impact on the transformation of war economies is further explored
throughout the remainder of this book. Chapter 2 provides a detailed review
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and assessment of the policies which the DSI has utilised as it seeks to
transform these economies into peaceful post-conflict economies, offering
some insight into the reasons for failure in specific policy areas. Chapter 3
offers an in-depth discussion of the development-security industry, detailing
the nature and characteristics of the industry and the complex network of
actors on which it depends. In this chapter, the problem of war economies
which the DSI confronts is explored in greater detail, with a discussion of the
ideological foundations of this industry and the competing conceptualisations
and standpoints from which these modes of economic activity can be
analysed. Chapter 4 will illustrate the above discussions and debates via an
examination of the war economy in Kosovo, where the problems of organised
crime and smuggling are seen as contributing to a distinct from of economy
which both fuelled and fed off the regional conflict and continues to present
problems for post-conflict peacebuilding. 
Chapters 5 to 7 provide detailed analysis based on empirical research of
attempts by the DSI in Kosovo to create a peace economy. Each of these
chapters points to trends both in the micro and macro politics of liberal peace-
building, suggesting that the failure to build peace economies is not simply a
matter of poor project planning and implementation but rather a problem
related to faulty conceptualisations of the political-economic aspects of war
and the much broader issue of ideological bias in the current peacebuilding
agenda. An analysis of rule of law reform (Chapter 5), thought to be an
effective way of managing the criminal elements of war economies, considers
whether at the ideological level, the rhetoric of liberal notions of law and
statehood are used as justification for the imposition of politically motivated
reform and how this might result in short-term political goals hindering the
creation of sustainable and accountable legal and security mechanisms. This
analysis is related to the conceptual issues whereby the political-economic
relationships in question are classified as wholly criminal as opposed to
political in nature. In this chapter, operational barriers which limit the effec-
tiveness of rule of law reform to potentially play a positive role in
transformation are also considered. 
Chapter 6 analyses the use of privatisation as a tool of transformation.
Seen as a way of ensuring that commodities and other lucrative economic
opportunities cannot be captured or manipulated by political actors and
warring parties, privatisation is considered central to political-economic
transformation generally and dealing with the associated problems of war
economies more specifically. Analysis reveals that this programme had a
unique impact on transformation. While this reform project is meant to act as
a cure for destructive political-economic relationships, such as corruption and
organised crime, privatisation also creates new arenas in which actors can
continue or reformulate such relationships. The DSI’s firm ideological
12
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commitment to privatisation appears to have blinded it to these impacts.
Conceptually, liberal peacebuilding’s tendency to view this body of reform as
an economic and technocratic process also creates new and deepens old
political tensions. Again, not unlike the previous areas of reform, the likeli-
hood that these ideological and conceptual problems will be replicated and
entrenched is increased by operational issues, primarily related to the staffing
and capacity of institutions. 
Chapter 7 considers the importance of customs reform. Seen as central in
dealing with the smuggling and illegal side of a war economy, customs
agencies also serve as a way of regularising trade and collecting revenue for
the state. Analysis of this reform area in Kosovo reveals interesting contradic-
tions in the DSI’s behaviour, challenging some of the assumptions and
findings from previous chapters regarding the ways in which the liberal
peacebuilding agenda operates. While the reform of the customs service can
be fundamental in creating (or confirming) a conflict-affected country’s status
as a ‘strong state’ via the creation or control of international borders, at a
conceptual level, some customs reform processes have been more effective in
recognising the social, economic and political motivations and interests
which affect transformation processes. This conceptual difference, along with
observations of several operational differences, partially refutes conclusions
made regarding the liberal peace and the DSI in previous chapters. When
these differences (along with occasional variations from the norm that are
raised in previous chapters) are taken as a whole, conclusions regarding the
nature of the DSI begin to take form. 
The concluding chapter considers the findings from each of the case study
chapters leading to the creation of a comprehensive framework for analysing
the DSI as it engages in attempts to build liberal peace economies in conflict-
affected states. The dominance of a liberal ideology is found to be problematic
in and of itself but also to have serious consequences for the ways in which the
problem of post-conflict transformation is conceived, and the operationalisa-
tion of solutions. However, given the heterogeneity of processes considered
throughout the book, this chapter presents a more nuanced and reflexive
analytical framework which takes into account the diversity of this industry
as well at the opportunity for actors within it to operate with agency. While
finding that there has been limited success in current modes of liberal peace-
building in transforming war economies, this chapter concludes with
suggestions for future research and policy directions.
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2
War economy transformation: current
policy options and issues
WHETHER SEEN as a primary cause of a war, as one of several competingmotivations to engage in violence, or simply an outcome of the
supposed lawlessness that is characteristic of conflict, it is increasingly recog-
nised that economic motivations create serious barriers to the resolution of
war and the consolidation of peace. Not only a problem in terms of the
causation, prolongation or intensity of conflict (Ballentine, 2003), these war
economies continue to pose problems in the post-conflict phase. Reports from
Angola illustrate this point with one researcher finding that 
the management of the diamond industry retains many of the characteristics that
it acquired during the periods when the diamond fields were both a prize and a
weapon in the civil war: the control of the diamond fields and their populations by
force of arms . . . and the domination of the Angolan diamond trade by secretive
networks operating on the margins of the law, but ultimately to the benefit of
political elites . . . In fact, far from occasioning fundamental change in the pattern
of exploitation in the diamond fields of the Lundas, the end of the war has served
to legitimize the status quo. (Pearce, 2004: 62)
A report regarding the timber industry in post-war Cambodia comes to a
similar conclusion, with research determining that ‘large portions of
Cambodia’s forests have become a new battleground, as forest-dependent
communities are confronted with the predations of powerful companies and
corrupt officials. Conflicts, often involving violence, are now reported almost
every week and are increasing both in number and severity’ (Davis, 2005:
162). Despite nominal changes, in terms of the ‘conflict’ and ‘post-conflict’
language, the constituent parts and processes of war economies continue,
often flourishing and growing following the end of official fighting. 
What follows is a detailed review of the policy options used by actors
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within the DSI to address problems such as those described above and thus
halt the destructive impact of these economies in the conflict and post-conflict
phases. In the proceeding section, descriptions of these policies and the logic
underpinning their use in transformation will be explored. Following this,
however, is a more critical reflection on these policies’ effectiveness and
impact on political-economic transformation. This section will reveal that the
policies used by the international community to manage these destructive
relationships have proved, on the whole, to be less than effective. Although
there are examples of policies which have had degrees of success in reducing
the relationship between violence and economic activity, the long-term
impact of these policies in creating negative peace economies, let alone
positive peace economies, has been limited. The reasons for such failures will
be explored, setting out the need and justification for the more holistic and
structural forms of analysis which characterise the remainder of the book.
Tools of transformation: the logic of policies employed 
The DSI has created new and reformulated ongoing policies in its mission to
transform war economies. Its repertoire consists of a range of programmes
which attempt to prevent actors from using profits acquired through the trade
of commodities or other economic transactions to fund violent campaigns.
These same policies also seek to limit the degree to which criminal actors can
take advantage of insecure environments for profit or personal gain. Broadly
speaking, this set of reforms can be divided between the targeted and the
general. The former directly tackle the trade of a specific commodity or
economic practice, while the latter takes a broader approach, seeking to halt
or prevent the development of a relationship between economic profit and
political violence more generally. The justification of each individual policy as
a tool of transformation, why these policies should work in theory, is set out
below.
Targeted policies
Targeted policies which seek to manage the trade of a specific conflict
commodity have received the greatest amount of attention. One of these
strategies, the eradication or destruction of a commodity, has proved a
dominant approach where the war economy primarily involves the trade of
illicit drugs. The most notorious example of this approach is the aerial
spraying of coca crops as part of Plan Colombia, a US-sponsored assistance
strategy aimed in part at eradicating drug production in Colombia. While this
programme can be seen primarily as an attempt by the US to decrease the
amount of cocaine flowing into the United States (and the crime associated
15
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with this trade), it is also considered to be a means by which actors can
diminish the power of the drug cartels, known to be linked to various para-
military groups in Latin America. Similar eradication plans have been used in
areas of Afghanistan where there has been a preference for physical eradica-
tion over the more controversial chemical and aerial methods.
Eradication plans are often closely linked to wider military responses. Plan
Colombia also provides technical and financial assistance to aid the Colombian
government in their military campaign against the drug cartels and the paramil-
itaries associated with them. Likewise, increased violence related to the drugs
industry in Mexico has led its government to increase the role of the country’s
army in combating the drugs industry, highlighting actors’ willingness to initi-
ate sizeable military responses against activities which threaten the safety of citi-
zens, state institutions (in the case of Mexico, the police and judiciary have
increasingly become targets of the drug cartels) and the security of international
borders. However, the option of military force is not only used in cases of drug
based-war economies (Le Billon and Nicholls, 2007). For example, private mili-
tary companies were used to clear Sierra Leone’s diamond fields of rebel groups in
the 1990s. International peacekeeping troops may also, inadvertently, find
themselves involved in the policing of war economy activity if their mandates
include monitoring and controlling international borders or helping to establish
rule of law. However, this involvement is often de facto, and not a deliberate strat-
egy of war economy transformation. 
There are other, less militaristic, strategies which also focus on the
management and governance of particular commodities and economic activ-
ities. In non-conflict-affected cases, these schemes are more generally referred
to as Commodity Tracking Systems, but are increasingly being considered in
the management of conflict commodities (Crossin, Hayman and Taylor,
2003). The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is the pre-eminent
example of this approach. After years of negotiation between relevant stake-
holders, including the governments of diamond producing and importing
states, the diamond industry and various NGOs, the KPCS came into effect in
2003 and sought to end the relationship between the trade of rough diamonds
and violent conflict in Africa. Accompanied by high-profile media campaigns
in North America and Europe, the issue of ‘blood diamonds’ rose quickly up
the international policy agenda, creating political and public pressure to end
the relationship between the trade of diamonds and the political violence.
Similar certification schemes have been considered, though not implemented,
for other conflict commodities including timber which is known to contribute
to incidents of violence in several states including Liberia and Cambodia as
well as for the trade of minerals and compounds such as coltan which have
become a defining feature of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC). 
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A related cluster of targeted policies, which can broadly be referred to as
resource governance initiatives, are also central to transformation. Including
privatisation, anti-corruption/transparency programmes and resource-shar-
ing mechanisms, this body of reforms seeks to improve public and private man-
agement systems related to resources, thus preventing them from being used to
fuel violence. Effective privatisation, discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6,
has emerged as a key strategy within the resource governance agenda. Of
course, many of the resources which become part of conflict dynamics have
been privatised prior to the outbreak of war, with the struggle over the benefits
of privatisation sometimes fuelling violence. In such cases, the DSI often
attempts to further regulate the industry by trying to increase levels of 
transparency and perceived fairness in terms of who is eligible to participate in
the privatised industry and to where/whom the accrued profits flow.
Alternatively, where conflict commodities have primarily been under govern-
ment control, new privatisation plans may be implemented. Underpinning the
focus on new or improved privatisation are concerns that profits from indus-
tries which are not ‘properly’ privatised can be used by political actors to fur-
ther their violent crackdowns on political enemies or that governmental power
to grant access to industries results in political actors meting out control of
resources to political supporters at the expense of political opponents (leading
to or deepening internal political conflict). As such, when resources are held
purely in the public-political realm they are seen as a potential source of con-
flict. Privatisation is seen as a way of removing the possibility of such political
abuse of resources. Its aim is to ensure that political (and therefore potentially
violent) competition over resources is replaced by a more neutral mode of com-
petition based on the efficiency of competing private interests which are
focused on maximising financial wealth as opposed to maximising political
power (Hayman and Crossin, 2005; Swanson, Oldgard and Lunde, 2003).
Referring to such resource governance plans as ‘ultra liberal codes’ Kuditshini
(2008) notes how these programmes aim to increase and monitor transparen-
cy in regard to who industries are privatised to, ensuring that privatisation
works in theory as well as in practice and that newly privatised industries do
not simply become another commodity over which political rivals can wage
war. As an example, privatisation of key industries in both Sierra Leone,
Angola and the DRC has been occurring in earnest since at least the 1980s,
often at the request of actors such as the World Bank and IMF. However, these
earlier processes of privatisation are often considered part of the problem in
terms of the growth of war economies – the opportunity to control privatised
industries becoming part of complex patronage systems, increasing rather
than decreasing political tensions in countries. Therefore, renewed privatisa-
tion programmes alongside strict anti-corruption and transparency measures
have been introduced in an attempt to rectify such problems.
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Alongside privatisation and anti-corruption initiatives, resource gover-
nance agendas may also include specific resource-sharing schemes. While
there are several models for resource sharing (Le Billon and Nichols, 2007),
all are premised on the belief that in sharing the wealth, or at least in sharing
the means through which this wealth is governed, resources will cease to be
fought over violently. Many post-Cold War peace agreements have included
sections related to the sharing of conflict commodities and resources
including the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999 which brought a temporary
peace to Sierra Leone and the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 which for a time was
successful in easing tensions in Angola (Le Billon and Nichols, 2007). In
some cases, agreements specifically allocate a portion of resources or control
thereof to former combatants or political groups. Other sharing agreements
are more general, focusing instead on ensuring a broader sharing of
resources that benefit the country as a whole, thereby reducing grievances
over the dispersal of resource wealth. An example of this latter approach to
resource sharing and management is the Chad–Cameroon Petroleum
Development and Pipeline Project (CCPP) which attempted to prevent oil
from becoming an enabling factor of violent conflict in Chad. In this case,
the World Bank-supported scheme was seen as a way of preventing the
president from using oil revenues to support and curry favour with his own
clan in the north and his political supporters (Kojucharov, 2007; Pegg,
2009) and in turn spread the wealth of the oil revenues more evenly across
a diverse, religiously divided and underdeveloped nation. Theoretically, the
increased transparency of this scheme would not only limit the degree to
which oil revenue could be used by actors in the ongoing and latent conflict
experienced in Chad over past decades, but would also increase the levels of
development across the country, decreasing levels of poverty and thus
preventing societal injustices that could in the future erupt into more conflict.
In this case, revenue sharing and management is seen not only as a means
of creating a negative peace economy (by preventing groups from using oil
revenues to seize or retain power), but also as a means for moving towards
a positive peace economy insofar as it was meant to literally spread the
wealth amongst citizens.
Another option in the transformation toolbox includes formal political
and economic sanctions. For example, the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) introduced sanctions in 2000 which prohibited the importation of
rough diamonds from Sierra Leone by all member states (UNSC Resolution
1306/2000). This was done in an attempt to curtail a dominant source of
funding for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels who were waging a
war against the government. Similar sanctions were put in place to limit the
ability of UNITA, the pro-independence party in Angola, to continue its
struggle against the government (UNSC Resolution 1173/1998). Sanctions
18
Building a peace economy?
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 18
as a tool of transformation are closely associated with the process of naming
and shaming. When formal sanctions are seen as too severe or politically
unfeasible, actors may be named and shamed by members of the DSI for their
participation in conflict-related trade. Formal reports by the UN, statements
by political leaders and media campaigns led by NGOs can all be used to instil
a sense of guilt or embarrassment on actors in an attempt to alter their
behaviour. A clear example of the naming and shaming approach is found in
attempts to manage the resource dimension of the DRC conflict. The UN’s
Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
and Other Forms of Wealth in the DRC (UNSC 2002a) publicly named and
shamed eighty-five companies it believed to be contributing to or taking
advantage of insecurity in the DRC for personal or financial gain (Feeney and
Kenny, 2005). Companies listed in the final report include Citibank New York
(US), International Diamond Industries (Israel) and Banro-Resources Corp
(Malaysia/Canada). Home governments of the companies involved were
chastised for not abiding by international obligations to ensure their
companies act responsibly while conducting business abroad (Feeney and
Kenny, 2005: 345) and the panel also placed much blame on the govern-
ments and armies of Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda for their role in exploiting
resources in conquered areas of the DRC. Further, the report attaches a degree
of blame to some of the DSI’s largest guiding actors for turning a blind eye to
the exploitation of Congolese resources. Saving some of its harshest criticism
for the World Bank, the authors of the report find that 
Notes exchanged between World Bank staff clearly show that the Bank was
informed about a significant increase in gold and diamond exports from [Uganda]
that produces very little of these minerals . . . In the case of Uganda . . . the World
Bank never questioned the increasing exports of resources and in one instance a
staff member even defended it . . . The Bank not only encouraged Uganda and
Rwanda indirectly by defending their case, but equally gave the impression of
rewarding them by proposing these countries for the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries debt relief initiative. (UNSC, 2001, paragraphs 188–189)
This document attempted to expand notions of guilt regarding the realities of
the DRC’s war economy by highlighting the important though varied role of
both domestic and foreign actors. 
Not all targeted policies are focused on prohibition, eradication or punish-
ment. For example, alternative livelihood (AL) schemes are becoming
increasingly popular in the fight against war economies. In these policies, the
focus is not on removing or prohibiting a particular activity, but on creating
new opportunities – encouraging and enabling actors to engage in economic
activities which support peace, not war. Here, there is an acceptance of the
fact that some actors who support war economies do not necessarily support
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the violence of which war economies are a part and perhaps engage in these
economic activities as a means of supporting themselves and their families. In
theory, if these actors can be encouraged to, and equipped with the capacity
to, engage in other forms of economic activity, participation in war economies
will be diminished. These schemes have been led domestically in countries
such as Thailand to deal with domestic drug production issues, to a certain
degree of success (Buxton, 2006), but more notably have been used by the DSI
in Colombia and Afghanistan, where farmers cultivating drug crops have
been encouraged, and equipped with the tools, to produce other crops such as
wheat and fruit. 
General policies
A second category of responses involves policies which are less targeted on a
specific commodity or economic activity and instead is made up of more
generic reforms that are implemented as part of the standard international
response to conflict-affected states. These policies are not a response to the
specificities of war economies themselves, though elements of the reform may
be altered to target this problem. The impact of these reforms on war economy
transformation can be considered more tangential – the reforms are seen as
desirable in and of themselves, but have the additional benefit of contributing
to war economy transformation. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) initia-
tives, for example, aim to create a set of standards by which foreign companies
are expected to (voluntarily) abide. Commonly enshrined in such codes are
guidelines on how private companies should act in conflict-affected areas in
order to prevent their activities from contributing to or benefiting from
political violence. Initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the OECD’s Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises provide a foundation for companies and their share-
holders who are seeking to minimise or reverse their negative impact on
conflict dynamics. Several well-known cases, such as shareholder pressure on
Talisman Energy to address its role in the Sudanese conflict, are illustrative of
the increasing pressure to hold companies in ‘zones of peace’ accountable for
their contribution to political economies of violence and for companies them-
selves to consider their potential role in violence before becoming deeply
entrenched in the conflict dynamic. Linked to CSR programmes, Export Credit
Agencies, government agencies which provide support for home companies
conducting business abroad, have also recognised the need to ensure that the
companies which they support are acting responsibility (Hildyard, 2005).
Bodies such as Canada’s export development agency, the EDC, now also
engage in extensive CSR reviews in regard to the Canadian corporations
which they support. Other national governments, specifically those in Nordic
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countries, have also introduced national strategies on CSR in an attempt to
ensure responsible behaviour of companies based within their borders
(Gjølberg, 2010). 
Even more broadly, strengthening the rule of law within conflict-affected
states is also seen as having a strong impact on transforming economies of
war and in pre-empting any future relationship between economic incentives
and violence from taking root. Discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, this set
of reforms encompasses several distinct programmes including security sector
reform (SSR), judicial reform and customs reform. Improving the efficiency of
the police is considered central in combating the production and trade of illicit
drugs, as seen in Afghanistan where the new Afghan National Police are at
the forefront of the drug eradication programme. Special investigative units
such as organised crime or money laundering task forces are also seen as a key
tool as they work to detect and limit the degree to which the profits from
conflict-related trade can be realised. The work of the police service is often
complemented by reforms within the customs agency, who find themselves at
the epicentre of the trans-border element of war economies. Often, the largest
financial rewards are made outside the immediate zone of conflict – in the
transit zones and destination zones where the commodity is eventually
consumed. In addition to manning border crossings to physically detect and
reduce trade, customs agencies are also sometimes tasked with detecting
financial irregularities in trade and business documents which might be
masking illegal trade or profits. Again the example of Afghanistan points to a
case where the task of transforming the customs service is seen as essential for
tackling the relationship between the drug industry and violence, with key
actors within the DSI including the World Bank, the UN Development
Programme,  the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the
European Union all contributing to the rebuilding of Afghanistan’s customs
department.
One facet of SSR, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR),
is seen as having a key role to play in war economy transformation. The
financial gains to be made from these economies are believed to create strong
incentives that work to discourage former combatants from laying down their
weapons and abiding by peace plans. This policy option is based on the logic
that if the profits from war are higher than the profits from peace, combatants
will choose to continue their armed struggle due to the financial benefits
involved. Actors who would choose to continue fighting therefore need to be
convinced that peace is indeed the more profitable path. DDR programmes are
deemed central in facilitating this shift in perception. In theory, through
effective DDR schemes which offer ex-combatants realistic and substantial
economic opportunities, potential spoilers are discouraged from continuing
the forms of economic activity which supported a war economy. As an
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example, USAID specifically targeted combatants once involved in the
diamond trade in Sierra Leone in their reintegration programming, helping
these former soldiers create an agricultural co-op in a region once dominated
by the illicit diamond trade (USAID Sierra Leone, 2004b). 
Of course, all of the above security reforms are dependent on a function-
ing judiciary. A legal system which can effectively investigate and prosecute
those believed to be involved in illicit activity, smuggling, tax evasion, money
laundering or peace spoiling, is required for any such reforms to be effective.
Transformation of war economies also requires effective security and judicial
institutions at the global level, and as such the DSI has created and continues
to strive for improvements in international intelligence, security and legal
regimes. For example, the transnational nature of many war economies and
the transfer of profits from these activities through global financial mecha-
nisms requires increased monitoring and control. It has therefore been
suggested that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money laundering
could potentially be used to flag transactions which are suspected of being
linked to the trade of conflict commodities. Though the FATF is not currently
mandated with this task (Winer, 2005), it has since the 1990s been used to
monitor and flag transactions potentially linked to money laundering
schemes (Arnone and Padoan, 2008; Helleiner, 1999), and therefore already
has a role to play in managing war economies. Multiple international conven-
tions and institutions including the UN Convention against Transnational
Organised Crime, the Council of Europe’s GRECO programme, the Offshore
Group of Bank Supervisors and the Wolfberg Group are also presently set up
to address issues of financial transparency, corruption and money laundering
and thus currently contribute to the transformation of war economies
through the tracking and investigation of illegal financial transactions
(Winer, 2005; Winer and Roule, 2003). 
Multiple international security bodies are also involved in the tracking
and investigation of the illicit side of war economies. Many of these bodies
have been set up to deal specifically with the global drug trade, transnational
organised crime or global terrorism, but due to the connections between these
activities and many war economies, have been or could potentially be adapted
to target war economies. Specifically, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), Interpol, Europol and the intelligence agencies of many countries
currently track, investigate and help bring to prosecution actors involved in
the illegal (and transnational) facets of war economies. The World Customs
Organization (WCO) is also working to increase its ability to monitor and
harmonise cross-border trade systems, a task that has been given increased
support since the September 11th attacks (Winer, 2005). Courts in countries
outside the immediate zones of conflict can also be used to prosecute actors
when the above agencies are able to supply requisite evidence. Along with
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criminal prosecution, civil claims against those contributing to conflict-
related trade could be heard by courts in third party countries. For example, it
has been suggested that international firms could be tried under the US Alien
Tort Claims Act (Hoffman, 2005) In two cases, Doe v. Unocal and Roe v.
Unocal, Burmese citizens brought charges against the American company,
alleging that gross human rights abuses were committed as the company
worked with the Burmese government to secure a pipeline project (Hoffman,
2005). Although this case was eventually resolved through a confidential
settlement as opposed to a court ruling, the ability of the claimants to bring
the case to the American courts in the first place undoubtedly had a strong
impact on the final settlement. It is also possible that international legal
venues such the International Criminal Court (ICC) and special war crimes
tribunals could in the future prosecute for war economy related economic-
crimes (Schabas, 2005). 
Effectiveness of transformation policies: evidence and explanations
Given the geographical scope, variance in the activities which constitute war
economies and the range of policies which attempt to manage these activities,
analyses of war economy transformation are necessarily diverse. This wide-
ranging body of work is reviewed below. Through an engagement with these
studies, the unique and idiosyncratic problems related to individual tools of
transformation are highlighted – a mode of analysis that is undoubtedly useful
for policy makers seeking to improve upon ongoing and future policies.
However, what this policy by policy review also reveals are recurring
concerns and themes which require us to question whether there are wider,
more generaliseable themes and concerns which underpin attempts at
political economic transformation. Such questions will be returned to at the
end of the chapter.
Targeted drug eradication 
An obvious place to begin this is discussion is with one of the most oft-assessed
areas of transformation – attempts to eradicate drug crops in Latin America
and Central Asia. While illustrating limited degrees of success, statistical
evidence requires us to remain sceptical of the DSI’s effectiveness in this field.
Reports on the growth of the opium trade in Afghanistan point to the inability
of the NATO coalition to eradicate this fundamental structure of
Afghanistan’s war economy; while there are reports of overall reductions in
some parts of the country, many areas, including those with the greatest
levels of violence, continue to register high or even increased levels of produc-
tion. Reports from 2006 reveal a 59 per cent increase over 2005 levels
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(UNODC, 2006: iv) with a further 17 per cent increase in poppy cultivation in
2007 (UNODC, 2007: iii). The official UN survey from 2010 reveals little to no
progress in terms of overall reductions in opium cultivation, though all
provinces which had been classified as poppy free in previous years remained
so in 2010, suggesting a consolidation of some previous gains (UNODC/GOA,
2010). Similar statistics can be found in relation to the cultivation of coca in
Colombia. While surveys conducted in 2009 reveal that coca cultivation was
at its lowest levels for the century, down 16 per cent from the previous year
(UNODC/GOC, 2010: 12), one has to question the sustainability of these
gains, given that in this same period there were marked increases in some
areas of the country including Cordoba, which saw an increase of 63 per cent
between 2008 and 2009, and Cauca, which saw a 385 per cent increase in
cultivation between 2004 and 2009 (UNODC/GOC, 2010: 16). 
A wealth of analysis exists regarding failures in this area of programming,
pointing to multiple problems with this approach to transformation (Buxton,
2006; Dávalos, Bejarano and Correa, 2009; Dion and Russler, 2008; Felbab-
Brown, 2009; Goodhand, 2008; Mercille, 2012; Oehme, 2010; Vargas,
2011). Several studies provide evidence of a ‘balloon effect’ whereby reduc-
tions in one area lead to cultivation being pushed to and increasing in other
areas. This has been observed in studies in Colombia, where eradication in
some regions is believed to have led to increases in cultivation in areas previ-
ously considered marginal in the drug war such as Antioquia and Bolivar
(Buxton, 2006; Oehme, 2010; Yang, 2008). It has also been noted that the
eradication efforts in Colombia have been a causal factor in terms of increased
levels of production in Peru and Bolivia (Buxton, 2006). In such instances, the
war economy is not so much being transformed as displaced. Eradication of
supply might also have perverse impacts. If demand for the drug remains the
same, reduced supply can increase the amount paid for the crops, increasing
the payoff for farmers willing to engage in the risk of drug crop cultivation
(Goodhand, 2005). There are also health and environmental issues in regard
to chemical and aerial eradication techniques (Buxton, 2006; Sherret, 2005)
and concerns have been raised regarding the impact on the livelihoods of the
poor, as in destroying crops, actors are also destroying a coping strategy of
many civilians. For example, as Goodhand notes in his assessment of eradica-
tion in Afghanistan, ‘the destruction of the fields of the more vulnerable (and
politically unconnected) farmers subsequently drove up debts so that poor
households had little choice but to grow poppy for the next year’ (2005: 212).
Studies such as these point not only to the inability of eradication programmes
to transform war economies in the negative sense, but also illustrate how
these types of programmes can actually move us further away from a positive
peace economy; eradication programmes may actually reduce the economic
opportunities for the poor and have negative health impacts on populations,
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manifestations of structural violence that disproportionately affect the poor
and those in rural areas in which drugs crops are cultivated. 
Militarised solutions
Similar assessments can be made of military responses to these economies. As
seen with the ‘balloon effect’ discussed above, the use of hard security tactics
via the military can potentially spread drug cultivation further afield. For
example, the militarisation of anti-drugs initiatives has ‘accelerated the pace
of fragmentation and displacement in the illicit sector’ (Buxton, 2006: 133).
The use of military tactics also increases the likelihood of civilian casualties.
With innocent civilians getting caught in the crossfire between the military
and those involved in the drug trade, political or physical security is being
pursued at the expense of human security. This is associated with the increase
in human rights abuses that often increase with military involvement (Dunn,
2001). In line with this, the militarisation of the war on drugs (or any
commodity) can also be seen as a direct threat to democratic governance and
freedoms. Exploring the increasing role of the army in Mexico’s battle against
the drug trade, Lindau notes that the government’s militarised strategy
‘increases the power of the least-transparent, least-accountable portions of
the regime’ (2011: 177–178). 
When militarisation is perceived to have been chosen due to external
pressure from the guiding actors within the DSI, there are also concerns
regarding state sovereignty and the legitimacy of governments. If the use of
the military is largely seen as appeasing powerful international actors, as
opposed to a strategy chosen by the relevant national leadership and their
constituencies, the power of the state and its leaders may be called into
question, threatening political stability in an already weakened state. Such
external interference is illustrated by a warning to the Bolivian electorate by
then US Ambassador Manuel Rocha who prior to the 2002 Bolivian elections
stated, ‘I want to remind the Bolivian electorate that if they vote for those who
want Bolivia to return to exporting cocaine, that will seriously jeopardize any
future aid to Bolivia from the United States’ (van Cott, 2003 as quoted in
Buxton, 2006: 135). Those against the militarised approach to drug eradica-
tion supported by the United States were threatened with serious political and
economic consequences, an obvious interference in internal political
processes by external actors. Governments seen as going against the desires
and wishes of domestic electorates in order to appease powerful external
actors risk alienating their own populations, but when military responses
come from external actors themselves, the threat to national sovereignty is
even greater. The use of private military companies such as Executive
Outcomes to clear the diamond fields in Sierra Leone or the use of private
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security companies by multinational corporations to protect their own activi-
ties in conflict zones are clear examples of this. In such cases one of the
markers of a strong sovereign state, monopoly over the use of force, is chal-
lenged and usurped by private or external entities, threatening both the
sovereignty and legitimacy of the state itself. In this regard, the use of the
military to eradicate or control elements of the war economy might result in
immediate, short-term successes, but could lead to long-term problems as the
legitimacy of the state is questioned. 
The use of the military in transformation is further called into question by
the fact that in many cases, the militaries are themselves part of the war
economy. International military actors are also known to have become
entangled in political economies of violence, contributing either directly or
indirectly to illicit economic activity, as discussed in forthcoming chapters.
This must cause one to question the motivation of some of these actors to take
seriously their role in transformation. For international police and peacekeep-
ing forces not involved in the war economy itself and who are committed to its
transformation, a range of other problems exist. Because their role in
managing the political economic aspects of conflict tends to be implicit as
opposed to explicitly stated in their mandates, they are often not equipped
(either in terms of technology or staff capacity) to act effectively. They will also
be confronted with the problems of authority and legitimacy as external
actors attempting to police foreign populations (Cockayne, 2009; Cockayne
and Lupel, 2009b; Felbab-Brown, 2009; Gavigan, 2009; Holt and Boucher,
2009). 
Resource governance and privatisation
Other targeted policies, albeit less controversial, have likewise been ques-
tioned in terms of their effectiveness on transformation. Although
occasionally heralded as a success in terms contributing to overall reductions
in conflict diamonds and as prime example of cooperation between states,
NGOs, MNCs and consumers, the Kimberley Process has faced much criticism
(Cooper, 2011; Crossin, Hayman and Taylor, 2003; Hilson and Clifford,
2010; Maconachie, 2009; Smillie, 2005; Winer, 2005; Turner, 2006; van
Dijck, 2009; Wilson, 2011; Zulu and Wilson, 2009). For example, it has been
condemned for lacking substantive capacity for monitoring and enforcement.
Participants are largely expected to self-regulate and self-monitor, presenting
their own records as proof of export levels. In some cases the capacity for
monitoring and management by national actors is limited and some mecha-
nisms are believed to be plagued with corruption. Further, powerful actors
have limited the ability of other actors within the process to gather requisite
data. Russia and Israel both sought to prevent the release of data in terms of
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statistics on diamond trading activities in their countries or by corporations
based within their borders (Smillie, 2005: 60). 
At the same time, there is evidence that less powerful actors remain on the
losing end of the process. Hilson and Clifford (2010) illustrate how the suspen-
sion of local diamond trading, whilst investigations were conducted into
Ghana’s diamond trade vis-a-vis Kimberley regulations, had dire conse-
quences for small diamond communities and local producers. Even though
Ghana was eventually exonerated, the period of disruption led to economic
upheaval locally. Further, the diamond industry in West Africa continues to
be characterised by asymmetries of power and wealth (Cooper, 2011)
meaning that small, local producers run the risk of being excluded from the
industry altogether as obtaining the requisite licenses and compliance certifi-
cates is expensive and often requires particular political connections (Wilson,
2011). And in terms of related policies offering the citizens of Sierra Leone
opportunities for reconstruction and development, the scheme has had
limited success with only US$280 000 of the $37 million trade finding its way
back to local diamond communities (USAID Sierra Leone, 2002; see also
Cooper, 2011). Even with the establishment of the Diamond Area Community
Fund, which is supposed to ensure that some of the wealth created by the
diamond trade feeds into local development initiatives, there has been little
progress in turning diamonds into a resource for peace (Maconachie, 2009). 
Similar problems are identified with the use of privatisation schemes as a
means of governing the trade of commodities. It has been documented that
pre-conflict privatisation schemes undertaken in countries such as Sierra
Leone and the DRC have in fact contributed to the growth and entrenchment
of war economies (Le Billon, 2003; Pugh and Cooper, 2004). The spoils of and
opportunities presented by privatisation processes, whether pre- or post-
conflict, are seen as essentially enriching the elite and creating a commodity
over which actors can wage war. In the post-conflict setting especially,
privatisation processes can reward and enrich former war entrepreneurs by
creating opportunities for these actors to legalise or legitimise gains made
during the conflict. If war entrepreneurs and related criminal elements are
allowed to influence these reforms (as they often are due to the economic and
political power accrued during the conflict) policies will have little impact in
terms of redistributing wealth. Such issues will be explored in greater detail in
Chapter 6.
Resource-sharing schemes do not appear to fare much better in terms of
transformation. The former RUF leader Foday Sankoh, for example, briefly
held the position of Minister of Natural Resources, giving him a great deal of
control over mining concessions. The appointment was largely granted in
return for his agreement to participate in peace plans. This arrangement
lasted only a matter of months, with the RUF returning to their violent
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struggle and exploitation of the country’s diamond wealth. In this case,
resource sharing proved to be a short-term fix which neither appeased the key
belligerents in the conflict nor the general corps of combatants – illicit
diamond trading continued to be a lucrative enterprise, and those fighting for
more ideological or political reasons do not appear to have been swayed by
political manoeuvrings at the elite level. 
Furthermore, in terms of resource sharing in the wider sense, a spread of
resource wealth that would benefit conflict-affected societies as a whole, these
schemes are again found lacking with a global elite (as opposed to local popu-
lations) benefiting from new schemes. In Sierra Leone, the key international
trading relationships which fuelled the destructive link between diamonds
and violence were barely disrupted. As Pugh and Cooper document in their
study on Sierra Leone, ‘Old firms linked to the conflict are now returning to
claim their concessions. Most notably, the Canadian mining firm
DiamondWorks’ (Pugh and Cooper, 2004: 116). This problem can be linked
to the evidence that resource governance reforms tend to favour internation-
al actors (primarily MNCs). Little effort has been made in terms of attempting
to privatise to domestic actors (Kuditshini, 2008). As international actors
have greater ability and capacity to make successful bids and are (rightly or
wrongly) believed to act more ethically, much of the resource wealth and
profits leave the host country. Also, with externally led privatisation, anti-
corruption and resource governance schemes, the role of the state is
diminished and the state–citizen relationship is pushed to the background as
forging and maintaining strong relationships with foreign companies and
international governing institutions becomes the primary task. Critiqued by
those concerned with global economic justice, this control over resources in
the South by powerful northern actors is another form of structural violence
insofar as it limits the degree to which domestic actors can push for more
accountable forms of governance. 
Finally, regardless of the success of these various governance schemes,
there is no way of ensuring that legal and legitimate profit streams will not
eventually be used to wage war. Even in the ‘cleanest’ of processes, where
there is little corruption and income is channelled transparently to the appro-
priate actors, the fact remains that governments will still profit through the
taxing of profits or via payments for the granting of mining concessions.
Although funds acquired in this way are ‘legitimate’ and ‘legal’, nothing
prevents governments from using said funds to commit human rights abuses
against its own citizens or political enemies. In the case of the
Chad–Cameroon pipeline project, the president spent $4.5 million of the ‘legit-
imately’ earned $25 million signing bonus from oil companies on arms to
strengthen government troops which were confronting unrest from various
rebel groups in the country. Though this money was returned following inter-
28
Building a peace economy?
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 28
national pressure, future changes to the agreement allowed for increased
spending on arms using funds from the project (Kojucharov, 2007). Indeed,
the ability of the CCPP to fundamentally alter conflict dynamics in the region
was perhaps overstated – ‘the World Bank grossly overestimated its ability to
alter these existing institutional patterns and it failed to appreciate the extent
to which oil wealth would amplify many of Chad’s pre-existing problems such
as corruption and political instability’ (Pegg, 2009: 312; see also Winters and
Gould, 2011). 
Sanctions and shaming
With concerns over the effectiveness of voluntary management schemes,
more forceful policy tools such as sanctions are often adopted. However, these
have also been assessed and found wanting. At a basic operational level, there
are a series of challenges which make the enforcement of sanctions difficult.
These challenges are largely a result of lack of political will and capacity by
key actors. Sanctions require a great deal of international cooperation and
agreement which for political (and economic) reasons is often lacking. In
regard to addressing the regional war economy in West Africa, for example,
both France and China blocked attempts to place sanctions on the trade of
Liberian timber (Atkinson, 2008). Sanctions can also have a perverse effect
on the goal of transformation by increasing the incentives for smuggling. As
Andreas notes, ‘[s]anctions and embargos inflate profits and create economic
opportunity structures for those best connected in the world of covert
commerce. This strengthens the hand of criminal actors, fuels cross-border
black market networks, and encourages closer ties between political leaders
and organized crime’ (2009: 35). Besides this, there are serious moral hazards
in terms of placing sanctions on war economy participants. Depending on the
language used and their scope, sanctions could inadvertently lend support or
legitimacy to governments engaged in serious human rights abuses. Where
sanctions target only the activity of rebel forces, they may grant an advantage
to one party in the conflict, strengthening one side both politically and
economically and potentially denying smaller non-state groups the right to
self defence (Lunde and Taylor, 2005). 
Similar arguments can be made regarding the use of naming and
shaming. While there have been some successes in the use of this strategy
(Ballentine, 2005), most notably in the massive public relations campaign
which sought to shame diamond companies into addressing their contribu-
tion to several of Africa’s civil wars, there remain serious questions regarding
both its effectiveness and ethical desirability. It is problematic, for example,
that this approach may be used in lieu of more punitive measures such as
sanctions or formal legal proceedings. As Ballentine argues, there is concern
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that a ‘growing reliance on naming and shaming [is] a substitute for more
decisive action. Deprived of subpoena power and lacking any enforcement
capacity of their own, however, expert panels can be only a poor and partial
substitute for determined Security Council and member-state action’ (2005:
455).
Creating documents, reports and media campaigns which implicate
actors in the structures of violent economies may be necessary but not suffi-
cient. Reports might induce actors to change their behaviour unilaterally,
provide a foundation on which actors issue sanctions, or induce states to
change their foreign policies. However, on their own, naming and shaming
tactics offer little more than reputational damage, and even that is often
limited. Certain actors may not be concerned with or threatened by the
tarnishing of their reputations. While some members of the international
community, such as MNCs, NGOs and IFIs, are more cognisant and sensitive
to the impact of reputational damage, other actors are less deterred by such
damage. Organised crime groups, terrorist organisations, individuals such as
Victor Bout (one of the world’s most infamous arms dealers) and some states
will not alter their behaviour because of this strategy. 
Of course, this discussion is also mired by ethical concerns. Inevitably one
must consider who has the power to name and shame, where that power
comes from and how it is being used. Persaud (2001), for example, raises
concerns over the naming and shaming by the OECD of a group of relatively
small and powerless nations for engaging in ‘harmful’ tax and financial
policies – noting how tax regimes in OECD countries engaging in similar
practices where labelled using less pejorative terms such as ‘preferential tax
regime’ or ‘potentially harmful’ (2001: 202; Tsingou, 2010). One needs to
consider the power of an actor such as the OECD to actively name, shame and
thus punish less powerful actors given the fact that such power is not recipro-
cal. An OECD or UN panel shaming actors in the developing world carries with
it greater consequences for state and sub-state actors than the voices of the
citizens in conflict-affected zones attempting to shame the powerful actors in
the DSI. While powerful institutions in the global system are able to essential-
ly blacklist weaker actors, there is not a similar mechanism which would
allow for smaller players in the international sphere to likewise effectively call
into disrepute the activities of powerful actors. Related to this, there is also
concern that processes of naming and shaming are not governed by the clear
evidentiary rules of legal proceedings, that misinformation or tainted infor-
mation can find its way into reports for political reasons, leading to
problematic political consequences.
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Alternative livelihoods
Moving on in the assessment of transformation policies, the optimism
surrounding alternative livelihood (AL) programmes initially appears justi-
fiable given its recognition that other transformation projects can have
negative impacts on individuals’ livelihoods and that unless policies are
initiated to replace what has been destroyed, such approaches will be inef-
fective. This recognition goes some way to moving us towards positive
transformation insofar as it identifies the economic injustices built into other
transformation processes and attempts to rectify them. However, such
optimism must be tempered with existing analyses of these projects. A
number of technical difficulties and financial limitations have been identified
which are believed to severely reduce the effectiveness of AL schemes
(Buxton, 2006; Felbab-Brown, 2009; Mansfield and Pain, 2005; Oehme,
2010; Spellberg and Kaplan, 2010). Incentives for switching from an illicit
economic activity to a licit economic activity are rarely strong enough as the
financial benefits of the former continue to outweigh the benefits of the latter.
In Afghanistan, the income earned by farmers engaged in growing poppies
can be much greater than what would be earned if they farmed one of the
suggested replacement crops – wheat. One study estimated that farmers can
earn up to 1000–2000 lakhs a year for growing poppies, instead of the 20
lakhs they would earn for producing wheat (Goodhand, 2000: 92). Although
wheat prices vary from year to year, the overall utility of shifting to an alter-
native crop can be described as minimal at best. By the UNODC’s own
admission ‘None of Afghanistan’s licit agricultural products can currently
match the gross income per hectare from opium’ (UNODC, 2011: 10). Even
in years where wheat prices have increased, the general trends in the growth
in the price of opium far outstrip even a decent increase in wheat; the former
seeing an increase of up to 306 per cent between February and March 2011
(UNODC, 2011: 10). In Colombia, the average income of a coca-growing
family in 2006 was $5194, compared to an average of only $2413 for
families not involved in this crop (Dávalos, Bejarano and Correa, 2009: 382).
An interesting adaptation of the AL approach, ‘venture development’ has
been put forward, which encourages producers of illicit crops not to simply
switch to growing an alternative crop but to simultaneously add value to
their new crop by producing a marketable good – for example if switching
to growing coffee beans, the grower could increase their income by then
producing espresso coffee soda (Spellberg and Kaplan, 2010). Such an
approach does suggest ways in which the basic economic calculations which
limit the uptake of AL programmes could be overcome, however, even this
approach is unlikely to overcome the other limiting factors of this policy tool.
For example, poor infrastructure such as access to markets and transport
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routes often make shifting to alternative crops infeasible and farmers are often
not provided with the initial inputs or credit to purchase inputs that a shift to
a new crop would entail. Likewise, even if the switch to a new crop is success-
ful, sales, and thus the benefits of making the transition, are not assured.
While smugglers are adept at transferring large quantities of drugs across
difficult terrain and finding willing buyers, the same infrastructure and
market opportunities are not always available to those who have made the
switch to a legal crop. Established trade routes, reliable middle men and a solid
consumer base may not exist for the new commodity. This is made worse by
liberalisation policies that allow for cheap imported agricultural products,
which have therefore undercut the market for domestically grown agri-
products (Buxton, 2006). Other noteworthy problems that have been
identified with this approach include the issue of sequencing – alternative
livelihood projects might be more effective if individuals were able to see that
the benefits of these programmes were stable in the long term. However, the
rapid nature of eradication programmes and their implementation prior to the
stabilisation of alternative livelihood schemes creates a disincentive for indi-
viduals to participate (Buxton, 2006). The benefits of alternative livelihood
projects may also take several years to materialise (Oehme, 2010), again
limiting the degree to which target groups will agree to participate. Finally, all
of the above concerns are related to the fact that AL programming remains
very much underfunded in relation to its cousin policies of eradication and
heavy-handed military and security policies which accompany them. 
Corporate social responsibility
Moving onto analyses of the more general approaches to transformation, one
finds a wealth of critical assessments of corporate social responsibility (CSR)
programmes (Feeney and Kenny, 2005; Hayman and Crossin, 2005;
Hildyard, 2005; Idemudia, 2010; Lunde and Taylor, 2005; Martin-Ortega,
2008; Turner, 2006; Zandvliet, 2005). The most common critique of CSR is
that abiding by these codes remains voluntary – similar to the certification
schemes discussed earlier, actors are not legally required to commit to these
strategies. Further, as with the naming and shaming policies, there are
concerns that even if many companies agree to abide by such codes they will
simply be replaced by companies less concerned by their corporate image or
under fewer constraints from legal and political pressures at home (Patey,
2007). For example, as Turner argues, 
The withdrawal of western MNCs such as Lundin Petroleum, allowed Eastern
MNCs, largely from India and China, to expand operations in Sudan. Eastern
MNCs thereafter flourished due to their states’ investment in the Government of
Sudan and the absence of human rights pressures from their own civil societies.
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The actions of Chinese and Indian MNCs thus reveal some of the flaws of volun-
tarism. No Chinese state-owned oil enterprises are supporting, endorsing or
participating in the EITI. (2006: 382)
While some companies might commit to CSR for moral reasons and others due
to shareholder or civil society pressure, there are few options in terms of
holding companies to account either legally (through international or
domestic courts) or economically (through sanctions), and those companies
that are willing to voluntarily abide by CSR codes are unlikely to be the
greatest threat in terms of MNCs’ contribution to war economies. 
Further, issues of global economic justice must also be considered. CSR
schemes are primarily created by the world’s most powerful actors – MNCs
and large multi-lateral institutions such as the OECD and the UN. The needs
and desires of the citizens most affected by harmful corporate practices are
rarely taken into account meaning there might be corporate responsibility (as
defined by MNCs) but not corporate accountability to local communities
(Carbonnier, Brugger and Krause, 2011; Idemudia, 2010; Maconachie,
2009; Newell, 2005). This relates to wider concerns that CSR as a tool of
transformation is less effective in regard to the ideal form of positive transfor-
mation which would involve fundamental changes in the modes of global
economic exchange – ‘If we step back from the glitter and fanfare surrounding
the dizzying array of initiatives being launched and take a moment to assess
them, it is plain to see that the majority of current CSR initiatives pose no real
threat to corporate interests or global capitalism’ (Turner, 2006: 383; see also
Macdonald and Macdonald, 2010; Zulu and Wilson, 2009). If we are
concerned with the creation of a positive peace economy as a long-term goal,
the ways in which the MNCs operate in a globalised capitalist market would
also need to be addressed. 
Rule of law and security reforms
Unlike the study of CSR, which has received much analysis in terms of its
role in war economy transformation, other areas classed as general tools of
transformation have received notably less attention. The use of rule of law
reforms, for example, is rarely studied specifically in relation to war economy
transformation and it is therefore difficult to summarise the current thinking
surrounding its effectiveness in this regard. Some studies have considered the
potential role of domestic legal reforms in regard to controlling and managing
natural resources and post-conflict crime (Gavigan, 2009; Matthew and
Hammill, 2007). However, whilst there is also an extensive literature on
security sector reform (SSR) in general (Donais, 2005; Gbla, 2006; Hood,
2006; Vetschera and Damian, 2006) most of these studies are on the area
of reform more generally and do not address the specific issues under scrutiny
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here. These areas of reform will be more carefully explored in Chapter 5.
Likewise, there has been limited analysis of the role of customs services in
terms of the transformation of war economies. Much of the literature on this
reform area addresses customs agencies’ roles in terms of econometric or tax-
related policies (Maskus and Rioja, 2007; Södersten and Reed, 1994), or
outlines techniques which can be used to modernise customs agencies (de
Wulf and Sokol, 2004; Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae, 2006;
Hors, 2001). There are, however, a few studies which consider the role of
customs services in dealing with trans-border crime such as smuggling
(Junninen and Aromaa, 2000; Velkova and Georgievski, 2004; Winer, 2005)
where it is argued that corruption within agencies and the perceived inability
of the judiciary to prosecute those charged with customs offences are key
reasons for the ineffectiveness of customs services in fighting illicit trade
(Velkova and Georgievski, 2004). On a purely functional level, the amount of
global trade further reduces the utility of customs services in physically
detecting illicit trade related to conflict. Customs services simply do not have
the capacity to physically inspect all goods crossing their border – ‘only 3
percent of the nearly 9 million containers that enter the United States every
year are checked’ (Stares, 1996: 69 as quoted in Shelley, 1999). This points
to the constant struggle or tensions between the facilitation of commerce and
the facilitation of enforcement – often with the flow of commerce winning out
(Andreas, 1999). Customs reform will be investigated in greater detail in
Chapter 7, given both its perceived importance, but relative lack of analysis
regarding its effectiveness in transforming war economies.
One security reform, DDR has been given greater attention in terms of
how it relates to war economy transformation (Cockayne, 2009; Fanthorpe
and Maconachie, 2010; Rozema, 2008; Tamagnini and Kraftt, 2010). That
there is more analysis on this aspect of reform is likely down to the belief that
ex-combatants who profit from war economies are likely to continue to use
violence or return to violence if their post-conflict salary is substantially
lower. Similar to AL schemes discussed earlier, there has been a degree of
optimism surrounding DDR, due in part to its focus on creating new opportu-
nities as opposed to simply banning or destroying livelihood strategies.
However, DDR suffers from many of the same operational problems associat-
ed with AL, including corruption, the ongoing superior profits presented by
illicit activity, and limits to the funding available for the reintegration phase.
These operational problems are compounded by the fact that DDR processes in
general were not initially conceived of as a tool for dealing with complex crim-
inality – thus even programmes that may appear successful in managing
traditional combatants may have less success in terms of dealing with the
complex networks that support illicit trade in conflict-affected areas. There are
several reasons for this, including the fact that it is often only ‘formal’ combat-
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ants who qualify for assistance, meaning that loosely grouped militias or
community protection brigades are not included. This leaves many former
war economy participants without assistance in terms of integrating into a
new peace economy and thus continuing with economic strategies related to
the conflict economy. The exclusion of criminal elements from DDR planning
is also problematic – as seen in Haiti where the DDR process ignored the
problem of gangs and other criminal actors (Cockayne, 2009). Rozema’s
(2008) study of criminality and an urban DDR programme is also particular-
ly insightful in this regard. In assessing several of the limitations of the process
in Colombia the author is quite clear in terms of a key underlying problem,
namely that in regard to the localised political economy of violence ‘the
network contains many nodes – paramilitaries, drug traffickers, gangs – and
with the demobilization of the paramilitaries, only part of the node has been
unravelled’ (Rozema, 2008: 449).
A much wider issue regarding the DDR approach in relation to transfor-
mation surrounds concerns that this strategy amounts to a ‘buying of the
peace’ (Le Billon, 2003) – it does little to resolve the underlying issues or griev-
ances which may have caused individuals to take up arms in the first place
and in fact legitimises the logic of violence insofar as former belligerents
appear to be granted an economic advantage in the post-conflict order,
affirming the logic of war economies and entrenching unjust political, social
and economic relationships. The focus on dealing with spoilers in DDR
processes can marginalise more progressive structures and actors in society.
A description of the DDR process in Tajikistan is illustrative of several of these
issues. In this case, the state and the international community witnessed a
degree of short-term success when demobilised soldiers were given control
over important economic assets including private and commercial properties,
cotton fields and previously state-owned assets, and a blind eye was turned to
some of their assumed illicit activity such as their participation in the drug
trade (Torjesen and MacFarlane, 2007). This approach to DDR has been
credited with short- to medium-term stability in the country but questions
remain over whether this ‘bought peace’ will hold in the long term, and it has
arguably led to increased levels of criminality in Tajik society. Clearly, while
the issue of potential peace spoilers in the form of ex-combatants must be
addressed, the prominent place accorded to these actors, and the issues of
sustainability and justice related to their sometimes privileged position in
peace accords, needs to be more carefully examined.
At the global level, changes to international rule of law reforms have also
been questioned in terms of their role in managing violent modes of economic
accumulation. Effective international policing, investigation and intelligence
is needed in order to trace and manage the international scope of war
economies. However, a lack of cooperation between actors from different
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countries remains a common theme in analyses of global efforts in this regard,
with one assessment of such schemes noting that ‘information exchange
remains largely bi-lateral, ad hoc and sectoral’ (Winer, 2005: 73; see also
Winer and Roule, 2003). Evaluations of anti-money laundering (AML)
regimes, likewise cite ‘unwillingness of the vast majority of countries to
disclose detailed assessments’ as a major shortcoming (Arnone and Padoan,
2008: 382) with disagreements over jurisdiction and other procedural issues
also limiting effectiveness in this policy area (Tsingou, 2010). Even when
political will exists and cooperation between actors is forthcoming, institu-
tions are handicapped by advances in technology and the skill of many actors
involved in the world of illicit finance – the techniques for evasion often
outpacing techniques for detection (Porteous, 2000). Reliance on informal
banking channels, such as the hawala system (which allows individuals to
transfer money without using ‘official’ financial institutions) may also render
such investigative measures moot. And besides the practicality of monitoring
transfers through such systems, attempts to include such informal money
transfers in AML regimes are ethically problematic. Their inclusion in AML
regimes, for example, is linked to unproven beliefs over their links to terrorism
and they are counter-productive insofar as they drive legitimate business
underground or damage innocent and small actors who are unable to meet
the rising costs of compliance (Lindley, 2009; Tsingou, 2010). Blanket
attempts to dismantle these informal systems also fail to recognise that money
transferred in this way is often a lifeline in terms of humanitarianism and
development (Lindley, 2009).
While the difficulties in gathering intelligence present serious hurdles to
transforming the global facets of war economies, a lack of judicial tools at the
global level is also problematic. The growth of the human rights discourse
from the 1990s accompanied a willingness and substantial investment in
terms of creating international legal mechanisms to deal with human rights
abuses in conflict-affected states. However, in terms of transforming politico-
economic aspects and legacies of conflict, the use of legal tools is less
prominent. Schabas describes a serious gap within international law
regarding the use of legal mechanisms to deal with economically motivated
activities during conflict: ‘the liability of economic actors would not be for
economic crimes, as these are essentially absent from the Rome Statute
[which governs the ICC], save for the war crime of “pillage and plunder”. . .
The prosecutors in the ICTY and ICTR have shown little interest in pursuing
economic actors’ (2005: 427–429). At present, international tribunals and
law are not equipped to deal with the economic activities which may fuel or
accompany conflict (Kopp, 2005). Though testimony was given in relation to
the involvement of Liberia’s Charles Taylor in West Africa’s illicit diamond
trade during his 2010 trial at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, his involve-
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ment in this trade was not part of the criminal indictment itself and was
included as a line of questioning in order to prove more well-established war
crimes. 
As it stands, international tribunals tend to prosecute for only the gravest
and most shocking of war crimes, a category which at the moment does not
include political-economic activities which accompany conflict. International
law, while constantly expanding in terms of its institutions and what it seeks
to legislate, has neither the operational capacity or de facto jurisdiction in
many cases, which would be required to counter the political-economic facets
of modern conflict. There are of course calls to make international law a more
effective tool in this regard, by classifying serious economic crimes as war
crimes (Eichlin, 2009/10; Schaber, 2011) or by allowing international legal
bodies to prosecute these forms of conflict trade under anti-pillage statutes of
the ICC (Lundberg, 2007/8), and some positive developments in terms of the
use of international legal mechanisms to deal with political-economies of
violence can be identified. Hybrid courts in both Bosnia and Kosovo have seen
the international community placing attention on and committing resources
to the prosecution of organised crime and corruption (Eichlin, 2009/10).
This, along with the International Court of Justice ruling against Uganda in a
civil suit regarding the plundering of resources in the DRC (Lundberg,
2007/8), offers evidence of a growing norm over the illegality of illicit
resource trade in conflict zones.
However, in order for this norm to become more fully developed, individ-
ual countries would need to make an explicit decision to prosecute the illicit
activities associated with war economies. Thus far, few countries appear to
have the political will or resources to deliberately target and prosecute the
activities of war entrepreneurs. There are of course some notable exceptions to
this. Sanjivan Ruprah and Leonid Minin have faced prosecution in Europe, in
part for their involvement in arms trading with Charles Taylor, while Gus
Kowenhouven was prosecuted in Holland for violating UN arms sanctions
(Atkinson, 2008: 31). The 2008 capture and arrest of famed arms dealer
Viktor Bout in Bangkok is further evidence of functional international investi-
gation and intelligence cooperation. It is worth noting though that all of these
cases involve arms dealing, suggesting that cooperation and the political will
to use international legal tools are more likely when more traditional security
threats such as weapons are involved – effective cooperation for other conflict
commodities such as timber and coltan appears less forthcoming. 
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Project assessment versus agenda analysis
The above discussion of the range of policies aimed at transformation illus-
trate how this body of reforms requires change in the political, economic and
social spheres, positioning war economy transformation as an exceedingly
diverse but also deeply intrusive project. The role of the DSI in some areas of
reform is more obvious and overt – military responses and support by the USA
via Plan Colombia illustrates an extreme example of the control exerted by
powerful political and security actors, while the dominance of NGOs in the
creation and implementation of the Kimberley protocol reveals the funda-
mental role that development actors also play in transformation projects.
Analysis of the individual policies presented above, and summarised at the
end of this chapter in Table 2.1, while useful in presenting snapshots of the
logic and effectiveness of these specific tools of transformation, provides only
a perfunctory step in producing an overarching analytical framework which
explains the political-economic transformation agenda comprehensively.
Such an approach is necessary given the fact that despite the flaws of these
projects being well documented, the same policies continue to be used across
time and place. 
There are of course some notable attempts to look at transformation more
broadly. These studies, which engage in comparative analysis of crime control
measures and peace operations offer several findings on which future work
can build. For example, such research points to the fact that the public face of
policies is often at odds with what is eventually operationalised, with
Cockayne and Lupel noting that ‘the rhetoric of peace operations tends to
stress “transformation”, but in practice tends to settle for containment’
(2009a: 158). Broader analyses also tend to focus on the problematic process
of ‘criminalisation’ – noting the wider political motivations for classifying
much of the political-economic activities associated with violence as
‘criminal’ and the impact of applying such labels (Andreas and Nadelmann,
2006; Cockayne and Lupel, 2009a; Friesendorf and Penska, 2008). Andreas
and Nadelmann’s (2006) comprehensive historical review of international
law enforcement regimes, whereby changes to the regime are assessed
through liberal, realist and constructivist lenses, provides an excellent
example of this mode of analysis. Their succinct and forthright assessment
regarding what rests at the foundation of international enforcement regimes
is worthy of note in terms of considering future investigations into the war
economy transformation agenda. Through comparative historical analysis,
they argue that 
the internationalization of crime control is primarily the outcome of ambitious
efforts by generations of Western power to export their domestically derived defi-
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nitions of crime . . . some of the most prominent international policing campaigns
continue to grow notwithstanding persistent failure and even counterproductive
consequences, in part because they prop up prohibition norms and reaffirm collec-
tive moral condemnation. (Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006: vii–13)
Such a finding suggests and justifies the need to place powerful actors, such as
those at the top of the DSI, at the centre of analyses. And while comparative
insights from the above disciplines offer us sets of questions and avenues for
further exploration, there remains a need for analytical approaches which
deal more specifically with the transformation of war economies.
Similar calls for and progress towards such frameworks have emerged.
Wennman (2007 and 2011) suggests a fundamental rethink on how the
problems of conflict commodities are perceived and thus acted upon – arguing
that the narrow focus on natural resources is particularly unhelpful and
conflict financing should instead be perceived of as a fluid and complex set of
economic strategies. At the same time, he argues that with the growth of
concepts such as war economies or conflict commodities, resources have been
conceptualised as a ‘problem’, perhaps distracting policy makers from
thinking about ways in which resources and even illicit economic activity can
be integrated more effectively into peacebuilding strategies. Andreas’s
research on the Arizona market in Bosnia, a hub of illicit trade during and
after the war, supports such reconceptualisations, noting that in Bosnia, ‘in
the immediate postwar era, the ability to overcome ethnic divides was
arguably nowhere more advanced than in the clandestine economy’ (2008:
133). Another collection of studies (Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2011) also
goes some way towards bringing together a range of studies with the aim of
thinking more broadly about conflict-related trade and the policies aimed at
its management. Noting that in terms of research on the transformation of
war economies ‘the field remains remarkably under-theorised’ (Pugh, Cooper
and Turner, 2011: 5), their work synthesises a range of case studies, policy
options and conceptual debates related to peacebuilding with the aim of
furthering our understanding of the political-economic aspects of war and
peace more generally. This synthesis concludes that at the foundations of this
aspect of security and development policy are ongoing asymmetries of power
between peacebuilders and the societies being transformed. 
The above findings, related to what can be deemed a war economy trans-
formation agenda, act as a foundation for the remainder of this book.
Concerns over the ways in which resources and illicit trade have come to be
conceptualised, the politics and power imbalances between actors involved in
this policy realm and the impact of these factors emerge as common lines of
inquiry that will help further theorisation in this field. The following chapters
will interrogate these issues of conceptualisation, politics, power and their
impact on practice by exploring how the network of actors involved (the DSI)
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create and manoeuvre through the regimes tasked with transforming war
economies. Examining how the above issues unfold in practice will offer not
only insight into the shape and failures of political-economic transitions, but
also provide frameworks through which future approaches and policies can be
assessed and altered.
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Table 2.1 Tools for war economy transformation: a project assessment approach
Response Examples Problems identified
Eradication/ Aerial eradication of coca ‘Balloon effect’; reductions in supply but 
destruction of plants in Colombia; physical not demand increases payoff; impact on 
commodity eradication of poppy plants in human health and environment; negative
Afghanistan impact on livelihoods
Military responses US financial and technical Accelerates ‘balloon effect’; civilian
assistance to Colombian casualties/human rights abuses;
military for dealing with drug provokes violent response; external
cartels and paramilitaries; interference brings sovereignty and 
use of private military legitimacy concerns; militaries as 
company to clear diamond participants in war economy; 
fields in Sierra Leone; international troops lack mandate or 
international peacekeeping capacity 
troops’ de facto involvement
when mandated to monitor
borders
Industry/ Kimberley Process Voluntary with limited monitoring or 
commodity enforcement; states lack capacity to 
certification and implement; powerful states place limitations
tracking on process to protect own interests; 
loopholes; no redistribution of wealth
Resource Privatisation; anti-corruption Voluntary/lack of enforcement;
governance and transparency measures; governments may still use profits to 
Chad–Cameroon Pipeline purchase arms; creates new commodities 
Project to fight over; rewards/legitimises violence 
and profits made through violence; buying
peace  a short-term solution; international
actors have too much control – threat to
sovereignty and accountability
Sanctions UNSCR 2000/1306 against Humanitarian impact; political will/
the trade of rough diamonds cooperation lacking; limited capacity to 
and UNSCR 1998/1173 to enforce; creates incentives for smuggling; 
limit UNITA’s actions in may benefit one party to the conflict over 
Angola another
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Table 2.1 continued
Response Examples Problems identified
Naming and UN report on resource Used in lieu of (stronger) sanctions; actors 
shaming exploitation in the DRC; not concerned with reputational damage; 
Fowler Report power to name and shame rests with 
powerful actors 
Alternative Afghanistan and Colombia Profit from illicit activities remains high; 
livelihood projects here drug farmers are lack of access to credit/infrastructure; 
encouraged to grow liberalisation makes developing new 
alternative crops or engage in industries difficult; sequencing; corruption; 
other industries limited funding
Corporate social Companies voluntarily abide Voluntary/lack of enforcement; free rider 
responsibility by their own set of standards problem; does not address wider economic/
or an external code such as social impact of resource exploitation; does 
the EITI or OECD guidelines; not alter power imbalance between MNCs and 
shareholder pressure/activism local populations
as seen with Talisman Oil;
standards by public entities
such as the EDC allow home
government to set standards
for companies operating
abroad
Security sector Afghan National Police Citizens do not trust institutions because of 
reform (domestic/ training to combat drug trade past and ongoing abuses; corruption/
within conflict- institutions easily infiltrated; ineffective 
affected state) judiciary
Demobilisation, Livelihood programming Reintegration phase underfunded; 
disarmament and specifically for ex-combatants/ identifying recipients; profits from illicit 
reintegration diamond miners in Sierra activity remain higher; sequencing; ‘buying 
Leone peace’ unsustainable; rewards and
legitimises those who used violence
Customs reform Customs service in Vulnerable to corruption; balancing needs 
(domestic/within Afghanistan trained to of commerce vs needs of enforcement; 
conflict-affected counter smuggling activities capacity to physically inspect; agents 
state) and detect financial come from areas where familial/
irregularities community ties strong; ineffective judiciary
Judicial reform Complement activity of Citizens do not trust institutions because 
(domestic/within reformed security and of past and ongoing abuses; overlapping/
conflict-affected customs services-prosecute contradictory ‘legal codes’ and customs; 
state) those found by these laws manipulated by elites; corruption/
institutions, e.g. Kosovo institutions easily infiltrated
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 41
42
Building a peace economy?
Table 2.1 continued
Response Examples Problems identified
International Use of FATF, Interpol, WCO to Lack of cooperation and political will;
security and track movement of questions over jurisdiction; technology 
investigation commodities and financial and informal systems allow groups to 
irregularities easily evade detection
International Possible future use of ICC for Questions over jurisdiction; international
justice and legal economic crimes; US Alien legal codes do not include economic 
mechanisms in Tort Claims Act crimes; lack of will or capacity to 
third party states prosecute domestically
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3
Explaining the dynamics of  transformation:
the nature of  the development-security
industry
TAKING INTO account the common themes emerging from analyses ofpolicies and agendas aimed at tackling the problem of war economies, itis clear that both the nature and outcomes of the transformation
agenda are determined by a number of interdependent processes. These
processes are determined by the interests and beliefs of powerful actors, in this
case the network of actors that determine and implement policies – the DSI.
These interests and beliefs are determined by the worldviews held by those
within this network, the problematic ways in which they define and view key
issues, and how these factors are then translated into policy. As such, in order
to move away from a project-assessment approach and towards a framework
that helps us to analyse the transformation agenda as a whole, one must
simultaneously consider the ideological foundations and practices on which
the DSI rests, the dominant conceptual lenses used in terms of how it
approaches the problem of war economies and the operational features and
trends which result from these ideological and conceptual tendencies. This
chapter will explore the nature of the DSI along these three dimensions,
assessing the ways in which the dominant features of this industry are known
to impact upon peace, security and development interventions more
generally. These characteristics of the DSI will in turn be used as a preliminary
framework through which policies aimed at transforming war economies,
including but not limited to those reviewed in forthcoming chapters, can be
assessed in a holistic and structured manner.
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Ideological projects and processes: the impact of liberalism 
The development-security industry, both in terms of its response to war
economies specifically and development and peacebuilding more generally,
can be characterised as resting on distinctly liberal foundations. Liberal
dominance in these fields has been accelerated and solidified since the end of
the Cold War when the primary alternative collapsed, leaving a largely uni-
polar or ‘uni-ideological’ global arena. Guiding actors within the DSI have
taken advantage of this new geopolitical reality and have moved the practices
of development and security from beyond limited strategic aims (such as the
rebuilding of Europe, or maintaining allies during the Cold War) to a more
pervasive and intrusive project of installing a particular form of liberal peace
across the globe. This mode of peace is founded on liberal beliefs, primarily the
inherent value of individual freedom, open markets and democratic gover-
nance. From these basic tenets an array of approaches to development-
security policy have materialised. In the economic sphere of programming,
neo-liberalism, a distinct strand of liberal theory, has emerged as the
dominant guiding principle. Defined as ‘a theory of political economic
practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maxi-
mization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework
characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered
markets, and free trade’ (Harvey, 2007: 22), neo-liberalism has become a
hegemonic discourse. It underpins global economic policy and forms the foun-
dation of economic reforms imposed on developing and conflict-affected states
by institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
Beginning in the late 1970s, this ideological discourse was operationalised by
the above institutions in what came to be known as the Washington
Consensus. Based on neo-liberal principles, policies of fiscal discipline, liberal-
isation, deregulation and privatisation were prescribed to developing and
developed nations alike (Krogstad, 2007). The failure of this consensus to
substantively contribute to economic development and stability led to an
adjustment of the consensus, with global financial actors coming to accept
that markets did not function perfectly on their own. This new post-
Washington Consensus (PWC) whilst underpinned by the core values of
neo-liberalism, simultaneously called for an increased role for states and insti-
tutions (local, national and international) in planning and regulating
economic policy (Krogstad, 2007; Öniş and Şenses, 2005). A recognition of
the importance of local context also characterised this shift, in theory leading
to increased flexibility that allowed for local actors to adjust policy based on
the specific needs of their constituents (as illustrated in an increased use of
nationally led Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by actors such as
the IMF and World Bank) (Krogstad, 2007; Ruckert, 2006).
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However, the move to a PWC does not represent a fundamental shift by
international institutions away from core neo-liberal beliefs and as such,
suggestions that there has been some kind of revolutionary change in regard
to how international financial institutions work are somewhat overstated.
Both approaches, for example, fail to deal with issues of equality including
problems of land and income distribution (Öniş and Şenses, 2005; Ruckert,
2006; Sheppard and Leitner, 2010) and despite granting room for the state
and institutions in the management of the economy, the PWC still lacks any
meaningful understanding or integration of social and political dimensions
(Kelly, 2008; Montiel, 2007). In this regard, the PWC can be characterised as
‘a new Trojan horse for embedding market-centred norms and practices’
(Carroll, 2009: 447). Whilst the PWC utilises different processes (i.e. state and
international regulation and policy tools such as PRSPs as opposed to a purely
free market approach), the ideology remains the same; it is simply embedded
and imposed using alternative techniques. 
Of course, it is not just economic policies that are guided by liberal ideals.
Neo-liberal economic policy has come to be implemented alongside a series of
complementary liberal political and social policies. Focused on issues such as
good governance, individual human rights, democratic politics and strong,
independent civil societies, these policies, alongside the above-mentioned
economic reforms, constitute what has come to be known as the liberal peace-
building consensus and form the foundation for the majority of interventions
undertaken by the DSI. Of course, as with neo-liberal reform, one can identify
variations within this wider project (Richmond, 2007), however, it is widely
agreed that at the root of interventions into conflict-affected states are a series
of liberal political and economic values to which political actors and citizens
must comply (Cramer, 2003b; Pugh, Cooper and Turner, 2011). This peace-
building consensus is based on a number of beliefs related to the pacifying
effect of liberal structures. For example, as Cramer notes, economic aspects of
the liberal peacebuilding consensus are largely based on the belief that capi-
talism and free markets ‘tie people up with the relatively benign business of
money making, thus diverting them from the more nefarious activities of
seeking power and making war’ (Cramer, 2003b: 152). 
Similar assumptions regarding the role of political and social reforms can
be found in one of the bedrocks of liberal international relations theory – the
democratic peace hypothesis. A proposition that has been continuously refor-
mulated and critiqued since Kant’s (1970) original articulation in his 1795
essay Perpetual Peace (for a good review see McDonald, 2009: 4–10), the
hypothesis and its supporters both explicitly and implicitly extol the virtues of
democratic processes and norms. Whilst admitting that there is a concomitant
likelihood that liberal states are more likely to commit violence against non-
liberal states, possibly leading to a form of liberal imperialism (Doyle, 2005)
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there is an underlying promotion of liberal democratic values and systems by
those who support the hypothesis. Simultaneous adherence to the range of
liberal norms is still seen as inherently pacifying, with liberal actors only
‘provoked’ into violence when faced with illiberal and thus disruptive regimes.
Concomitant beliefs in the power of civil society groups and NGOs to hold
potentially violent regimes to account and help resolve social discord within
society are also strong features within much of the liberal peace discourse
(Cramer, 2003b). There is of course a vast literature critiquing the basic tenets
and logic of the liberal peace (Cooper, 2005; Duffield, 2001; Mac Ginty and
Richmond, 2007; Pugh, 2007; Richmond, 2008, 2010). These works
challenge both the content of liberal reforms, pointing to inherent contradic-
tions and logical flaws of these approaches, as well as the processes through
which liberalism is imposed. 
Despite these concerns, liberalism continues to underpin most of the
policies initiated by the DSI, and on top of the inherent problems related to the
nature of policies (discussed in greater detail below and throughout the
remainder of this book), there are also concerns regarding the way in which
international actors are going about the spreading of liberal peace. As Duffield
notes: ‘In the past, while development and security policy were clearly associ-
ated, compared to now the relationship was more opportunistic, geared to
national interests and often covert. The current merger of development and
security is much more inclusive, organic and transparent’ (2001: 35). There
is no longer a need to try and mask the political, opportunistic aims of DSI
involvement in conflict-affected states as was often the case during the Cold
War. However, Duffield’s description of a more ‘inclusive, organic and trans-
parent’ process should not necessarily be taken as a positive or neutral
assessment of this new agenda as these new processes make use of problemat-
ic technologies. Indeed, analysis of security and development policies reveal
that in order to create these new liberal societies, the DSI must engage in two
seemingly paradoxical, but complementary processes – the depoliticisation of
conflict and security environments and a politicisation of aid initiatives. 
This first technology, depoliticisation, is central to a liberal approach,
whereby actions and events are depoliticised in an attempt to normalise them
(Edkins, 1999; Mouffe, 1993, 2005), to make them appear part of a non-
contentious sphere of private and public life that therefore requires little if any
scrutiny. This process reveals itself in several ways within the arena of
security and development programming (Jaeger, 2007). For example,
depoliticisation occurs when political causes and consequences of insecurity
and conflict are pushed to the background, with economic and developmental
issues becoming central both to the explanation of insecurity and thus to the
solutions. Poverty in and of itself is treated as a cause of conflict, as opposed to
more politically contentious issues of distribution of wealth, inequality and
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power. At a more concrete level, depoliticisation also describes instances
where projects are implemented as if there were peace, despite ongoing
political and security issues. Ongoing violence is treated as an aberration,
with incidents often portrayed as random anomalies committed by ‘rogue’ or
‘extremist’ elements – as opposed to acts motivated by those with ongoing
grievances or other motivations. As aid is depoliticised, reconstruction and
development continues as if such acts were unimportant, a minor distraction.
Likewise, wider unresolved geopolitical disputes may be brushed aside with
post-conflict programming being implemented regardless. 
Depoliticisation is a useful political strategy for the DSI on several fronts.
First, the removal of politics serves to legitimise the failure of actors to
intervene politically or militarily. Portraying conflict as apolitical, or as
primarily a development problem, allows actors to excuse themselves from
actively engaging or working towards more political solutions (described in
greater detail in forthcoming sections). Linked to this, as aid becomes the
primary technology for conflict response, as opposed to more difficult or costly
forms of political engagement, major actors are able to deflect blame for failed
peacebuilding endeavours. While the guiding actors in the DSI set the agenda
and call for aid to be used to solve political strife, it is the operational actors
who come to be used as scapegoats should the mission fail (Aall, 2000). In
effect international political elites are absolved from responsibility for
continued violence, as poor project implementation by the operational arms of
the DSI, including local actors and recipient populations, take the blame. The
apolitical approach also provides a cover of neutrality for organisations who
do not wish to be seen as taking sides in overtly political struggles. This is espe-
cially true in an era where accusations of neo-colonialism threaten the
legitimacy of such interventions. For this reason, we can see the internation-
al community as not wanting to engage in the politics of the locale, and to at
least have an appearance of not acting as part of a wider (or foreign) political
project.
Acts of depoliticisation are not merely conceptual oversights or opera-
tional flaws but are actually essential to the creation of liberal peaces by the
DSI. In other words, processes of depoliticising conflict and security are
political strategies of the guiding actors in the DSI. Such a process is very
much akin to Ferguson’s (1994) notion of development as an anti-politics
machine. Through these processes, actors attempt to subtract politics from
the conflict equation in order to facilitate their own political agendas of
spreading and creating liberalism in post-conflict states. Thus, acts of depoliti-
cisation enable politicisation of peacebuilding policy, with the politicisation
occurring as peacebuilding becomes a means by which the DSI can install a
liberal peace in post-conflict zones. Of course, it should be noted that phrases
such as ‘political’ or ‘politicisation’ need not be used pejoratively (de Zeeuw,
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2001). Indeed, as will be seen in upcoming chapters the insertion of politics
into peacebuilding projects and areas of reform is not only inevitable, but even
desirable insofar as it leads to context-appropriate and sustainable modes of
transformation. Where politicisation can become problematic, as discussed in
forthcoming sections, is when the interests of powerful external actors
override the goals of local conflict resolution and achieving a positive peace. 
The depoliticising/politicising dynamic found within public life, both
locally and in terms of international politics, is problematic on several front
(Edkins, 1999; Kurki, 2011; Mouffe, 1993, 2005; Peterson, 2013; Rancière,
2010). At the most general of levels, a denying of the messy politics of the real
world to further one’s own goals gradually decreases our ability to manage
such politics; depolticisation leads to ‘bewilderment in the face of [political]
manifestations and to impotence in dealing with them’ (Mouffe, 1993: 140).
More specifically, however, the depoliticising-politicisation dynamic which is
characteristic of the DSI’s liberal peace project has at least four policy impli-
cations, some of which can be considered as general issues, and others which
can be seen as specifically relating to the problem of war economies. First, as
the liberal project is promoted, there is a concern that actors working in post-
conflict contexts will become little more than tools of foreign policy for the
world’s most powerful political bodies and countries. Projects may be designed
or implemented in order to maintain stability and thus prevent the spread of
instability to intervening countries, or to protect ongoing political and
financial investments. Evidence of such politicisation can arguably be found
by considering aid levels, where contributions appear to coincide with the
politics and goals of donors (Atmar and Goodhand, 2002; Macrae and Leader,
2001; Munslow and Brown, 1999) as well as the selectivity of interventions
(Bradbury, 1998; Meron, 1995). This suggests a prioritising of international
goals over local needs. 
A decreasing focus on development in favour of security goals is also a
concern as the blending of development and security is not a balanced merger.
Development policy can easily become subordinate to security concerns
(Klingebiel, 2006) a possibility of increasing concern given the shift in
security thinking resulting from the global war on terror (Duffield, 2006).
Also, declining aid budgets have led to a situation where NGOs that used to
engage in developmental work are now expected to be more relief oriented
(Abiew, 2003) leading to a shift away from long-term to short-term program-
ming (Seddon and Hussein, 2002). For example, EU funding for security and
stability projects in the region was set to increase by 131 per cent from
2007–2013, while funds for development cooperation and economic cooper-
ation were set to drop from 56 per cent of the budget to 49 per cent (Robinson,
2006: 83–84). What counts as official development aid is also allowing
countries to shift their priorities from traditional development aims to
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programming which supports security. Official development assistance guide-
lines now allow the management of security expenditure, enhancing civil
society’s role in the management of the security sector, security sector reform,
small arms and light weapons programming, civilian activities for peace-
building, conflict prevention and conflict resolution to count towards levels of
official development assistance (Robinson, 2006: 86). 
Further, there is a concern that in the pursuit the of idealised liberal
project the DSI will allow local actors to capture the political and economic
benefits of programming as a way of achieving ideological goals. In order to
maintain stability, or to reward those who support the DSI in their aim of
installing a liberal peace, local elites become the benefactors of post-conflict
programming – sometimes at the expense of wider development goals or social
reconciliation. In this sense, politicisation occurs as peacebuilding initiatives
focus on appeasing actors who may spoil the desired liberal peace, marginal-
ising more peaceful and progressive groups within society (Pankhurst, 1999).
By focusing on violent powerful groups the non-powerful are ignored,
confirming the rationality of and institutionalising the use of violence
(Turton, 1997). As will be seen in upcoming chapters, this is an especially
problematic impact in terms of the transformation of war economies where
those involved in conflict trade have unjustly amassed a great deal of political
power and wealth through corruption, illicit trade and violence.
Most concerning is that the liberal project is pursued via the use of
hegemonic mechanisms, resulting in an ‘agenda of control’ (Cooper, 2003;
Pugh and Cooper, 2004). These methods taken together relate to one of the
strongest critiques against the (neo-) liberal ideological project, namely its
autocratic underpinnings. As David Harvey finds, ‘it is the profoundly antide-
mocratic nature of neoliberalism that should surely be the main focus of
political struggle. Institutions with enormous leverage . . . are outside any
democratic control’ (2007: 42). This anti-democratic power of the liberal
project has been strengthened by the DSI’s insistence on the link between
poverty, crime and war. Kate Meagher has linked the liberal approach to
conflict and the concern over illegal trans-border trade in her assessment of
policy options utilised by the DSI:
Policy makers are now left with two major options: transborder trade can be
suppressed and criminalised or it can be incorporated into the formal economy . . .
Neo liberal ideologies and international development institutions seem to be grav-
itating towards the criminalisation option. Close analysis suggests that this policy
preference has more to do with the interests of Western powers regarding control
and protection of their markets than with hard empirical evidence on levels of
criminality. (2003: 71–72)
Whilst the criminalisation of these economies will be discussed in greater
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detail later in this chapter, it is important to highlight here how the discourse
surrounding them serves to strengthen the resolve for implementing liberal
reforms. What is relevant at this point in the discussion is that the resulting
control mechanisms are politically and economically motivated, as such tech-
niques constitute a way of safeguarding the interests of western nations and
powerful elites. 
There are many examples of policies that could be classified as belonging
to an agenda of control. The two most obvious examples in the case of war
economy transformation are direct military intervention, such as UK inter-
vention in Sierra Leone, and the destruction of a commodity such as the crop
eradication programmes in Colombia and Afghanistan. More subtle forms of
control would include externally led and monitored anti-corruption reforms.
In effect, these are attempts at keeping a close check on the internal workings
of sovereign nations. While policy documents often cite the need to increase
levels of accountability to local peoples as justification for such programmes,
accountability is often not downwards, but upwards with the aims, needs and
requirement of donors at the forefront of national reforms. Besides this, there
is also the more basic issue of effectiveness. The success of the policies related
to this agenda is limited and unlikely to prove any more successful in the
future, as the ability of groups and actors to evade control is pervasive (Jones
and Roemer, 1989; Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005). The above arguments
are not meant to suggest turning a blind eye to illegal industries such as drugs
and arms. Nor are they suggesting an abandonment of democratic reform and
more effective and responsible security forces and judicial sectors. But the
agenda of control remains problematic insofar as it ‘gives priority to the rule
of law rather than social justice’ (Pugh and Cooper, 2004: 6); it values
stability over justice or positive peace. 
Intrinsically linked to the agenda of control is that the DSI agenda is
predisposed towards normative western economic and political ideals. The
development-security nexus portrays intervention as an altruistic activity
which simultaneously bestows peace and wealth. This is a much more subtle
form of control (Schuurman, 2000) but is part of the agenda of control
nonetheless, based on the assumption that the West possesses knowledge of
universal truths of what is good and what is perverse. The processes of
defining the problem war economies and creating solutions for this problem
are accompanied by these assumptions and result in the tendency of the DSI
to rely on euro-centric norms and values which ignore the peculiarities of the
growth and sustainability of war economy activity and presume, unquestion-
ably, the superiority of western models to transform such activity. 
Evidence of a system biased on western values and interests can be found
by looking at the number of policies and concomitant resources directed at
dealing with drug economies over arguably more destructive forms of conflict
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trade such as timber, minerals including coltan, oil, tax evasion and money
laundering. More subtle forms of western normative bias, however, may be
found in two specific policy options utilised in war economy transformation.
Through judicial sector reform, the western legal system is being imposed on
a number of countries for whom such systems and values are to a certain
extent foreign. These reforms are often based on western legal ideals as
opposed to local or national ideals of law and justice. Secondly, the option of
naming and shaming individuals and companies involved in conflict trade, by
international actors, infers some form of legitimate moral position to make
judgements on what is legitimate and illegitimate in today’s global economy.
The concomitant use of ‘white lists’, by which all companies that can ensure
high standards of transparency become preferred operators within their
industry (Winer, 2005), similarly evokes images of casting moral judgements
by dividing those who meet the required western standards of operation from
those who do not. As such, western actors are exalted over those who stray
too far from the idealised liberal form.
As shown, liberalism is a political project that relies on a number of strate-
gies which are in and of themselves damaging to the goals of peace and
security programming and in turn, political-economic transformation.
Through depoliticisation, the task of rebuilding war-affected states is
portrayed as a largely apolitical, neutral and thus unobjectionable project.
The wider political project of spreading a particular ideological project –
namely liberalism – is made to disappear. And while these processes have been
shown to be problematic in their own right, the impact of liberal ideals goes
much further, also influencing the conceptualitsation of war economies and
the operational tools that are used to manage them.
Conceptualisations of conflict and recovery 
The hegemony of liberal discourses shapes the ways in which war economies
are conceived and thus influences the nature and choice of policies aimed at
their management. Understanding the dominant conceptualisations of war
economies and the issues associated with each of these offers further insight
into the dilemma of transformation. Research findings presented in Chapters
5 to 7 will show the diversity of actors’ opinions regarding political economies
of violence, and indeed examples of when individuals and organisations
‘strayed’ off the stereotypical liberal path are central to the conclusion of this
book. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify the dominant understandings of
conflict and recovery and the impact these have on political-economic
programming.
As a starting point for this discussion, it is important to review the prevail-
ing theories which have come to shape actors’ understandings of origins of
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war. Currently, conflict theory can be seen as having entered its own era of
‘impasse’, to borrow terminology from the development literature, as there
exists no hegemonic conclusion regarding the causes of war. Analyses of
political violence therefore utilise explanations from many bodies of conflict
theory, leading to a layering of explanations regarding the motivation of
actors who engage in violence. These explanations regarding causes of violent
conflict offer insight into the competing ways in which actors within the DSI
can choose to understand the role of commodities and profit in violent conflict,
providing another lens through which we can analyse the processes chosen
by actors in regard to war economy transformation. 
Prior to the end of the Cold War, a militaristic understanding of security
dominated conflict analysis. Often referred to as traditional or orthodox
security, this school of thought is concerned with violence between states,
with both the nature of threats and the responses to them being conceived of
in military terms (Ayoob, 1991). This classical view is based largely on a
realist paradigm which sees the international system as inherently anarchic
and in which the nation-state remains as the primary unit of analysis. With
the fall of communism and the emergence of a unipolar system, notions of
security began to change. Initially, it was assumed that with the end of the
super power struggle, the globe would witness a new era of peace – a ‘New
World Order’. However, this utopia failed to emerge, and paradoxically a ‘new
world disorder’ revealed itself with conflict erupting across Asia, Africa and
Eastern Europe (Keohane, 1995). It is in the wealth of diverse analysis that
attempts to understand the causes and nature of these ‘New Wars’ (Kaldor,
2001) that the problem of war economies gains prominence.
In the early 1990s, several ideas which addressed the ethnic nature of
these wars emerged as dominant explanatory tools. Under orthodox political
analyses, people’s identities and loyalties were seen as coalescing around the
state. However, with the rise of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War era,
the primacy of national identities as an organising principle faded and ethnic
identities became central to conflict analysis. Supporting such theories were
wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide. Based on
Huntington-esque visions of a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington, 1996),
these theories are often closely attributed to the works of Robert Kaplan,
whose works Balkan Ghosts (1993), The Ends of the Earth (1996) and The
Coming Anarchy (2000) evoke images of chaotic wars between disgruntled
and historically opposed societies. And while conceptualisations such as this
of the role of ethnicity have played well in the media, these simplistic expla-
nations of the role of ethnicity in violent conflict have been questioned in
terms of their intellectual and methodological rigour (Duffield, 2001; Gilgan,
2001; Keen, 1997; Shaw, 1996; Turton, 1997). Stemming from such
critiques, a more considered and theoretically grounded debate on the role of
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ethnicity in modern conflict emerged, allowing socially constructed identities
a key role in conflict analysis without falling into the traps of the ‘new
barbarism’ and ‘ancient hatreds’ models (Gurr, 1993; Kaufmann, 2001).
While focusing largely on the role of the construction of ethnic identities,
these approaches to ethnicity began to address the relationship between
violence and resources. Kaufmann’s work on symbolic politics, for example,
suggests that for conflict to occur, groups must also be presented with the
opportunity to engage in conflict, and that this involves both adequate political
space as well as physical resources (Kaufmann, 2001: 29–38). Likewise,
Gurr’s work on ethnic conflict suggests two broad motivations for ethnic
groups engaging in conflict – relative deprivation and group mobilisation: ‘the
former contends that peoples’ discontent about unjust deprivation is the
primary motivation for political action, whereas the latter emphasizes leaders’
calculated mobilization of group resources in response to changing political
opportunities’ (1993: 123–124). These two motivations are indicative of one
of the key debates that then emerged in the field of conflict analysis with the
former representing what has come to be referred to as grievance theory and
the latter providing a foundation for an emerging body of work which
suggests that greed, economic motivations and opportunities are central to
understanding incidents of modern conflict. It is from this debate that war
economies became central to the study of conflict.
Grievance explanations for civil wars are based largely on the idea that
deprivation, in the economic, social or political spheres, provides the motiva-
tion for groups to rebel against actors whom they see as causing their
deprivation (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970). Such explanations for violent conflict
have proved influential in the policy arena, with the addressing of depriva-
tions via peacebuilding and development initiatives being seen as a cure for
ongoing conflict and as a preventative mechanism for future conflict.
However, the causal relationship between grievances, deprivation and the
outbreak of political violence came to be questioned by statistical analysis
emerging from World Bank researchers (Collier, 1995, Collier and Hoeffler,
1999, 2001). These studies argue that grievances are not strongly correlated
with instances of violent group conflict but that economic opportunities play
a much more important role in both motivating and facilitating violence. This
questioning of grievance-based theories has been a key factor in elevating war
economies to the position of a principle explanatory factor of violent conflict.
Crudely referred to as greed theory, this body of work places financial motiva-
tions and the role of economic opportunities in facilitating rebellion at the
centre of causal explanations of violence (Collier, 1995, 2000a; Collier and
Hoeffler, 1999, 2001; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2006; Lujala, Rød and
Thieme, 2007; Ross, 2006). 
These econocentric explanations of war resulted in much debate with
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both the methodologies used and the implications of these approaches coming
under attack. One of the strongest critiques against such theories is that they
are reductionist and fail to incorporate historical and political context; they
give little recognition to the fact that political violence is very much a dynamic
process, with motivations and driving forces changing over time (Berdal,
2005; Cramer, 2003a; Luckham et al., 2001; Murshed and Tadjoeddin,
2009). Further, these understandings of the causes of violence also deny or
downplay the role of ideology or identity (Cramer, 2002). In this sense, one
can see the obvious linkages between this conceptualisation of the conflict
and conflict economies, and the preference for apolitical narratives which
have been shown to suit the ideological agenda of the DSI. 
Despite war economies being closely associated with the above debate,
other approaches to conflict have also stressed the importance of these
economies in conflict dynamics in ways which seek to address the critiques of
economic-centric approaches, whilst also accepting the importance of
economic factors. Research surrounding the concept of ‘complex political
emergencies’ (CPEs) has been particularly useful in expanding conceptualisa-
tions of the role of economics in instances of political violence. While some
take issue with the concept of ‘emergency’ contained within this work
(Calhoun, 2004; Dillon and Reid, 2000; Edkins, 2000) the strength of the CPE
approach is that it expands analyses beyond state borders and considers the
wider regional and international factors which become part of otherwise
‘internal’ political struggles. There is less of a focus on relationships of cause
and effect and a greater concern with wider structural forces which have a
more indirect impact on political-economic dynamics by shaping, influencing
(and perhaps confining) the choices available to actors. Ballentine’s work
(2003) offers an example of this approach, moving our thinking regarding
war economies away from the notion that illicit economic opportunities either
cause wars or are caused by war and towards a model which suggests that
war economies feed into already existing political conflicts, impacting the
duration, character and intensity of a war. In this sense, facets of war
economies are seen as existing as part of a dynamic system –  constituent parts
of war economies both contribute to and are fuelled by insecurity and violence
as well as other structural factors such as poverty, corruption and global
market forces.
Competing analytical approaches to war economies
The above assessment over the dominant explanations on the causes of
conflict and the position of economic factors within each of the debates
suggests there are multiple lenses through which the DSI can interpret
economic issues in relation to political violence. Two distinct conceptual
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approaches to war economies emerge, each granting war economies a
prominent yet different role in conflict. The first conceptualisation can be
characterised as a rational choice (RC) model of war economies. Under this
view, war economies stem directly from the decisions taken by ‘war entrepre-
neurs’ who are motivated by profit or power and who either take advantage of
an already occurring war, or actually instigate conflict, with financial enrich-
ment as the ultimate goal. Decisions to participate in such activity are based
on a rational weighing of potential risks and payoffs. In this sense, war
economies are the end result of a series of considerations and enabling factors
and are an entity unto themselves. As presented in Figure 3.1, this conceptu-
alisation sees war economies as a distinct unit, a final culmination resulting
from of a sequence of steps and choices taken by actors.
Alternatively, war economies can be seen as a constituent part of a wider
political-economic environment which provides fertile ground for the
formation and continuance of these economies. With a focus on relational and
structural forces, this model supports calls for an alternative ‘radical political
economy’ approach to understanding the role of resources and other
economic factors in political violence (Obi, 2010: 483). Unlike the RC model,
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there is less of a focus on individuals’ motivations, with state, regional and
international actors and structures seen as playing a significant role in the
conflict dynamic. What we see as a tangible war economy is actually an
outgrowth of the status quo – war economy activity is not an aberration based
on the rational calculations of actors, but rather an almost logical or even
predictable outcome of a perfect storm of geopolitical, regional, national and
local political, social and economic realities. Under this alternative conceptu-
alisation, war economies are considered manifestations of wider political and
economic structures (see Figure 3.2). In other words, war economies are also
a characteristic or outcome of what can be referred to as national, regional or
international peace economies. Under this conceptualisation, war economies
are not a separate final state as seen in the RC approach. Rather, they are
contained, encircled and encapsulated within wider political and economic
structures.
Adopting a structural political-economy (SPE) perspective requires a consid-
eration of a much wider range of motivations and impacts of war economies.
Under this view, the war economy is not simply a dysfunctional set of activi-
ties which causes or prolongs political violence with the view to gain
economically, but in fact may serve as a means by which numerous actors
(both legitimate and illegitimate) seek to gain or maintain political power
(Ajulu, 2001; Dietrich, 2000; MacLean, 2002). In addition, the SPE model
requires one to reconceptualise actors’ decisions to participate in war
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economies – to think about motivation not simply in terms of a desire to accu-
mulate wealth, but perhaps as an attempt to find a way of participating in
today’s competitive global economy (Cooper, 2003). In this sense, war
economies can be seen as a means through which actors can provide for
themselves when the state and ‘legitimate’ markets fail to do so (Chingano,
1996; Ifeka, 2001). Part of an ever-evolving global political-economic system,
these economic practices represent both a reaction and alteration to the
creation of a new global political economy (Obi, 2010; Raeymaekers, 2010).
What is actually occurring is the creation of a new status quo, not simply the
failure of or interruption to current systems.
While both conceptual lenses are available to members of the DSI, it is the
RC approach to war economies that is believed to be most prevalent in
responses to war economies, with the wider political-economic structures
privileged by an SPE approach often being ignored in donor and aid policies
(Brown, 1999; Cooper, 2002; Johnson et al., 2003). Obi goes as far as saying
that such simplistic notions of causality, typified in much of the work on the
resource curse, has become a hegemonic discourse (Obi, 2010). In fact,
despite methodological and ethical concerns regarding much of the research
related to the RC approach, it has retained a central place in academic and
policy endeavours. Explaining this dominance, Mats Berdal notes, ‘The most
important factor behind the initial attraction of the greed thesis . . . was the
statistical analysis and social-science methodology in which it was steeped,
which had the effect of simplifying the complexity of conflicts confronting
policy makers’ (2005: 688–689; see also Cramer, 2002). Charles Cater
concurs, noting that practitioners often place
the most explanatory weight on the rational decisions made by other elites and the
readily identifiable factors assumed to influence these choices. Consequently,
strategies for intervention by the UN and other actors have focused on a limited
range of measures intended to influence the flow of natural resources and the
decision-making calculus of elites, rather than more comprehensive approaches
that tackle the macro level processes and structures that generate and sustain
intrastate war. (2003: 40)
In an academic field and policy arena often overwhelmed by interdisciplinari-
ty and complexity, the straightforward and logical framework offered by the
RC approach is tempting. It is supported by theoretical statistical modelling
and can be easily fused with qualitative evidence. Policy wise, it creates simple
and thus attractive answers as it suggests that conflict can be prevented and
contained through better resource management, monitoring and stricter
financial controls. These tendencies within the aid world are representative of
the growth of neo-classical economic theory and rational choice theory in the
field of conflict and security studies more generally (Cramer, 2002), providing
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evidence of a concrete link between ideology and the conceptual lenses which
dominate peace and development programming.
The dominance of the RC approach to war economies is, however, highly
problematic. As Cramer notes, rational choice approaches to conflict often fail
to address the need for ‘structural and relational change’ (2002: 1850),
mirroring critiques found within other studies of development programming
in which it is determined that ‘the development aid system still neglects most
of the non-economic aspects of development in favour of a narrow economic-
technical approach’ (Uvin, 1999: 55; see also Uvin, 1998). The resulting
technocratic responses emerging from an RC conceptualisation of the problem
fits well within a liberal framework which, as noted, is characterised by its
reliance on rational choice theories and technical solutions. Such preferences
fit well with another core characteristic of liberal thought, namely a belief in
the power of institutions to resolve all manner of social and political problems
(Shahar, 2007). Although there exists a variety of institutional approaches
and analyses (Fioretos, 2011; Grieco, 1988; Shahar, 2007) liberal institu-
tionalism has become a dominant concept and tool to both explain and
promote the idea that there can be cooperation (instead of conflict) between
states in the geopolitical realm (Nuruzzaman, 2008). A belief in the pacifying
nature of liberal institutions at the international level has trickled down to a
belief that the right institutions (i.e. liberal models of democratic governance,
civil society, judiciaries) can also build and promote peace at the national and
local levels by constraining the narrow interests of political elites. This
approach is perhaps most clearly conceptualised in Paris’s (2004) ‘institu-
tionalisation before liberalisation’ approach to post-conflict reconstruction.
Under this school of thought, there remains a belief in the inherent effective-
ness of liberal approaches, but there is also a reconsideration of the
sequencing of reforms, with a belief that good institutions must be created in
order for the virtues of liberalism to be realised. 
Adopting a structural approach to understanding war economies
To be clear, arguing that there is an increasing technocratic element to aid is
not synonymous with saying that the aid industry is apolitical. What is being
suggested is that while the distribution of aid, and the motivation for
providing aid, may be extremely political in nature, the processes through
which aid is meant to be utilised have become highly bureaucratised and
formulaic, focusing on creating superficial economic, political and social insti-
tutions and thus eliminating any potential for aid being used for real and
substantial social and political change. Importantly, bringing politics back
into the process does not equate to an imperialistic imposition of northern
ideals and processes. As de Zeeuw argues, 
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a political focus for peace-building does not mean that the international
community should promote or even prescribe certain political institutions. Instead
it should try and identify ‘those relationships, processes, mechanisms and institu-
tions that hold the greatest promise for ongoing conflict resolution, which may not
always look like those in Western states’. (Adapted from Cousens and Kumar, as
quoted in de Zeeuw, 2001: 17)
Accepting the politics of peacebuilding requires aid agencies to be more aware
of the power relations which led to conflict and sustained the war, and which
continue to affect post-conflict power arrangements. Without denying the
reality that individuals and groups do formulate decisions based on potential
risks and payoffs, choices are also shaped and constrained by surrounding
forces such as history, politics and socio-cultural dynamics. Therefore the
adoption and integration of SPE analysis by the DSI is a fundamental require-
ment in the transformation of war economies. In order to address the wider
political-economic issues related to war economy transformation as opposed
to a narrowly defined RC model of war economies, at least four areas need to
be considered by actors: the problematic characterisation of criminality in
zones of conflict; the geographical scope of war economies; the temporal scope
of war economies; and the functions of these forms of economic activity. 
Accompanying a focus on economic agendas in war is an increased
tendency to view war as criminal with many actors being relegated to the
category of common criminal. Consider an evaluation of the situation in
Northern Ireland where one commentator concludes that ‘violence takes on
more characteristics of gangsterism than of a revolutionary uprising’
(Jennings, 1998: 294). In effect, as the criminalisation discourse permeates,
fighting war has turned more and more into fighting crime. Moodie (2010)
refers to such changes in the labelling of acts associated with violence as
‘critical code switching’. Citing the case of El Salvador, where policy makers
have been faced with ongoing and arguably increased violence and criminal-
ity since the signing of the peace accords, it is noted that 
if El Salvador was to join the ranks of the modern, investment-grade nations,
then traces of war and indeed ‘politics’ had to be erased. So attention turned to
recategorizing acts of violence, to recoding them, in a way that established a
sense of order and normativity. That sense of order was bolstered by a new
discourse on technical mastery of criminal investigation, of science rather than
politics. (2010: 55)
However, one should remain cautious of the criminalisation discourse for
several reasons. While there is a close relationship between criminal activity
and war economies, many reports are sensationalist and exaggerated
(Dupont, 1999), with discussions of war economies being hijacked by a ‘drugs
and thugs’ mentality (Cooper, 2002: 935). Second, the category of criminal is
59
The nature of the development-security industry
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 59
not easily (or objectively) defined. While a legalistic definition would posit
crime as any activity which breaks a formal legal code, criminality is not
always defined in this way. Crime is a socially constructed concept. Defining
what is criminal in war economies is made more difficult in that illicit facets of
war economies are often closely linked to licit formal and informal economies.
Grey, black, shadow, underground, illicit, illegal and informal economies,
regardless of how you define them (Karp, 1994; Lindauer, 1989; Meagher,
2003; Portes, 1996) ‘are closely intertwined; there are no clear boundaries
between them . . . In this context concepts such as “licit” and “illicit” economy
fall short’ (Collinson et al., 2003: 5). At what point in the trading process does
an illegally mined diamond cease to be illegal? At the point of leaving the
country? At the point of sale to De Beers? Once purchased by a consumer in
the United Kingdom? This is not to argue that no element of a war or of a war
economy should be classified as criminal, but that the difficulty in defining
crime should act as a first step in reconsidering the preconceived notion that
war economies are necessarily criminal. Characterising activities as ‘criminal’
shapes and indeed limits the feasible responses to these activities. 
Another problem with the current criminalisation discourse relates to the
fact that in many cases, gangs survive based on acceptance within their own
communities (Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997) and as such, cannot simply
be moralised away via derogatory labelling. Such overt normativity via the
labelling of acts as criminal effectively delegitimises conflict and conflict actors
(Keen, 2002/03). In other words, one of the dangers of the discourse lies in the
portrayal of conflict actors as morally inferior and void of political ambitions
or status (Meron, 1995), which may result in morality and normative judge-
ments replacing thorough political analysis (Douzinas, 2003). Further,
portraying leaders as greedy ‘justifies open-ended and repeated international
intervention on behalf of populations’ (Hughes and Pupavac, 2005: 882).
Here we can see the link between the ideological and analytical planes, as it
suits the liberal political project to define the problem as criminal and thus
apolitical.
Alongside a reconsideration of the fundamental role that supposed crimi-
nality has come to play, undertaking an SPE approach to war economies also
necessitates widening the geographical scope of analysis. It is not enough to
simply examine the role of resources in terms of the confines of a localised and
geographically bound conflict. One should consider the links between
localised conflict-related trade and regional or international economies of
peace. Many legitimate international actors benefit from illegitimate local
activities related to violent conflict. These actors include some of the globe’s
most powerful actors including IFIs and multinational corporations.
International companies often circumvent southern governments’ authority,
making agreements with faction leaders (Aning, 2003) – Shell, for example, is
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known to have paid money directly to the Biafran Separatist administration
(Fitzgerald, 2001). A large percentage of the profits from war economies are
laundered or filtered through financial institutions in the developed world
(Power, 2001; Quirk, 1997) and some of the world’s most powerful tobacco
companies have also been found to have knowingly contributed to cigarette
smuggling, with trade routes including conflict zones (Titeca, Joosens and
Raw, 2011). External actors are also known to benefit via the involvement of
international private security companies such as Executive Outcomes
(Harding, 1997; Howe, 1998; O’Brien, 1998). Governments of so-called
‘peaceful states’ also benefit from these forms of trade, shifting allegiances as
need requires (Friman and Andreas, 1999: 10; Power, 2001). 
Related to this is the issue of consumption of conflict goods. Where
commodity sales form the basis of a war economy, consumption rests largely
in the North. Consider the fact that ‘timber stolen from communities at gun-
point eventually emerges in European garden furniture stores under a “green”
label’ (Le Billon, 2000: 788). Similarly, the final destination of conflict
diamonds is predominantly northern markets, and the consumption of drugs
also occurs in the globe’s most developed regions. In terms of the scope of
involvement, global value chain analyses point to the fact that the majority of
the value added occurs outside the conflict-affected state. For example, just 1
per cent of the profit from the Afghan opium economy remains in Afghanistan
(Cooper, 2002: 941). This is not to deny that profits are made by those in the
conflict-affected state, however, the above arguments provide support for a
need to move away from conceptualising war economies as a detached
system, resulting from the immediate motivations of individual actors and
assembled around the immediate violence of conflict. Instead, these
economies, and thus their transformation, need to be more widely considered
as having a global reach.
Likewise, linkages need to be considered on a wider temporal plane; a
clear understanding of the role and impact of war economies requires us to
look both forwards and backwards in time and not simply focus on the
immediate conflict era. Many of the activities that become classed as part of
the war economy were occurring years or decades before the commencement
of the conflict. Transforming a war economy therefore is not simply a matter
of addressing structures, relationships and behaviours which emerged during
the active conflict, but understanding the often centuries-long processes
which led to and facilitate such forms of accumulation. Conversely, the activ-
ities which constitute a war economy generally continue into peacetime with
their structures becoming entrenched in the political-economy of the locale,
region and globe. A war economy’s legacy can be felt in three arenas. First,
there is a political legacy as central figures of a war economy utilise the
financial assets gained to acquire and sustain political power in the post-
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conflict phase. There is also a criminal legacy as ‘criminal capital becomes
political capital’ (Andreas, 2004: 44) achieved largely through the continu-
ance of alliances made during the war, a problem which is compounded by the
immunity often granted to individuals in peace accords (Ballentine, 2004;
Gouvnev, 2003). Finally, there is an obvious economic legacy. Past war
economies may hinder peacetime development by destabilising the state,
which limits foreign investment, and continued smuggling detracts money
from the state by eroding the tax base. 
Of course, there is a functional and political logic to framing war
economies as temporally bound within the accepted time frame of the conflict.
As Hughes and Pupavac argue, ‘framing historical events in the contingent
understandings of relevant time and space puts particular actors in the frame,
while others remain outside of it . . . The international and local political and
economic context for the initial descent into violence is removed from the
analysis’ (2005: 875). Defining the war economy in terms of activity that
occurred during the conflict period is practical in terms of narrowing the
actors and structures which need to be dealt with, but also politically feasible
and expedient as intervening parties can be selective about the actors on
whom they choose to focus. However if broader transformation is the aim, the
historical foundations and post-conflict impacts of war economies are of equal
analytical concern. 
Finally, once the above connections have been traced, analyses can go
even further, attempting to understand not only what the linkages are, but
also why those linkages exist. This can be done by examining the functions
that these economies fulfil. Without glorifying or romanticising war
economies and their participants, one cannot deny the positive social
functions which war economies and their participants sometimes serve. As
Duffield notes, in its interaction with these criminal economies ‘networks of
aid practice confront a far more serious foe – the reflexive and resistant
modernity of actual development’ (Duffield, 2002a: 1054–1055, emphasis
added). The ‘actual development’ resulting from war economies may take
many forms and can in fact lead to local resistance to transformation policies
which might be seen as threatening local livelihoods or quality of life. Policy
makers need to consider how post-war programming might need to fill these
gaps, if the war economy is to be transformed. For example, in some cases, the
war economy and its participants serve a security function within an area.
With the collapse of the state, or in weakened states, sub-state groups,
including participants in war economies, often step in to provide valuable
security functions (Goodhand, 2008; Musah, 2002; Skaperdas and
Syropoulos, 1997). For example, organised criminal groups have been
credited with saving Sarajevo when the city was under siege (Andreas, 2004,
2008). Likewise, war economies also fulfil certain socio-political functions.
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While groups who participate in war economies are often seen as the antithe-
ses of legitimate state governments, it has been suggested that in some cases
gangs fulfil the role of primitive states (Baumol, 1997; Skaperdas and
Syropoulos, 1997). For example, drug traffickers in Latin America have
contributed to social welfare programmes, with infamous drug lords such as
Pablo Escobar and Roberto Suarez funding education and leisure facilities,
providing scholarships and refurbishing churches (Richani, 1997; Shelley,
1999: 36). Taking this argument one step further, one must also consider the
work of Charles Tilly who has famously argued that ‘war makes states’ (1985)
but who also argued that ‘Banditry, piracy, gangland rivalry, policing and
war making all belong on the same continuum’ (Tilly, 1985: 170; see also
Downey, Bonds and Clark, 2010). In this sense, what one might classify as a
part of the war economy can also be considered as a historical element of the
statebuilding process. 
Besides providing opportunities for wealth accumulation to warlords,
criminals and political elites, many civilians also benefit economically from
these economies, revealing important economic functions of war economies.
Participating in a war economy is often a survival strategy for non-combat-
ants. Afghanistan is often cited as a prime example of this, where estimates
suggest that over half a million people are economically dependent on the war
economy (Goodhand, 2000: 92). As mentioned earlier, within war
economies, one can often find active and efficient credit markets, with
economic elites in these economies often providing small loans for local people
(Richani, 1997). Remittances from abroad, while sometimes used to support
armed rebellions, are also a key part of many people’s livelihoods in times of
conflict, suggesting that attempts to curb remittances to conflict zones in an
effort to reduce the ability of groups to purchase arms, may also have dire
economic consequences. The scale and thus impact of these economies is also
important. In Colombia, activities related to the war economy are estimated to
have accounted for 12.3 per cent of the country’s GDP in 1995 (Richani,
1997: 60). Likewise, the opium industry in Afghanistan is thought to account
for nearly 60 per cent of its GDP (UNODC, 2004). None of this is meant to
suggest that the structures of the war economy be left in place. These
economies are also based on violence, fear and extortion. The profits are
highly unequal, with much of the profits being accrued by elites and actors
outside the country. These economies also deny the state revenue which could
be used for post-conflict programming and social spending – in just one year it
is estimated that the Cambodian government lost nearly $100 million due to
illegal logging (Boyce, 2005: 294). Nevertheless, war economies do fulfil
certain functions at a local, national and international level. These functions
allow war economies to become deeply entrenched and therefore difficult to
transform.
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The ability to consider the above issues, and address war economies from
an SPE approach is limited, however, by the ideological underpinnings of DSI
interventions. Operational actors are constrained, at least in part, by ideology
to view phenomena through a technocratic lens (such as the RC approach to
war economies) and thus rely on technocratic or apolitical solutions:
solutions which fail to take into consideration the fraught and ongoing
political realities that will affect both the implementation and outcome of the
policy. But alongside the ideological constraints, which operate largely at the
level of agenda-setting (dominated by guiding actors), there are other hurdles
which hinder operational actors from moving away from an RC model and
integrate something more akin to an SPE approach. One convincing explana-
tion can be found in what Bradbury (1998) refers to as ‘functional ignorance’.
In order to be able to function and survive, organisations must focus on the
issues and problems which they feel can be solved, ignoring those that may
complicate their work. In the case of transforming war economies and peace-
building initiatives, it is perhaps also an issue of functional ignorance that
leads to faulty conceptualisations and problematic procedures. Due to the
complexity presented by a wider political-economy approach, actors fall back
on more simplistic models in attempts to understand problems and create
solutions. There is of course variety in the analytical models adopted by
actors, with individuals and institutions often moving along a spectrum
between the two extremes of rational choice versus structural approach. This
reality will become more apparent as cases of reform are assessed in coming
chapters. In these instances, understanding how and when the less
hegemonic choices are deviated from will prove an important field of investi-
gation.
Operationalising ideological and conceptual tendencies
The underlying ideological and conceptual foundations of transformation
policy are eventually translated into concrete operating procedures of the DSI,
and thus understanding the actual dilemmas and problems faced by policy
makers and implementers on the ground remains an essential task in creating
a holistic picture of processes of transformation. The tendency toward tech-
nocratic approaches, the realities of an agenda of control, preferences for
western cum (neo-) liberal institutions and other factors discussed in previous
sections have shaped the format of DSI and transformation policies in ways
that preclude more effective interventions. 
To begin, the DSI’s need to label the ‘other’, to differentiate between itself
and those whom it is trying to ‘help’, often blinds it to its own contributions to
hostilities and thus to war economies (Anderson, 1999; Uvin 1998, 1999).
Such contributions are at times overt, but at times less obvious. Examples of
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the former include the involvement of UN troops in the smuggling economy
during the Balkan wars (Andreas 2004: 38) and the payment of militias in
Somalia for protection by NGOs (Ahmed and Green 1999: 121). In terms of
less overt contributions to a conflict economy, one study has noted how
general practices of aid can be problematic: ‘British aid in the town of Prijedor
had bolstered the economic and political power of local political bosses who
had directed ethnic cleansing operations during the war . . . the hardliners in
the Serb Republic “will laugh all the way to the banks we have reconstructed
for them”’ (Boyce, 2002a: 1030, referring to reports from Human Rights
Watch, 1997 and Paul, 1997). Such forms of involvement are often portrayed
as a necessary evil, a means to a greater end. The reality, though, is that with
the DSI clearly impacting upon conflict dynamics it is not an objective third
party and the ability of DSI institutions to be reflective of their own contribu-
tion to war economies and to self-reform is limited. Their role and financial
interests in war economies themselves calls into question their central role in
transformation.
Beyond the issues of the DSI being a contributor to political-economies of
violence, operational procedures of the DSI also limit its potential to effective-
ly transform war economies. Critiques of the ways in which DSI structures
limit peacebuilding initiatives in general provide insight into some of the
problems the DSI faces in transforming war economies specifically. First, the
number of actors involved in this industry (encouraged by the free market
approach) makes coordination immensely difficult. The problem of coordina-
tion is increased as security and development actors try to work together
towards common goals. Differences in size, power, resources and mandates
make coordination between the military and civilian institutions especially
difficult. In the case of civil-military engagement, NGOs do not want to share
information with the military, fearing their relationship with local civilian
populations might be threatened (Aall, 2000). Likewise, the military are
known to act in a ‘hegemonic manner towards the NGOs, typified by the
attitude: “only we understand the security situation”’ (Abiew, 2003: 30).
Differences in organisational culture also impede meaningful coordination as
security institutions tend to have hierarchical, centralised command struc-
tures where the roles and responsibilities of actors are well defined.
Development institutions tend to be more flexible in nature, with decen-
tralised decision-making processes often based on consensus and shifting roles
and responsibilities (Abiew, 2003). Instead of real coordination, based on
high standards of performance, coordination often becomes little more than
combining the wish lists of the various actors (Natsios, 1995). 
A second problem, related to poor coordination, is the highly competitive
nature of the aid industry. Groups in competition with each other are less
likely to cooperate effectively, fearing the loss of their position in the industry
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if tasks are shared. Taking on characteristics of other highly competitive
industries, a growing number of organisations are vying for a finite amount of
funds. Competition is partly responsible for creating a need for quick, observ-
able results that can be easily quantified and presented to donors. Such
pressure has led to a preference for short-term, quick-fix projects which means
that in highly complex situations such as conflict and post-war environments,
there is little time for serious conflict analysis (Collinson et al., 2003). The
combined pressures of competition, demands for quick quantifiable results
and the danger of working in conflict-affected environments also leads to
agencies becoming extremely risk averse – not undertaking progressive,
creative or unique programming (Christpolos, Mitchell and Liljelund, 2001;
Goodhand, 2001; Montani and Majid, 2002). Associated with the above
pressures and concerns is ‘approval disbarment culture’ (Boyce 2002a)
whereby actors are forced to spend their budgets, regardless of views and
opinions on the effectiveness of doing so, in order to ensure their budgets do
not get cut in forthcoming years. 
Also related to the way the DSI functions is a general lack of capacity
which is linked to several associated problems. First, aid agencies are often
required to follow trends in the industry (Pugh, 1998). Organisations
therefore need to be able to adapt to whatever locales or causes donors choose
to focus on. With the geographical and topical focus of the industry constant-
ly in flux, it is impossible for many organisations, big or small, to be specialists
on all things and in all places. This is further complicated by the prevalence of
a contract culture (Schafer, 2002) and high levels of staff turnover (Schloms,
2003). Such factors limit any serious amount of institutional learning as the
experience and knowledge gained through staff experiences are lost. NGOs are
further disadvantaged in the new DSI as many of them lack the skills and
analysis they need to engage in security issues (Goodhand and Lewer, 1999).
Likewise, security actors may lack the necessary skills to engage in more
developmental work. These problems, related to having to engage in areas
which fall beyond the realm of an institution’s mandate, have been labelled as
mission creep and can affect all organisations, even the large and well-
resourced actors in the DSI. Of course none of the problems listed here are
unknown to those working within the industry. However, despite this recog-
nition, there appears little momentum for change, likely down to the fact that
at the macro level (at both the ideological and conceptual level) the blueprint
is correct and that there simply needs to be adjustment at the micro-policy
level. Without fundamental structural challenges to the aid system, it is ques-
tionable whether the above operational challenges to transformation can be
overcome.
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Analysing processes of transformation
Policies aimed at transforming war economies are being impacted upon by
several varied, yet interconnected forces. At the broadest of levels, the ideo-
logical foundations of the DSI have led to a preference for apolitical
programming which is both a fundamental characteristic of liberalism but
also a key strategy in masking the very political project of liberal peacebuild-
ing. These technologies of liberalism have numerous impacts on the nature
and quality of post-conflict programming generally and thus need to be
considered in relation to attempts to build economies of peace in conflict-
affected states. Further, ideological trends and inclinations within the DSI
have in turn had a direct impact on the ways in which the problem of war
economies have been conceptualised. Faced with two competing models for
the existence and growth of war economies, the appetite and need for apoliti-
cal perspectives, the desire for quick, easy solutions and a concomitant
reliance on liberal institutions has led to an unfortunate dominance of
rational choice explanations for the existence of and solutions to war
economies as opposed to the more holistic (though more complex) structural
political economy model. These processes and beliefs, focused on apolitical,
technocratic discourses and practices have shaped this industry in such a way
that the basic operating procedures and protocols are ill-equipped to handle
the complexity of issues such as war economy transformation. 
Of course, it would be wrong to argue that all actors within the DSI adopt
a purely RC model based on ideological tendencies and structural constraints.
As alluded to earlier, whilst there appears to be a bias towards liberal cum
rational choice understandings and thus solutions to the violence 
Decision-makers are both empowered and constrained by the ideational cate-
gories they have inherited from within their own societies and through which
they make sense of the world . . . the pre-existence of these ordering mechanisms
does not strip the individual of autonomy; for, in recognizing and acting within
these constraints, individuals are reproducing them and hence retain the possibil-
ity of changing them. (Dodge, 2010: 1271–1272)
Therefore, it is important to recognise as we move through forthcoming
analyses that whilst ideologically liberal foundations tend to drive actors
within the DSI towards a more RC-based approach, the aid arena is populated
by a diverse set of actors and, more importantly, by individuals. This reality
creates opportunities for deviations from the narrowly viewed liberal models.
In the coming chapters, detailed analyses of the implementation of reforms
aimed at transforming war economies are undertaken. Using the above
debates regarding the ideological, conceptual and operational characteristics
of the DSI as preliminary lenses, these case studies will explore the tangible
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practices and impacts of the liberal project on war economy transformation.
In doing so, a clearer picture of the dominance of liberalism and the concomi-
tant failure to transform economies will be exposed with a detailed framework
of how to understand war economies and transformation policies presented in
Chapter 8. Within this framework, opportunities for deviating from the liberal
model and potentially moving towards more positive modes of political-
economic interaction will be highlighted.
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4
Transforming a war economy: learning from
the case of  Kosovo
HAVING BUILT up a preliminary framework in the previous chapterthrough which war economies and transformation policies can beassessed, the case of Kosovo and transformation policies implemented
by the DSI following the conflict there will be analysed, not simply to test the
framework but to build and improve upon it. As a starting point, it is
important to note that the conflict in Kosovo has primarily been analysed in
relation to violence between its two main ethnic groups or the ethics and
legality of the NATO intervention there in 1999. Unlike other civil wars, the
economic dynamics of this conflict have received much less attention in terms
of academic investigations into the political-economy of conflict. However,
the same economic processes and relationships which in both academic and
policy circles are cited as impacting more ‘infamous’ war economies, such as
those in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, have been well documented by aid
practitioners and policy makers as having impacted upon the conflict and
post-conflict dynamic in Kosovo. 
Although less visible in terms of media coverage and popular conceptions
of the causes and key characteristics of the political violence there, economic
motivations, the trade of goods and services to fund the war and the ongoing
impact of such economic issues in the post-conflict phase are indeed defining
features of all of the Balkan conflicts which took place throughout the 1990s
(Andreas, 2004; Gouvnev, 2003; Hislope, 2002; Korovilas, 2002; Pugh and
Cooper, 2004). In these conflicts, rebel factions engaged in illicit cross-border
trade in order to buy arms and continue their struggle, large profits were 
made by conflict entrepreneurs, remittances from the Diaspora were a
defining feature and source of funding, the political and economic benefits of
peace have been divided amongst former belligerents and there has been a
continuance of these activities and relationships into the post-conflict phase.
Of course, each war economy and the factors contributing to it need to be
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contextualised. The particular political, social and economic dynamics influ-
encing the nature and impact of each war economy needs to be considered not
only in analytical terms but also in terms of creating policies to transform it. 
Following a review of the war economy in Kosovo, analysis in Chapters 5
to 7 will draw on the processes of intervention and post-conflict programming
related to attempts to transform it. While a unique case in some regards, the
examination of practices of aid and intervention in the area does have a wider
applicability. Kosovo provides an excellent opportunity to study the transfor-
mation agenda in a broad and general sense as it has undergone rapid and
extreme forms of intervention, with the DSI engaging in extensive program-
ming in several relevant transformation policies. These reforms have been
implemented with great speed and by a wide range of actors, allowing for
comparative work that results in a more comprehensive analysis of transfor-
mation attempts. Further, Kosovo is an informative case due to the longevity
of intervention by the DSI. Whilst this study does not cover the entirety of the
intervention (focusing primarily on the era before Kosovo declared independ-
ence), it does explore processes of intervention that cover nearly a decade of
reform. Further, aid praxis in Kosovo, whilst itself influenced by liberal peace
blueprints, has also doubled as a laboratory for creating new techniques and
reworking reform processes that have in turn influenced subsequent inter-
ventions, making it an essential case study for understanding ongoing and
future transformation projects.
Finally, it is important to note that it is not the concrete outcomes of the
reforms in Kosovo (which are indeed context-specific moving targets) which
offer the most useful lessons regarding transformation programming, but
rather the general processes of reform observed in a range of interventions.
What is under scrutiny, and where the most utility in terms of understanding
DSI interventions can be found, are the day-to-day mechanics of peacebuild-
ing and statebuilding. Therefore, this work is not concerned with assessing
the final effects of intervention (if that is even possible), but rather with the
motivations and rationale that underpin policy decisions which affect the
course of post-conflict economies. The relevant lessons come from under-
standing the varied trajectories of reform as opposed to any clear end state. In
other words, the real value of exploring the case of Kosovo over several years
of intervention, is that it provides an assessment of policy implementation as
it was occurring, and not simply a post-facto assessment. An important
finding that emerges from studying these active moments of reform is the
heterogeneity of responses. Whilst faced with underlying principles, blue-
prints and a comparable set of circumstances, forthcoming analysis reveals
that actors within the DSI do adopt a range of strategies when faced with
similar situations – some of these fitting with the liberal peace discourse and
others appearing to deviate from the expected template. The revelations of
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conformity, diversity and even subversion discovered through an assessment
of transformation policies in Kosovo will offer much in terms of understanding
both the hurdles to and opportunities for effective transformation elsewhere.
The political economy of violence in Kosovo: evidence and intervention
The history of political violence in Kosovo has been well studied and scruti-
nised (Cviic, 2005; Djilas, 1998; Vickers, 1994, 1998). However, several
notable events are relevant for understanding the outbreak of war in the
territory in the 1990s, and the NATO intervention that followed. To begin, a
series of decisions made by the Serbian parliament throughout the 1980s
which sought to increase Serbian state control over Kosovo are often cited as
key triggers to the outbreak of violence in the following decade. These
decisions culminated in the territory’s autonomous status being formally
revoked in 1990. Such a shift was a major disruption to the status quo in
Kosovo, which while formally part of Serbia had previously enjoyed a great
deal of independence from the state. In 1963 it had been granted provincial
status, similar to the province of Vojvodina in the north of Serbia, and by the
1970s enjoyed a status almost on a par with the other republics of Yugoslavia
(Djilas, 1998). The 1969 Serbian parliament made constitutional changes
granting Kosovo its own Supreme Court and policy-making powers as well as
language and minority rights. The revocation of autonomous status was
accompanied by the firing, en masse, of Albanians from civil service positions.
In response, the Albanian community, which made up roughly 88 per cent of
the population (Vickers, 1994: 40) organised a referendum in 1991, resulting
in Kosovo declaring itself an independent and sovereign republic. Ibrahim
Rugova of the Albanian Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was elected
president. This referendum was not recognised by the Serbs, the Serbian state
or other external actors. Under Rugova, Kosovo embarked on a non-violent
campaign of peaceful resistance to Serb rule. A parallel financial system which
collected a 3 per cent tax from Albanians abroad and within the country was
used to fund a shadow administration which included the provision of health-
care and education. This tax was collected mostly through voluntary
contributions, although there is some evidence of coercion. 
The territory operated in this way, with relatively low levels of physical
violence, for the first half of the 1990s, although Serbian reprisals and arrests
of Albanian political leaders were growing, along with increased violence
against civilians. Nonetheless, Rugova’s non-violence agenda prevailed until
the middle of the decade at which point divisions within Kosovo Albanian
society emerged and the peaceful facade rapidly disintegrated. Explanations
regarding the causes of this disintegration are varied. One explanation
surrounds the failure of the international community to address problems in
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Kosovo during the Dayton accords which resolved the conflicts in Croatia and
Bosnia (O’Neill, 2002). The failure to reward Kosovars for the non-violent
approach, and the decision not to push for agreements on Kosovo with the
Serb regime, led some in the territory to question the policy of non-violent
resistance, strengthening more radical elements within the area, including
elements committed to using violence to achieve political ends (Yannis,
2003). Further, the failure of Dayton to deal with the problem of Kosovo
possibly emboldened Milosevic to pursue a policy of ethnic cleansing and
repression in Kosovo (Hirsch, 1999). 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia led to the Serbian government tighten-
ing its grip on what territory and resources it could control – this included
Kosovo. In addition, the wars in the other parts of the former Yugoslavia led
to increased immigration of Serbs to Kosovo which altered the demographic
balance and increased social tensions (O’Neill, 2002). Changes in the political
situation in the state of Albania also changed the political dynamic of Kosovo,
modifying the opportunity structure in favour of those committed to using
violence to achieve independence. In 1997 the Albanian state collapsed, and
as Judah notes, ‘in the ensuing chaos the government lost control, the army
dissolved, the police ran away and arms depots were thrown open . . . The
significance of this was not lost on the Kosovans – guns and ammunition
suddenly available for virtually nothing and no more central government in
Tirana to prevent them smuggling as much as they could carry back to
Kosovo’ (2002: 128). An almost unlimited supply of cheap weapons became
readily available to emerging armed groups in Kosovo. The armed groups
buying weapons were the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Armed
Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) (Lani, 1999) though in the end it was
the KLA that emerged as the dominant rebel group. Formed some time
between 1992 and 1993, they were originally linked to the political
movement the Kosovo People’s Movement (KPM) who had a leftist ideology,
though this diminished in importance with time (Lani, 1999). Support for the
KLA continued to grow throughout the mid-1990s and by 1997 violence
between the KLA and Serb forces had spread throughout the territory. 
In October of 1998 an agreement brokered by the American diplomat
Richard Holbrooke with Milosevic led to a ceasefire in Kosovo and the deploy-
ment of an unarmed Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) monitoring delegation, the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). While
there to monitor abuses by all parties to the conflict, including KLA reprisals
against Serb forces and civilians, the mission’s reports are telling, conclud-
ing that ‘the violence perpetrated against Albanians was planned and
organised at the highest levels of Serbian authority. The Serb army, police
and paramilitaries were not rogue actors, “out of control” and carrying out
their own personal vendettas’ (O’Neill, 2002: 25). Evidence led to affirma-
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tions that the Serbian state was acting in violation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1199 which called for a halt to Serbian repression of civilians.
As the cycle of attacks and reprisals worsened, the KVM was evacuated on
20 March 1999. Simultaneous but ultimately unsuccessful peace talks in the
French town of Rambouillet failed to bring a peaceful resolution (Judah,
2002). The failure of the Rambouillet talks coupled with the damaging
reports by the KVM led to the launch of a NATO air campaign against the
Serbian regime. Beginning on 24 March 1999, NATO bombed targets both
within Kosovo and Serbia proper. Russia, a traditional ally of Serbia,
suspended its cooperation with NATO. On the ground, the KLA were accepted
as ground troops (O’Neill, 2002) and cooperated with NATO troops along
the Albanian border (ICG,1999c; interview with international staff, 2006).
The bombardment ended on 10 June after a negotiated withdrawal of Serbian
forces from the territory. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 left a United
Nations administration (the United Nations Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK) in
control of Kosovo pending the resolution of final status. Over 42,000 NATO
troops formed a peacekeeping force (KFOR). Serbia, de jure, retained its sover-
eignty over the territory and thus, technically, Kosovo remained part of the
Serbian state. 
The growth of Kosovo’s war economy 
Beginning with international economic interests in the region and then
moving on to regional, state, group and individual economic interests, one
can see how economic agendas, motivations and relationships have impacted
the conflict in Kosovo, allowing one to speak of a Kosovan war economy. First,
given the large investment by the international community in the previous
Balkan conflicts, the Kosovo intervention can be seen as a means through
which international actors were able to protect the financial and military
gains already made in the region. A large civil war in Kosovo could have
destabilised the region, negating many of the political and economic gains
that had been made through other peacebuilding programmes. One also
needs to consider the more contentious issue of oil. While it would be
erroneous to suggest that the Kosovo conflict was primarily about oil, it would
also be short-sighted to ignore the role of this commodity in the regional
conflict dynamic. Fisher (2002) provides a detailed and balanced analysis of
role of oil in the Kosovan and wider Balkan conflicts, finding that the need to
protect western investments by ensuring a stable and safe route for Caspian oil
westwards has been, and continues to be, a key concern for western policy
makers. Further, the profits of large multinational and foreign companies
should be recognised. As Gottstien argues, ‘In all countries, but especially the
highly industrialised ones, the military industry reaps the greatest profits from
73
Transforming a war economy: Kosovo
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 73
war. The military-industrial complex plays a highly effective economic and
political role in ensuring the persistence of war’ (1999: 59). 
Indeed, the stock prices of many large military manufacturing companies
rapidly increased following the commencement of the Kosovo campaign
(Talbot, 2000: 101) and in the post-conflict phase private military companies
such as the American firm Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) have
also profited from conflict. This is not to say that NATO countries intervened
purely to ensure a profit for private companies, nor is it to deny the tremen-
dous cost of the campaign. What the above does point to is that whether about
a specific commodity, oil for example, or a commitment to a wider reform
agenda such as facilitating global trade, international economic concerns are
clearly central to understanding international intervention in the territory. If
analysis of a war economy involves understanding who profits from conflict
and how, all of these issues become pertinent. 
The same can be said in terms of understanding the economic interests of
regional actors. Despite being one of the poorest regions of the former
Yugoslavia, Kosovo contains some of the largest mineral deposits in the region
including zinc, lignite and coal. The Trepça mining complex, located in the
Serbian-dominated northern region of Kosovo, was estimated to be worth
approximately $5 billion at the end of the conflict (Talbot, 2000), a figure
which rose to roughly $14 billion in 2007 according to reports from Kosovo’s
Ministry of Energy and Mining and the Independent Commission for Mines
and Minerals (ECIKS, 2007). Although a revival of the former mining
industry to output levels seen before the war is unlikely, control over these
resources has unquestionably affected the conflict dynamic (this will be
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6). Also at the regional level, sanctions
against Yugoslavia by the international community in the early 1990s
altered the political-economic dynamic of the conflict. These sanctions, and
the effect they had on the availability of goods, led to inflation of 1000 per cent
by 1993 (Gottstein, 1999: 60). Gas for heating and cooking became difficult
to obtain, as did medical supplies. This meant that smuggling became an
increasingly important and lucrative part of the regional economy, creating ‘a
profitable war economy for both the KLA and the Serbian government’
(Yannis, 2003: 175). Smugglers were also being paid $900 per adult to
smuggle Kosovans to safety during the conflict (Cilluffo and Salmoiraghi,
1999: 22). These transnational trading and smuggling networks emerged in
order to provide goods and services to the local population, the profits of which
were at times converted into individual economic wealth, but were also used
to build up and maintain power by political groups in both Serbia and Kosovo. 
It is worth noting that while problematic in terms of contributing to the
criminal economy, some smuggling served a valuable function insofar as it
provided much-needed goods to conflict-affected communities. The
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smuggling element of the war economy may have also served a positive
security function. Some evaluations of the role of ethnicity in the war
economy in Serbia and Kosovo suggest that smuggling had a stabilising effect.
As one commentator proposes, ‘ethnic unrest in Kosovo was partly contained
in the early 1990s by the profits generated from sanctions busting and other
underground economic activities, contributing to a Serbian-Albanian “pax
Mafiosi” . . . worsening economic conditions following the lifting of sanctions
further exacerbated ethnic tensions’ (Andreas, 2005 referring to Strazzari,
2003). Interviews conducted in the territory confirmed the cooperation
between various ethnic groups in smuggling, with one respondent noting that
crime is ‘the only field where nobody has to insist for it to be multi-ethnic’. 
Political-economic issues can also be understood as impacting the conflict
at a micro level by looking at the motivations and opportunity structure of
local groups and individuals. In the case of Kosovo, analysis at this level
focuses on the ways in which the KLA was able to fund its armed struggle as
opposed to looking at individual wealth accumulation (although there is
evidence that many individuals were personally enriched during the Kosovo
conflict). Funding for the conflict primarily came from two sources. First,
there is convincing evidence of links between the criminal groups engaged in
drug smuggling and the KLA. Approximately $250 million from the heroin
trade is alleged to have gone towards funding the armed resistance in Kosovo
(Hislope, 2002: 38; Makarenko, 2004). Of course, historically, Kosovo rests in
the middle of a drugs trading route that sees drug travel from Afghanistan,
Pakistan and Turkey before making their way across the Balkans and into
Western Europe (Stefavnova, 2004). The smuggling of drugs through this
region cannot be seen simply as a function of the wars and the actions of the
KLA. 
Besides these illicit forms of funding, the war effort was also largely
supported through donations from the Albanian Diaspora through the
‘Homeland is Calling’ fund. It is estimated that the KLA received approxi-
mately $163 million through this network of contributions which collected
money from across North America and Western Europe (Hislope, 2002: 38).
While the 3 per cent tax was collected separately and went primarily to
support the parallel Albanian governance systems, there is evidence that
some of this money was diverted to fund FARK. But even this more licit form
of conflict funding had links to criminal elements – two bank accounts were
shut down by German authorities when it was discovered that known drug
traffickers were making deposits; one of these accounts had in fact been
opened by Bukoshi, the chairman of the LDK (Hislope, 2002). Of course, not
all war economy analysis at this level relates to the funding of the KLA. During
the 1990s there is evidence of Albanian extortion and protection rackets that
demanded money for protecting Albanians from Serbs (Yannis, 2003),
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tempering the portrayal of Kosovo’s war economy participants as always or
only concerned with supporting the cause of independence. 
The war economy also needs to be understood not just in terms of wealth
accumulation or as an avenue for acquiring arms, but alternatively in the
way that it became part of a livelihood strategy for many Kosovans. Between
1989 and 1994 the GDP in Kosovo decreased by 50 per cent and unemploy-
ment reached 70 per cent in 1995 (Yannis, 2003: 173–174). Joining the KLA
or participating in the war economy was, for some, a way of earning a living
and providing for their family. However, it is important not to overemphasise
profit or even income as a motivation for joining the KLA as political goals
remained a strong factor for engaging in the conflict. As Yannis notes ‘many,
if not most, of the young volunteers were joining the KLA not for money but
for the cause of independence. Indeed a significant number of KLA recruits
returned from the Diaspora, leaving behind lucrative jobs and physical safety
to take up arms for Kosovo’ (2003: 177). 
All of this requires one to problematise notions of economic motivations in
violent conflict as they highlight the multiplicity of motivations which lead
individuals and groups to take up arms. While economic opportunities clearly
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Table 4.1 Kosovo’s war economy
Actors Economic motivations or activities 
International organisations Protection of peacekeeping investments already made
(NATO/UN) and western
governments Installation of neo-liberal economic regimes
Western governments and MNCs, Ensuring safe route for oil from Caspian sea westwards
private military companies/private
security companies Arms sales, military/security contracts
Serbia and Kosovo Control over mineral deposits in Kosovo (Trepça mining
complex)
Serbian officials, organised crime Sanctions-busting:  provision of oil, medical supplies, 
groups, informal traders, various luxury goods for profit, and the consolidation of political 
foreign actors power
KLA and Diaspora ‘Homeland is Calling’ fund to support KLA
KLA and organised crime groups Drug smuggling, extortion/protection rackets, human
smuggling for profit and to support armed uprising
Informal traders and citizens Smuggling as a form of employment/livelihood strategy; 
throughout region and 3% tax
internationally
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impact upon the character of wars, such incentives co-exist and are often
entwined with other motivating factors and drivers of violent conflict. Groups,
and thus motivations, are not homogenous and may change over the course
of a conflict. This being said, economic motivations as well as the economic
opportunities presented by the war economy also proved highly influential in
this conflict. The complexity and interaction of economic and political
interests at multiple levels (summarised in Table 4.1) are clearly illustrative of
both the need the utility of undertaking an SPE approach to analysing war
economies. 
The legacy of Kosovo’s war economy
The above political-economic issues and concerns did not end with the
cessation of hostilities and have continued to impact post-conflict Kosovo.
These legacies of the war economy can be divided into three broad but inter-
related categories: economic, criminal and security/political. The economic
impact of continued illicit trading is relatively straightforward. Public
revenues in 2001 were estimated to be at only 50 per cent of their potential
with 80 per cent of the missing revenue being attributed to illegal activities
(Yannis, 2003: 181). Looking at just one smuggled commodity is telling – the
Kosovo central budget is deprived of an estimated $18 million per year as a
result of cigarette smuggling (Stefanova, 2004: 271). This limits funding
available for post-conflict reconstruction programmes and public spending on
health and education programmes. Another economic legacy can be seen in
the area of privatisation, one of the key strategies for economic development
in the territory. Many of the former KLA fighters and former political elite
have become major players in the post-conflict privatisation of former socially
owned enterprises (SOEs), using their position and influence to capture many
of these businesses and the property on which they sit. It is also estimated that
80 per cent of 15,000 land transfers, from municipal to private hands, are
either illegal or questionable (Stefanova, 2004: 272). This process and the
impact of this capture will be further discussed in Chapter 6, but it is worth
noting that the privatising of SOEs in the territory has become a new arena of
conflict in the post-war era as former KLA, criminal groups, political elite,
Albanians and Serbs struggle over their control. 
At the same time, remnants of the war economy are fulfilling a socio-
economic function in the territory. Despite the negative impacts of organised
crime (OC), this economy can also be seen as a vital source of income for
citizens of various ethnicities, pointing to an overlap between a positive
economic function and a negative criminal legacy of the war economy. A
report conducted by Kosovan researchers concludes that ‘high unemploy-
ment combined with corruption has created a fertile recruiting ground for
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both militias and organised crime groups. Most people cannot survive
economically without links to organised crime’ (Nahzi, 2006: 25). Supporting
this, a large-scale public consultation on security issues in Kosovo determined
that economic issues, such as poverty and unemployment, were contributing
to other security threats including organised crime (ISSR, 2006). 
However, despite the socio-economic function served, the negative
impacts of OC on the territory are obvious. Relationships based on extortion
and fear continued in the immediate post-conflict phase with a campaign
called ‘Friends of the KPC’ (the Kosovo Protection Corps is the demobilised
KLA), collecting ‘donations’ from businesses of 300–3,000 DM per month per
business (Yannis, 2003: 182). Some former KLA members continue to use
fear, force and the power they gained as freedom fighters as means for profit.
Despite the above concerns over extortion, however, the main criminal
activity which is of concern is smuggling. Kosovan groups now handle double
the levels of heroin they did before the 1999 war (Yannis, 2003: 182). Profits
made from these activities both during and after the war have been laundered
through the construction, travel/tourism industry and petrol stations. In
relation to illegal cigarettes, interviews conducted with customs agents in the
territory suggested that 10–15 per cent of cigarettes entered the territory
illegally and that the problem appeared to be getting worse (I82) – with one
report suggesting that between 20 and 30 per cent of cigarettes in Kosovo
were smuggled (BIRN Kosovo, 2006). Other finds, such as 130kg of gold in
2006 (UCS, 2006) and the discovery of an illegal drinks warehouse (UCS,
2007b) illustrate the diversity of illegal trade in the territory.
In terms of political and security legacies, there are again several interre-
lated concerns. One of the most obvious examples here is the Macedonian
uprising in 2001. Actors linked to Kosovo’s war economy were found to have
helped organise and facilitate this rebellion (Hislope, 2002; Yannis, 2003).
The Albanian National Army (a small force believed to be made up of
primarily former KLA fighters) continued to cause problems in southern
Serbia and inside Kosovo (OSCE, 2003c) and were rumoured to have links to
the disarmed KLA (KPC and now KPF) as well as organised crime groups. In
relation to political governance in the territory, at least two legacies of under-
ground economic activity are relevant. In Serb-dominated areas such as
North Mitrovica, Serbian parallel structures have emerged (OSCE, 2003a,
2006/7), with the Serbian state providing funding and income for healthcare,
education, judicial bodies and security actors in these areas. While not linked
directly to the more infamous side of Kosovo’s war economy, these economic
arrangements between Serbs living in Kosovo and the Serbian state are a
direct result of the ongoing political conflict and have resulted in both inter-
national and Kosovan political bodies having limited control in terms of
governing these areas. In Albanian areas, former KLA commanders quickly
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filled local power vacuums (Yannis, 2001), creating de factomunicipal admin-
istrations and collecting taxes from local residents and businesses. This is an
extension of the war economy, with the same actors controlling the economic
resources (and political power) as during the war. Most of these actors even-
tually joined the formal Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG)
system which would eventually form Kosovo’s new independent government.
Still, the funding of Kosovo’s main political parties remains an issue. Funding
is believed to come from ‘the economic underworld of Kosovo, the wider
region, and several European states . . . These links risk subordinating
political and economic decision making in Kosovo to the priorities of
organised crime at the expense of the society at large’ (Yannis, 2003: 188).
This points to an overlap or blending between political and criminal actors
within Kosovo and suggests serious problems related to political corruption.
The much talked-about links between organised crime and Kosovo’s demo-
cratically elected government are perhaps of greatest concern when
considering the legacy of the war economy in Kosovo. It should be noted that
despite rumours, verifiable evidence linking organised crime to politics is
lacking. There have been persistent reports of the involvement of former
Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj in the smuggling of cigarettes and petrol
between western Kosovo and Montenegro though formal charges have not
been laid (ICG, 2000b). During interviews conducted with senior internation-
al personnel in Kosovo, such connections were commonly alluded to, but
never proved. One extreme view expressed by a senior UNMIK officer is that
‘Kosovo is not ruled by politics. There are three families and the political actors
are influenced by families’ (I34). These three families are thought to be key
players in organised crime. No documents were provided, nor were specific
names given and it should be noted that other security agents based in the
territory saw little connection between crime and politics in Kosovo (I10,
I65). Nonetheless, such accusations and perceptions of political connections
to the world of organised crime persist and continue to affect political devel-
opment in Kosovo. In 2009 a self-confessed criminal, Nazim Bllaca, publicly
accused senior members of Kosovo’s government and security structures of
being involved in organised crime, leading to a series of investigations of
political actors and ongoing international and public distrust of Kosovo’s
leading political actors and institutions.
Although the effects of and opinions regarding the supposed crime-politics
nexus are varied (and will be further discussed in forthcoming chapters), a few
general issues regarding these legacies of the war economy are worth high-
lighting. A senior UN police officer suggests that the ramifications of organised
crime are broad: ‘Organised crime is a threat for the whole society. People see
organised crime and think . . . Why can’t these people be prosecuted? This
causes them to lose trust in state institutions’ (I47). A document compiled by
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the OSCE and KPS adds to this, finding that ‘organised crime has gained an
increasingly prominent role in Kosovo . . . These illicit activities are affecting
all levels of society as they challenge human rights protection, undermine
democratisation processes, disrespect the rule of law and interfere with insti-
tution building, reform efforts and potential investment in Kosovo’ (OSCE,
KPSS and American Department of Justice, 2003). From these opinions, the
need to address the relationship between crime and politics in the area is clear,
though the processes through which this can and should happen will be prob-
lematised in forthcoming chapters. It is also worth noting that, arguably,
there is at least one positive outcome of the criminal/political legacy Kosovo’s
war economy – the supposed links between organized crime groups and the
KLA are partly responsible for renewed popularity of Rugova and the LDK
(Judah, 2002). This was a positive outcome, not because the LDK can objec-
tively be seen as a more positive force in Kosovo politics, but in that it restored
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Table 4.2 The legacy of Kosovo’s war economy 
Sphere Area of impact Details
Economic Public revenue 80 percent of budget losses attributed to
illegal activity (Yannis, 2003: 181)
Privatisation KLA/former combatants purchasing SOEs
Livelihood strategy Fuels organised crime but provides a vital
source of income for some segments of
population
Criminal Continued smuggling Primarily high excise goods (oil/cigarettes)
Entrenchment and growth Possible extortion/protection rackets,
of OC increased criminality in territory
Political/security Contribution to ongoing Involvement of OC in uprising in 2001 
insecurity Macedonian conflict, and fringe armed
groups in Kosovo
Formation of de facto Ex-combatants/war economy participants
governing structures fill power vacuum in immediate post-
conflict phase
Parallel structures in Serbian areas make it
difficult  for UNMIK/PISG and newly inde-
pendent government to govern
Political corruption Criminal groups influencing political
parties
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some balance within Kosovo, ensuring that post-war politics were not
completely dominated by parties descending from the former KLA. 
The above illustrates that the war economy in Kosovo has not been trans-
formed and continues to be significant in the post-conflict phase having an
impact on levels of crime, political corruption and economic development (as
summarised in Table 4.2). These legacies hinder peacebuilding efforts and
provide evidence that current attempts to transform political-economic rela-
tionships in the territory have been less than successful, a reality that requires
a detailed assessment of the ways in which the political-economic transition of
the country has been handled by the international community who were
entrusted with the governing of the country from 1999 onwards.
Governing post-conflict Kosovo: the DSI and war economy transformation
Immediately following the conflict, the former KLA leadership formed a de
facto administration, often competing with UNMIK civil administrators for
control over parts of the territory. However, after negotiations with all
political parties, a system referred to as the Provisional Institutions of Self
Government (PISG) was created, resulting in a mechanism through which
Kosovan actors could cooperate with the UNMIK administration in the
running of the territory. In the immediate post-conflict phase, several parties
came to dominate Kosovan politics – the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)
(former President Rugova’s party) the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK)
(made up primarily of former KLA personnel) and the Alliance for the Future
of Kosovo (AAK) (also closely associated with the former KLA). Initially, there
was limited variance between the position of these parties on social, economic
and political issues. Throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century,
Kosovo Albanian politics was dominated by the issue of independence. But
despite the unifying goal of independence, political rivalries between Albanian
parties have remained strong and political violence between parties is
common. Serbian participation in these structures varies greatly, with some
boycotting all structures of UNMIK, the PISG during the years of UN trustee-
ship, and post-independence Kosovan institutions. Other minorities have set
up their own parties, but their impact on Kosovan politics is limited due to
their size. 
At the end of the NATO airstrikes in 1999 and up until the declaration of
independence by Kosovo in 2008, political, economic and security gover-
nance in Kosovo was managed by NATO and UN missions. While the UN did
not sanction the NATO bombing, the alliance’s peacekeeping force (KFOR)
received its mandate from UNSC Resolution 1244 as well as a Military
Technical Agreement signed with the former Yugoslavian regime. They coop-
erated closely with the civilian arm of the UN trusteeship, UNMIK, whose
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mandate also came from UNSC Resolution 1244. The resolution had two
basic tenets: first, a commitment to the territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and secondly the creation of substantial autonomy
and self-administration for Kosovo (O’Neill, 2002). The first tenet largely
ensured that Russia would not veto the resolution at the UN and confirmed
Kosovo as legally remaining part of the Serbian state. A major barrier to
achieving the latter aim of the resolution is that ‘no one knew what the terms
“substantial autonomy” and “meaningful self-administration” really meant’
(O’Neill, 2002: 30). Resolution 1244 granted the UN administration
executive control over all of Kosovo’s governing institutions. All laws,
programmes, political and economic agreements had to be approved by the
Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). Numerous interna-
tional and local NGOs, as well as bi-lateral agencies and IFIs, supported the
work of the UNMIK pillars. The UNMIK mission was largely dominated by
European actors – the SRSG for example has without exception been
European. However, the Americans, as the largest economic donor, have had
a strong political influence in the territory and have largely been seen as the
most influential in the police and justice sector.
At the beginning of the mission, the issue of independence was pushed to
the background as the humanitarian and immediate reconstruction needs of
the territory were met. However, as Kosovo’s governing, judicial and security
institutions became stronger and more independent, the neutral stance of
some international actors over the issue of independence diminished, with
some actors informally stating their preference for an independent Kosovo.
Formal talks to attempt to deal with the issue of status began in 2005, led by
UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. The talks suffered a number of setbacks
with neither the Serb nor Albanian sides willing to deviate from their original
positions on independence. Russia’s threats to veto any UN Security Council
resolution which would grant Kosovo supervised independence led to a
cancellation of a vote on the issue at the UN. Negotiations were later taken
over by the Contact Group (the USA, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and
Russia). However the desire for a negotiated settlement was left unfulfilled
with Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence on 17 February 2008.
Key states such as the USA, Britain, France and Germany recognised Kosovo’s
independence almost immediately, with Canada, Japan, Croatia, Montenegro
and Macedonia following suit within months. As of 2013 many states have
yet to recognise Kosovo and recognition at the UN and the EU is doubtful in
the short to medium term due to the stance of states such as Russia and Spain.
Nonetheless, Kosovo formally joined the IMF and World Bank in 2009, setting
it on a clear path to statehood despite the contestations of many actors.
With the declaration of independence by Kosovo’s elected government,
UNMIK’s role in the territory was greatly diminished and the power of
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Resolution 1244 called into question. Technically, UNMIK’s role and the
authority of 1244 remained intact after independence – however, Kosovo’s
Albanian-dominated political bodies continually called on the UN to formally
cease its mission, arguing that with the declaration of independence, Kosovan
actors and institutions are no longer legally required to abide by Resolution
1244 (UNSC, 2009). Cooperation between what remains of UNMIK in the
territory and Kosovo’s political institutions exists primarily at the practical
level, although in the Serbian-dominated areas of northern Kosovo, the UN
has retained its relevance, acting as an arbitrator between the Serbian
community and the new Kosovan institutions which the Serbs largely reject.
The new EU law and justice mission (EULEX) took over many of the rule of law
programmes once run by the UN, maintaining some executive powers such as
the right to respond to security emergencies and to try cases within the
judicial system. Their role has primarily been to monitor, advise and train
Kosovo’s police, judicial and customs services. It is expected that KFOR will
not substantially reduce its troop numbers and will remain in the territory at
least well into the second decade of the twenty-first century. Following inde-
pendence, the International Civilian Office (ICO) now played a key role in
terms of international influence. Consisting of actors from a range of
countries, but seen by some as being heavily influenced by western European
and American actors, this institution was largely supportive of Kosovo’s inde-
pendence and was focused on stabilising economic and political life in Kosovo.
Given its favourable position on independence, it maintained a fairly coopera-
tive relationship with the government of Kosovo.
Despite the breadth of actors involved in Kosovo’s reconstruction and the
wide range of programme areas over which the DSI has presided, there has
never been a specific policy or programme to deal with the problem of
Kosovo’s war economy. As will be discussed in upcoming chapters, having
been framed in terms of the ‘ethnic conflict’ discourse, issues of political-
economy were not a priority in the immediate post-conflict phase in the same
way that the problem of diamonds in Sierra Leone or poppy crops in
Afghanistan have been. However, three key areas of reform are having an
impact on the transformation of political-economic relationships in the
territory, namely, rule of law reform (which addresses the criminal legacies of
the war economy), the privatisation scheme (which can be seen both as a
cause of and a response to the war and post-war economy) and finally,
customs reform (which is at the forefront of dealing with the ongoing
smuggling which affects not only Kosovo but other countries within the
region). Each of the following chapters provides evidence of these three trans-
formation programmes based on research conducted in Kosovo. Analysis of
the implementation of these policies by the DSI reveals the general inability of
dominant liberal technologies to fundamentally transform war economies,
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which begs for a reconsideration of their policies and approaches in relation to
other political economies of violence. From the case of Kosovo’s transforma-
tion, however, strong evidence is provided regarding potential avenues for
altering or deviating from the liberal blueprint with the aim of working
towards more effective positive transformation.
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85
5
Strengthening the rule of  law: managing the
criminal facets of  war economies
GIVEN THAT much of the activity surrounding war economies is consideredto occur in the criminal realm, strengthening the rule of law (RoL) hascome to be seen as central to the DSI’s transformation agenda. In
theory, effective investigation, capture and prosecution of criminal actors will
help to dismantle ongoing links between illegal economic activities and
political violence. Building up the RoL may also act as a deterrent to other
actors; the perception of effective legal and security institutions may increase
the perceived risk of being involved in these activities, thereby diminishing the
incentive for individuals to become involved in criminal enterprise. Finally,
improved RoL can also contribute to the wider goals of positive transforma-
tion insofar as it reduces levels of criminality within an area more generally,
increasing the levels of personal security along with levels of transparency
within society as a whole. In this sense, this reform area can further the goal
of justice in the post-conflict phase, with the benefits of programming
contributing to a more equitable society. 
These justifications for the importance of RoL programming in the trans-
formation agenda are strengthened by the fact that in some cases individuals
working within RoL institutions are themselves active in modes of criminality
that contribute to political economies of violence (Brand, 2002; Dziedzic et al.,
2002; Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov, 2006). Security agents, both
local and international, are known to be either the direct beneficiaries of
conflict-related trade, or complicit-facilitators who benefit from the corrup-
tion on which other war economy participants rely. Given the degree to which
agents of security become enmeshed in war economies, particular attention
needs to be paid to how these actors are themselves reformed. 
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Managing organised crime in Kosovo
Although rule of law programming involves a wide range of institutions, this
chapter will specifically examine reforms to Kosovo’s security services and
judicial system with the aim of exploring the ways in which the criminal facets
of Kosovo’s war economy have been approached. The case of Kosovo provides
an excellent case study for such an exploration as the problem of OC remains a
central feature of both Kosovo’s past war economy and its post-conflict legacy.
The tumultuous history of Kosovo vis-à-vis its relationship with Serbia and
the Yugoslav Federation resulted in many changes to RoL institutions within
the territory which have in turn impacted the ability of these bodies to manage
problems of criminality during the conflict itself and in the post- conflict
phase. As with other sectors of Kosovan society, the judiciary enjoyed a fair
amount of independence from the national government. In 1969, alterations
to the Serbian constitution granted Kosovo its own Supreme Court, although
Yugoslav legal codes continued to be used. On the security side, there was also
a fair amount of freedom throughout the 1960s and early 1970s (Caygill,
2001; Vickers, 1994). Both of these trends were reversed with the revocation
of autonomy in the late 1980s and as with other public services in Kosovo,
ethnic Albanians became almost entirely absent from formal judicial and
security structures. The police force and the judiciary in Kosovo became dom-
inated ethnically and politically by Serbs and the Serbian government, lead-
ing ethnic Albanians to view these institutions as tools of oppression.
The NATO bombing in 1999 led to a nearly complete withdrawal of
Serbian personnel from RoL institutions and many of the buildings that
housed legal and security actors were left demolished by the fighting. NATO’s
peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) played an important, although at times
controversial, role in the days following the conflict in terms of maintaining
law and order, arresting and detaining individuals seen as a threat to security
(O’Neill, 2002; OSCE, 2006c). As the security situation improved, KFOR’s
policy of detaining suspects gradually diminished to a point where it had very
little interaction with judicial institutions, though it continues to play a role in
the provision of security and has a fair amount of contact and cooperation
with domestic security services. UNMIK’s role in the realm of RoL program-
ming, on the other hand, intensified. In terms of its role in the judiciary,
UNMIK was quick to hire judges and prosecutors to staff a new judicial system
in the immediate post-emergency phase. This process proved difficult for
several reasons. Because nearly all ethnic Albanians had been dismissed from
the judiciary in 1989, there were few applicants who had practised their
profession during the previous ten-year period, leaving a serious skills gap.
Recruiting qualified Serbian personnel was equally difficult. Most Serbian
judicial staff fled Kosovo following the NATO strikes. Serb judges and lawyers
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who stayed in the territory were unlikely to take up positions in the new
judiciary, partly due to the fear of intimidation by ethnic Albanians, but also
due to a perceived or real fear of being seen as traitors by their own ethnic
group. Despite these challenges, UNMIK had hired over 300 judges and pros-
ecutors by the end of December 1999. 
Nonetheless, it soon became apparent that in many cases, the courts were
operating neither efficiently nor impartially. Besides being understaffed and
lacking infrastructure, ethnic bias by the now Albanian-dominated judiciary
and intimidation of court staff became a serious threat to the process. In order
to counter these problems, a pilot project which inserted international jurists
into the Kosovan legal system was implemented in February 2000. Initially,
the International Judges and Prosecutors Programme (IJPP) was utilised only
in the ethnically divided municipality of Mitrovica. However, after its
successes there, the programme was expanded to other regions of Kosovo. The
programme provided a mechanism through which international jurists were
able to take cases when it was felt that Kosovan staff were unable to effective-
ly try a case due to either a real or perceived security threat or where their
ability to try the case impartially was questionable (UNMIK 2000c, 2000d:
Regulation 2000/6 and 2000/64). This programme was not a parallel
system; international jurists worked within Kosovo’s judiciary and were not
part of the wider international justice programme at the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). Within the IJPP there were also
Special Prosecutors Offices for serious crimes such as financial crimes which
were set up specifically to deal with the criminal side of the post-war economy.
With independence, the EU-led EULEX mission operates in Kosovo, monitor-
ing and assisting in some criminal cases.
Alongside these judicial measures, the UN mission sought to strengthen
the RoL by creating new security institutions. Two key domestic security insti-
tutions were established in the immediate post-conflict phase, the Kosovo
Protection Corps (KPC) and the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The KPC, largely
seen as the successor to the KLA, was created as a largely unarmed civil
protection force. The KPC was under the authority of the SRSG, but was
monitored by an international team made up of senior military officials from
NATO countries. Members of the KPC were not allowed to hold political office,
although many senior politicians once held high positions within the KPC
including the President of the PDK Hashim Thaçi, ex-PM Ramush Haradinaj,
and ex-PM Agim Çeku. At times, nearly 70 per cent of KPC members were ex-
KLA members (KPC, nd). In 2005 only 5 per cent of the active KPC came from
minority groups and only 2 per cent from the Serbian community (ISSR,
2006: 102) and they have had very little presence in Serbian areas of the
country. This is likely due to the fact that many within the Serbian
community viewed the KPC as an offshoot of the KLA which committed atroc-
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ities against Serbs. Following the declaration of independence, the KPC were
again transformed into the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), but in terms of role,
structure and ethnic makeup there were few changes. The transition from
KLA to KPC and then to the KSF has not been unproblematic. Questions
remain about actual levels of disarmament and they have also come under
suspicion for supposed links to organised crime. 
The second key domestic security institution is the Kosovo Police Service
(KPS). In October 1999 the first class of KPS graduated from training school
with 176 cadets (OSCE, 2005b). By September 2006, the KPS had grown to
approximately 7,150 officers (ISSR, 2006). Data from 2005 revealed the
ethnic makeup of the force was in line with pre-conflict demographics: 84 per
cent Albanian, 10 per cent Serb and 6 per cent from other minority groups
(OSCE, 2005b). Despite a representative number of Serbian officers, the KPS
have always had difficulties operating in North Mitrovica. This again is partly
a result of ongoing ethnic tensions and the perception of the makeup of the
KPS. As part of the demobilisation agreement, 50 per cent of applicant places
for the initial service were reserved for ex-KLA, though there was no
guarantee that this would translate into an equivalent number making it into
the police service. Nonetheless, statistics from 2001 show that 39 per cent of
the police force were ex-KLA (UNMIK, 2001b). Working with international
institutions, the KPS created an organised crime training programme. Part of
this training involved coordination and cooperation with the regional bodies
including the Organised Crime Training Network (OCTN), the Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Centre for Combating Organised Crime
and the Stability Pact Initiative Against Organised Crime (SPOC).While there
are continued concerns about corruption and political interference in the
police force, evaluations and opinions regarding the force remain, on the
whole, positive, with survey data showing that the KPS was more trusted by
the population than international police (ISSR, 2006). 
The path of security sector reform was largely dominated by the UN Pillar
for Police and Justice through which the UN Civilian Police Force (CIVPOL)
was run. Within the international policing mission, special units were set up
to manage organised crime. The Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau (KOCB) was
set up in 2002, and in 2006 became the Department of Organised Crime
(DOC). These departments were run by CIVPOL – however, many KPS officers
worked alongside internationals. A specialised unit to deal with economic
crimes, the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) was created in 2003 (Wilson,
2006: 161). The Financial Intelligence Centre set up in 2004 also monitored
economic transactions for criminal activity. Since 1999 KFOR has been
responsible for monitoring Kosovo’s borders, meaning they have been
involved in dealing with the smuggling of goods across the border – within a
few years of their mission, they also began working along the borders with the
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KPS’s border control units. The Multi-National Specialised Unit of KFOR also
engages in information gathering and criminal intelligence on organised
crime and is staffed in part by the Italian Carabinieri, known to have expertise
in the area of organised and financial crime. In 2011 the task of managing
Kosovo’s borders became a contentious issue with the border crossings in the
Serb-dominated north proving to be flashpoints in ongoing ethnic tensions.
The Serbian population has continued to oppose the manning of these border
points by independent Kosovan institutions and KFOR has at times been
required to intervene between these new institutions and the Serb population. 
Besides formal security institutions, there are several informal and
parallel security bodies in Kosovo worthy of discussion. The Serbian Ministry
of Interior as well as Serbian police and courts operate in Mitrovica North
(OSCE, 2006/7). At the same time, some of the major Albanian political
parties also established their own parallel security/intelligence bodies.
Interviews with security officials in the territory suggest that the LDK, PDK
the Reformist Party and ORA have their own security services. The purpose of
these agencies is largely to spy on political opponents. These structures are not
part of the formal security apparatus and are considered by some to be illegal. 
The levels of success by legal and security actors in managing the criminal
legacy of the war economy are debateable, and as will be shown there is a deep
concern over the involvement of security actors themselves in this regard.
Given the starting point of reform, which many refer to as ‘ground zero’, many
staff working in the area of RoL reform have offered positive evaluations of
UNMIK activities, pointing to the rapid establishment of key institutions and
training programmes. However, many formal and informal evaluations
portray Kosovo as a country unable to sever the links between crime, corrup-
tion and political violence. For example, an experienced legal observer
working in the territory confided that ‘even though I have been working with
the criminal law for quite a while, I have to say that most of the serious crimes
do not reach the courts in Kosovo . . . So even though everyone talks about
them . . . it’s very rare to have one of these high-profile criminal cases reach
trial’ (I39). In the eyes of Kosovars themselves, there is much concern
regarding these bodies. A 2004 public opinion report revealed that only 18
per cent of the population agree strongly with the statement that all citizens
are treated equally in the judicial system (NCSC/IFES, 2004: 38) and confi-
dence levels in the courts decreased from 69 per cent to 60 per cent between
2002 and 2004 (NCSC/IFES, 2004: 33). The reasons given for this lack of
confidence are diverse, although it is telling that 63 per cent of respondents
consider criminal groups to be a source of corruption in the judicial system
(NCSC/IFES, 2004: 52). These perceptions were also reflected in the Internal
Security Sector Review (ISSR) where it was found that ‘there were clear
perceptions that those with a higher social or economic status are effectively
89
Strengthening the rule of law
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 89
free to act at will’ (ISSR, 2006: 19). This highlights a common perception that
many of the most serious crimes, including organised crime related to political
corruption, are not being addressed to the standard that either the DSI or
Kosovo’s citizens find acceptable. In order to understand why, despite quite a
substantial investment in this reform area, there appears to be both real and
perceived problems with this mode of transformation, a closer inspection of
these programmes is required.
Rule of law as a tool of transformation or liberal control?
One of the cornerstones of liberalism, the rule of law is seen as essential in the
development of prosperous, just and liberal societies (Peterson, 2010). Stable
and impartial security services and judiciaries, based on democratic principles
and a belief in universal human rights, are central to explanations regarding
the pacific nature of liberal societies. However, while these liberal systems are
often presented in this positive, peace-supporting light, other streams of
analysis allude to a much more problematic side of this technology of liberal-
ism. In reference to post-conflict programming generally, externally led RoL
projects can be assessed as a tool in a wider liberal and hegemonic political
process. Magalhães describes this as ‘legal globalisation’, suggesting that in
countries undergoing transition, ‘legal reform has been the result of a process
of “high intensity globalisation” whose fundamental purpose is the expansion
of a neo liberal consensus and the fostering of a new model of development
based on the reliance of markets and the private sector that fits the hegemonic
purpose of the core of the world system’ (1999: 46). This is a problematic
claim as it suggests that RoL reforms are being promoted not in the interest of
providing fair and effective institutions of justice in transitioning states, but
rather are a tool for furthering the liberal interests of the international
community. Such a tactic goes hand in hand with the focus on criminality
that accompanies an increased focus on political economies of violence.
Indeed, legal globalisation and the growth of the war economies discourse are
mutually reinforcing. The criminalisation-legalisation dynamic is a useful
tool for the DSI insofar as it provides a moral justification for separating
‘illiberal’ leaders from their people (Kelsall, 2004). Portraying leaders as
criminal as opposed to political actors justifies their removal and the insertion
of leaders more palatable, or favourable to liberal goals and stability. In this
sense, internationally led RoL measures can be seen as a tool which grants
external powerful actors a great deal of control over states and regions recov-
ering from conflict. 
Despite the fact that no senior elected politicians have ever been charged
with offences related to organised crime, discussions with international staff
working under the RoL pillar in Kosovo were constantly punctuated with
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suggestions of clear, direct and dangerous links between politicians and
organised crime. Consider the following illustrative quotations:
Albanian society is organised in clans, some totally devoted to illegal structures,
racketeering and some in open business. They try to infiltrate all the organisations
such as KPS and KPC and the government. They are powerful people and can get
themselves elected. (I15)
Senior politicians, high-profile figures at the top of Kosovo society . . . have made
themselves very quickly, multi-millionaires, but it’s not clear how. There is no
obvious business enterprise with which they’re associated which could possibly
make that much money. (I3)
Ramush [Haradinaj, the ex-Prime Minister] . . . He’s pretty much known to have
run organised crime in Peje. (I49)
These remarks are evidence of a pervasive characterisation of political activi-
ties in Kosovo being influenced by crime. Organised crime and its supporters
are portrayed as constant enemies, who are attempting to ‘pollute’ the
territory’s governing institutions. As such, strong justifications for strength-
ening the security and legal tools against these actors emerge. These tools
generally include the creation of specialised police units, prosecutorial offices
and executive control by internationals over domestic institutions.
These tools are strengthened by other control techniques utilised by
actors in the DSI under the rubric of RoL programming. For example, targeted
prosecution of key individuals for the sake of stability became an accepted
form of justice in Kosovo during the time of international administration. One
international confirmed that former high-ranking KLA have been arrested for
war crimes because there was not enough evidence to arrest them for OC
(I18). This strategy was corroborated by another international working in the
RoL sector:
in deciding which crimes to prosecute – there have been cases in which people
who intelligence has suggested they were very strongly integrated in organised
crime, happened to be also cases where there was evidence that they’d been
involved in other crimes, such as war crimes . . . It’s a well-known tactic to employ
what people call the ‘Al Capone’ strategy of prosecuting cases which you have
prioritised over other cases you could have prosecuted because not only to bring
justice in that particular case, but also for the incidental benefit of being able to
target people who happened to be high on your target list for organised crime
activities. (I32)
Using the criminality discourse the DSI is able to target actors it wants to
remove from public life in a clear attempt to control and shape the future
political environs of states emerging from war. 
Conversely, while targeting some individuals, the DSI in Kosovo has also
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been accused of shielding others from prosecution. For political reasons, either
a desire to maintain stability or reward political allies, some individuals have
supposedly been able to avoid arrest and prosecution for atrocities committed.
Examples of political leaders, ex-KLA and current KPC members avoiding
prosecution when there appears to be substantial evidence against them was
a common storyline in interviews (see also O’Neill, 2002). This is not to say
that no individuals connected to political and military institutions within the
territory will be prosecuted, but to suggest that certain individuals have been
or are being tolerated to ensure a smooth transition. Of course, it is worth
highlighting here the substantial amount of control granted to the DSI in
Kosovo given its role as a trustee. Not all DSI missions allow for such obvious
forms of targeting and shielding. Nonetheless, governments of other conflict-
affected states undoubtedly face both political and economic pressures to
engage in similar acts of targeting and shielding – witness the de-
Baathification in Iraq and the pressure put on Serbia to assist in the capture of
Mladić and Karadžić.
Paradoxically, the use of RoL institutions by the DSI to further its own
political aims (through targeted prosecution, or the blocking of prosecutionsm
discussed above) has violated two core values of the modern liberal legal
tradition  –  independence and impartiality. In Kosovo, ‘the separation of
powers, a classical requirement for allowing a system of checks and balances,
and therefore guaranteeing democratic governance, is entirely absent’
(Brand, 2002: 471). UNMIK’s substantial executive powers over judicial and
security institutions for nearly a decade is a case in point. Under Regulation
1999/1 (1999b), UNMIK had the power to appoint and remove judicial staff
based on its own assessments and judgements. One interviewee confirmed this
as a problem, stating there was ‘serious interference of the SRSG in the nomi-
nation of the members of management court, Kosovo’s assembly was not
happy with that . . . the SRSG said, well, we still have executive powers . . .
when the SRSG goes, you’re free to choose whatever you want’ (I37). The
OSCE, responsible for legal monitoring in Kosovo, has also raised concerns
about levels of executive interference in judicial decision making (OSCE,
2006c: 64). This interference, and threats to judicial independence, is not
only a concern in regard to local staff but also in relation to the IJPP. Because
of the way in which international judges and prosecutors were hired, and the
structures in which they worked, they were directly linked to the executive
UN powers, as opposed to operating independently. While individuals within
the IJPP have strongly resisted such political interference, the success of this
resistance has been limited and an ongoing struggle between legal priorities
and political aims continues. 
The use of the criminalisation discourse to justify the mechanisms of
control described above is, however, masked by another rhetorical tool. RoL
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reforms, and security sector reforms in particular, are now often characterised
as development issues, as opposed to security or politically motivated initia-
tives. The normative impetus and apparently altruistic motivation on which
the development industry rests has granted it greater legitimacy to enact
reform in areas so closely associated with a state’s sovereignty. Despite this
portrayal, these developmental reforms are used as both a carrot and a stick
by international bodies as they aim to create liberal democracies in post-
conflict or transitioning states. ‘In Bosnia and Kosovo, regional integration
activities and the drive for membership in NATO and the EU have probably
been the single most important factors pushing change in the security sectors’
(Law, 2006a: 121). Making appropriate changes to security institutions is
rewarded with offers of or movement towards allowing developing states
access to powerful global institutions and alliances. Conversely, failure in
reforming RoL institutions is used as further justification for keeping develop-
ing states out of these same circles of power. Making the right movements
toward the DSI’s set standards in the realm of RoL is thus a key condition to
membership in the liberal community of states. The question, of course,
remains as to what the impact of this is in relation to political-economic trans-
formation. Does the agenda of control, justified by the criminalisation and
development rhetoric, have an impact on attempts to move post-conflict
countries towards positive peace economies? 
Manoeuvring the goals of justice, stability and accountability
As the DSI attempts to use RoL institutions to further its own aims, as
described above, evidence of concerning trade-offs between the goals of
stability, justice and accountability emerge. To begin, the de facto immunity
that results from ‘shielding’ cooperative actors, or actors who need to be
appeased to ensure short-term stability, often allows former warlords to
become entrenched, consolidating the gains they made during conflict and to
continue engaging in damaging economic activity. Nowhere are these
problems more contentious and obvious than in processes of demobilisation,
disarmament and reintegration (DDR). Within this facet of security sector
reform decisions are made regarding whether those involved in destructive
political economic relationships will be tolerated and rewarded or stopped and
punished. The DSI’s preference for stability over justice often leads to
predictable results in this regard. In relation to the disarmament of the KLA,
this becomes clear, with the following quotation regarding the formation of
the KPC proving particularly telling: ‘The purpose of KPC is double. One is to
control people of former UCK [KLA] that could be dangerous to KFOR and to
the population, and especially the criminality. And the second is to build a
civil protection which would be useful for Kosovo’ (I17). While the second aim
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is encouraging, looking at what has had to be done to achieve the first goal,
controlling former warlords, is problematic. It involves minimal changes to
political-economic structures of power. For example, the structure of the KPC
was disproportionately structured at the higher levels of command:
you have twelve generals which is very unusual for a 3,000-men [unit] . . . a
3,000-men strong unit in [a western country], for example, would be commanded
by one general and you would have about ten colonels. You have 300 colonels
here. So, you know, we had, to put it short, we had warlords we had to deal with,
they had to have positions where . . . the rewards are as they used to be, so they
were given general level positions. (I17)
In other words, Kosovo was given a security institution with an unsustainable
structure based on the desire to appease warlords. 
There is also concern over the international administration’s response to
informal security services in the territory. As noted, several of Kosovo’s main
political parties have set up their own security services, which carry out intel-
ligence based on the desires of a party’s leadership. These services act entirely
outside of the legal and formal government institutions but were quietly
tolerated by the international administration with one respondent arguing
that this was simply a case of rewarding individuals and political parties for
clearly illegal activity (I8). In these cases, individuals who would not or
cannot be accepted in formal institutions are being allowed to consolidate and
gain political and economic power through illegal activity. As such, political-
economic relationships continue to be based on threat, force and illegality. For
the sake of stability and a smooth transition the crimes and atrocities
committed by security agents are either de facto or de jure brushed aside,
allowing former participants in the war economy privileged status in new
security institutions. This hinders the development of effective and fair insti-
tutions as it is not the most qualified that enter leadership roles, but rather the
most politically and economically connected. The shielding of security actors
in these numerous ways – allowing informal security institutions to operate
and appeasing former warlords with positions in the KPC and the KPS, legit-
imises dysfunctional political-economic relationships and allows for the
pollution of security apparatus in order to maintain stability. Agents of
security are allowed by the DSI to become barriers to transformation. 
The building up of structures which would allow for dysfunctional
political-economic activity to be transformed in the long term are being traded
off for short-term political goals. While the balance between these is undoubt-
edly difficult to manage, allowing impunity for the purposes of stability is
problematic in terms of the precedent it sets. Considering the activities of the
DSI in Kosovo itself and in bordering countries, for example, Kosovo’s leaders
and security actors have seen other nations granted EU status with levels of
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organised crime equal to if not greater than that of Kosovo (I32). As such,
domestic issues such as crime and corruption can remain unchallenged as
there is limited incentive to engage in programmes that deal effectively with
OC. The message communicated by guiding actors of the DSI is that the funda-
mental issue and desired end point is stability and physical security – issues
such as positive war economy transformation are not required to be welcomed
into the liberal community of states. The appearance of well-organised insti-
tutions are often privileged over substantive change, encouraging a baseline
of security assessed quantitatively in terms of the size and potential capacity of
force, and competence in providing basic stability. There is less of a focus on
justice, on the types of substantive change that would be required for
achieving wider goals of transformation. Tensions between justice and
security, tensions not yet resolved by the DSI, emerge as fundamental barriers
to transformation; the need for stability (which often requires maintaining
dysfunctional political-economic structures) is deemed more important than
justice (which would be required for positive transformation). 
However, what one can also take from an analysis of RoL reform in
Kosovo is that the struggle between justice and stability is not always won by
the latter. There remain several problems with blanket accusations that the
DSI facilitates impunity for the sake of stability. There have been instances
where operational actors have chosen justice and transformation over
stability. For example, in 2001, five KPC Generals were suspended from their
duties because of their involvement in the 2001 uprising of Albanians in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) and organised crime
(Özerdem, 2003: 94). Interviews with officials at the office of the KPCC also
suggest that since then, accusations of misconduct by its members have been
dealt with swiftly and severely. This points to the need for greater analysis of
the dilemmas which the DSI is forced to consider over the long course of peace-
building missions. In the case of Kosovo, at least at the beginning of the
mission, the trade-off was clearly one of stability over transforming political-
economic relationships. In the immediate post-conflict phase, dealing with
those who achieved political and economic power through violence to consol-
idate their gains was outweighed by the need for stability. By some accounts
this was a strategy that largely paid off. In the short to medium term, there
was not a return to large-scale political violence. 
It is important to highlight, however, that there have also been moments
when operational actors felt able to take a risk and favour justice over
stability. This suggests that the sequencing or timing of chosen transforma-
tion techniques may be of more importance than choosing between
alternative strategies. More research needs to be conducted in regard to what
might be called ‘policy moments’, whereby operational actors in the DSI are
able to take risks, implementing policies which may counter the aims of the
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guiding actors in the DSI. Specifically, in reference to preventing security
actors from continuing with dysfunctional economic activity, operational
actors could look for opportunities where the threat of instability might be
outweighed by the need for justice. Mechanisms through which actors might
be allowed to take advantage of such ‘policy moments’ would be a step
forward in finding ways of creating transformative policy. 
Apolitical analyses? Varied approaches to politics and crime
It is assumed that given the power of ‘legal globalisation’ and the ‘war as
crime’ discourse, the work of operational actors has shifted towards fighting
crime as opposed to dealing with more complex political issues. Concerns have
emerged that legal tools are now being seen as ‘magic wands’ (Faundez, 2005:
568) – with the law replacing traditional, political diplomacy and agreements
as a tool of resolution. Tim Kelsall (2004) finds evidence of this depoliticisa-
tion through his study of court transcripts of criminal proceedings in post-
conflict Sierra Leone where the courts appeared to explicitly forbid any
inclusion of political context in the hearing of war crimes cases. Of course, RoL
reform is an area where we would expect there to be depoliticisation, and
perhaps for good reason. As Donais (2005) argues, a key tenet of police reform
is in fact to ensure that the police have been depoliticised – to ensure that the
police are loyal to the state and its citizens regardless of what political party is
in charge. However, creating an apolitical security and judicial structure
should not equate to a denial of political context, as ignoring political realities
may inhibit security sector reform in both the short and long term.
In relation to war economy transformation, then, are we seeing a prob-
lematic apolitical approach in relation to RoL programming? With the growth
of the war as crime discourse has there been an overstating and oversimplify-
ing of the links between crime, violence and politics that has in turn led to
flawed apolitical policy choices? In the case of Kosovo, there are no clear
answers to these questions, with perceptions of staff working in the field of RoL
reform varying greatly and thus providing an excellent case through which to
explore the multiple ways in which apolitical approaches are or are not prob-
lematic in terms of transformation. 
Criminality and context: local political issues and transformation
Arguments that the rational-choice approach to understanding the political
economy of conflict now dominate logically lead to assumptions that
programming will be typically apolitical (as defined in Chapter 3), showing a
lack of awareness and integration of local context vis-a-vis RoL programming.
In other words, what one would expect to find in this reform area is that the
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reform process is intentionally devoid of the political issues in order to facilitate
a smooth transition to a liberal order. Further, given the rhetoric that law is
meant to be blind to issues of politics, the possibility that reforms in this area
will suffer from such apolitical or technocratic tendencies seems nearly
certain. However, a careful analysis of the DSI’s approach to RoL reform in
Kosovo offers a more complex story.
Within the international policing mission, for example, there was a great
deal of variance into how the crime-politics nexus has been conceptualised.
Some actors did draw simple, direct lines between the two. One interviewee
spoke of a former KLA Colonel who was at the same time a member of the
mafia and has now risen within the ranks of Kosovo’s political elite (I46).
Others draw direct but more vaguely articulated links between unspecified
criminal groups and specific organisations such as the KPS, KPC and formal
governing structures. These understandings are associated with the more
technocratic, rational choice forms of analysis which focus on the tangible
and direct relationships between two actors and the benefits accrued by each
party. When this is the dominant conceptualisation of the problem, a more
technocratic response is privileged: more effective policing, investigations and
prosecution. This is problematic on several fronts including the fact that the
arrest and charging of individuals will do little to alter the entrenched rela-
tionships between crime and politics in the territory. In the case of Kosovo,
such a strategy has proved largely ineffective as it has focused ‘on institution-
building rather than on trust-building among the communities’
(Heinemann-Grüder and Grebenschikov, 2006: 54). Supporting such a
perspective, one respondent spoke of the international communities’ focus on
quantities of police officers – ‘right from the very beginning, I believe it was the
Contact Group, basically said we want seven and a half thousand police
officers on the street within two years. That obviously had a huge effect on the
quality. They were concerned with numbers rather than quality’ (I8). 
Evidence of the preference for these more technocratic forms of program-
ming are evidenced by other responses received when interviewees were
asked about ways forward for security sector institutions. For example, one
key figure in Kosovo’s police reform argued that ‘it’s just a question of really
becoming more professional in what it does and gaining greater levels of
competency over investigation’ (I8). A substantial number of replies centred
around the provision of specific forms of training. While capacity-building is
not without its merits, it overshadows an equally if not more relevant
concern, namely oversight and the concomitant public accountability that
accompanies such mechanisms. The need for oversight of security institutions
in post-conflict states generally and Kosovo specifically is evidenced by the
highly politicised environment in which reform is occurring and therefore the
increased likelihood of political intrusion into the security sector. Both the
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actual and perceived links between criminal and political interests in Kosovo
would suggest an even greater need for a neutral oversight body which would
be able to investigate and indict supposed corruption and abuse within
security bodies. The amount of money spent on, and the attention given to,
equipping, training and promoting the KPS from the very start of the mission
is in stark contrast to the efforts and monies provided to ensure accountabili-
ty – a police oversight system was only introduced in the spring of 2006 and
according to those closely involved in the process, remained drastically under-
funded. 
Even more damaging is that the lack of oversight has helped create an
environment where rumours of such relationships have created distrust of
security institutions and political bodies – a perception which, once
engrained, is difficult to change. Of course, there are some accountability
structures built into these types of reforms, but in many cases such accounta-
bility tends to move upwards to international administrators who control  the
finances, the character of reform and the pass-key to international institu-
tions and communities. The accountability that extends outwards to citizens
is less developed. This leads to an environment in which the security
apparatus is not trusted by citizens as fair arbiters between them and criminal
elements in society.
However it is important to note that other policy makers working under
the RoL pillar adopted something more akin to the SPE conceptualization
discussed in Chapter 3. For example, analyses emerging from one of the key
European bodies working on organised crime, the Council of Europe Regional
Police Programme (CARPO), acknowledges that criminal networks may serve
as alternative social systems (CARPO, 2005). Many interviewees also noted
how strong family ties, the clan system and tight-knit communities were key
survival mechanisms during the war and perhaps even a response to periods
of oppressive Serbian rule. They admitted that this has in turn created a
culture, or history, of non-cooperation or non-observance of official state
structures and a deep mistrust of the police. The question then becomes one of
whether operational actors’ engagement with an SPE approach has resulted
in alternative or improved programming. Again, a varied story emerges.
Evidence of an SPE approach influencing DSI policy directly can be seen in
the response of internal actors in Kosovo to the problem of which law to put
into force following the cessation of NATO bombing in 1999. International
administrators initially decided that the law as it existed on the day before the
NATO bombardment would become the applicable law in the territory. In
other words, the applicable law in Kosovo would be the law as practised by the
Serbian-dominated judiciary in the ten years since the revocation of
autonomy. A provision was added, stating that for a law to be valid it must not
be discriminatory. There were at least two problems with this initial decision.
98
Building a peace economy?
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 98
First, there was no legal guidance or criteria given for identifying which laws
might be considered discriminatory (Strohmeyer, 2001a). Much more prob-
lematic, however, was that Albanian jurists rebelled against having to employ
a set of laws they considered to be Serbian. ‘Yugoslav criminal laws, in partic-
ular, were considered to have been one of the most potent tools of a
decade-long policy of discrimination against and repression of the Kosovan
Albanian population. The political representatives of the Kosovan Albanian
community thus threatened to cease cooperating with the United Nations’
(Strohmeyer, 2001a: 58–59). 
UNMIK eventually conceded, bringing into force a new regulation,
1999/24 on the law applicable in Kosovo (UNMIK, 1999a) which declared
that the applicable law would be any regulations promulgated by the SRSG
and the law in force in Kosovo on 22 March 1989, in other words, the law
prior to the revocation of autonomy. Consider the opinion of one internation-
al regarding this decision: ‘are there advantages to applying the 1999 law? . . .
Yes . . . why would one say, oh, let’s go back to ’89 . . . do I think it was logical
that the judges decided to apply the ’89 law? No. Not based on the law’ (I51).
Here we see that an apolitical choice was initially made – as a matter of sound
jurisprudence the 1999 law was chosen, an approach based on opinions of
what was technically (legally) most appropriate. However, political debate
and contestation led the international administrators to reconsider their
approach, forcing them to alter reform in consideration of context. Despite
legal arguments, nationalistic and ethnic sensitivities were eventually recog-
nised by UNMIK. This example reveals a willingness of the international
mission to integrate political realities into their decisions and an ability to
negotiate with domestic political concerns. However, this also acted as a
strong signal in terms of where the loyalties of the UN mission lay. In this case,
‘Albanian law’ was chosen over ‘Serbian law’. It was one of the first gestures
which would allow for a shift in the balance of power within the territory and
within the region – a shift, which as will be further discussed, has facilitated
the creation of an Albanian-dominated political-economic environment. 
In the field of security sector reform, however, there is also evidence to
suggest that political awareness of the above issues and problems related to
the linkages between crime and broader societal processes has not translated
into context-sensitive programming, suggesting that there are barriers for
operational actors translating their analysis of situations into effective
programming. Although there is a recognition of the importance of social and
familial relationships, security sector reform focused primarily on the highly
formalised institutions of security such as the KPS and KPC. Despite the preva-
lence of and effects on security and peacebuilding of informal Albanian
security institutions, the UN administration has done very little to dismantle
them or address how they might have been more effectively integrated into
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Kosovan society. The strategy appears largely to ignore the problem in the
hopes that over time, things will disappear, normalise or organically meld into
a more state-centric formal system. Of course, strengthening the RoL, dealing
with impunity and managing illicit cum informal mechanisms are not simple
tasks. Still, in other instances, such as convincing various Albanian groups to
sign up to the PISG and finding avenues for cooperation with Serb customs
officers (see Chapter 7), dismantling informal mechanisms or overcoming
substantial political barriers was possible through concerted negotiation. 
Accounting for global and regional politics
In the case of domestic reforms, there is often an assumption that regional and
global politics are of little concern. This is undoubtedly a flawed assumption,
for as we see in Kosovo, RoL reforms were greatly impacted upon by wider
external political sensibilities, primarily regional and global debates regarding
the final status of the territory. Between 1999 and 2008, the reality of unre-
solved status delayed the formation of local institutions central to the
maintenance of law and order. For example, due to Kosovo’s unresolved
status, a Kosovan Ministry of Justice was not set up until 2005/6. One senior
UN official reflects on this, speaking of a 
general sense that we had been imperilling the success of our project by allowing
ourselves to sit on our hands for so long and not get to grips with fundamental
questions. Suddenly in the aftermath of 2004 the international community
decided that perhaps after all, it didn’t impinge on sovereignty to have ministries
of interiors and justice. But, I must say that when I arrived here, everyone seemed
to have the opposite impression and it seemed to be considered that ministries of
interior and justice were things that could only be created upon final status, and
that meant that there was no ability to build up any sense of political accountabil-
ity and responsibility for rule of law . . .
The overwhelming blockage was the whole thing of final status. It just
complicated the whole concept of transition, and slowed down therefore the whole
process of transition and rendered it less coherent, because it was much more
difficult to try and design in this strange sort of vacuum . . . There’s no question
that trying to run a mandate where you’ve left the question of final status open,
whether or not it was the right thing and whether anything could have been done
at the time, I’m not going to judge, but it certainly made life very difficult in a
number of respects. (I32)
The DSI’s stance on this issue notably changed over time, with the essential
institutions and codes needed to combat crime and corruption eventually
being created as Serbia’s claims of sovereignty over Kosovo came to be seen as
a less contentious issue to guiding actors of the DSI. However, in Kosovo’s
formative years as a new state the DSI’s inability, or unwillingness, to face up
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to serious political challenges, limited the ability of actors to build up fair and
effective RoL institutions. All of these delays in setting up these vital domesti-
cally run institutions has provided some actors with
a wonderful excuse to say everything is the fault of the internationals . . . but the
fact is that we didn’t [set up these institutions], because we felt we couldn’t do
anything about that, all we could do is train more and more Kosovo policemen and
train Kosovo judges and so on . . . it slowed down the progress of the system, it
made things like March 2004 easier, it put the government in a superb position to
disclaim responsibility for anything that ever goes wrong, and it did. (I32)
The effect has been to limit the political space for the territory’s politicians,
which in turn has had serious repercussions on local political accountability.
Limiting the capacity of Kosovo’s RoL institutions until status was determined
had the perverse effect of diluting the sense of political responsibilities within
Kosovo’s governing institutions and security institutions – a key factor in
building progressive and sustainable institutions. This problem is perhaps
clearest in attempts to deal with organised crime, an area in which interna-
tionals will maintain executive authority for as long as possible (first the IJPP
and now EULEX). As such, as the problem of OC grows in the region, the fact
that dealing with OC has remained, and will largely remain, under interna-
tional control will only delay and inhibit Kosovan institutions’ role in
managing the problem. 
This desire to maintain control is illustrated by a concern regarding co-
operation between internationals and domestic actors, with one international
investigator suggesting that ‘at the moment, information is confidential, but
what happens when Kosovars take over? . . . there is a fear from other
countries of sharing information as they don’t know whether things will
remain confidential after things are transferred to Kosovars. Countries are
therefore sceptical about giving information – it might not be kept secret in the
future’ (I28). Concerns about the ability of Kosovars to deal with OC and
resistance to hand over information or control over the process is under-
standable given both the limited experience of the current Kosovan staff as
well as the aforementioned links between crime and politics in the area.
Nonetheless, this guarded approach to dealing with a key issue of transforma-
tion clearly illustrates a link between a failure to deal with an overarching
political issue, namely status, and attempts to deal with a significant facet of
Kosovo’s political-economy. As a protectorate, Kosovo’s institutions and its
leaders were unable to fully participate in strategies and plans to deal with
areas of its own transformation. Besides providing an excellent avenue for
Kosovan actors to absolve themselves of responsibility in the short term, long-
term consequences are delays to institution-building and relationships based
on mistrust and suspicion with international and regional actors. All of this
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limits the potential for long-term transformation as the institutions and rela-
tionships that need to be developed are being delayed and a dangerous status
quo is usurping the need and motivation for more progressive and structural
policies.
Of course, some will argue that this critique ignores the difficulty of
dealing with the fraught geopolitical issues, such as final status, that the diffi-
culties in resolving the overall political dispute have necessitated delays in the
building up of local judicial and security structures. While final resolution of
the Kosovo conflict was indeed difficult and complex, a lack of status did not
appear to limit the creation of key institutions and bodies in other sectors
(most notably the customs and privatisation agencies which will be discussed
in forthcoming chapters) and thus this counter-argument does not hold. Key
institutions arguably could have been created earlier in order to create a more
effective, legitimate and accountable judiciary. In this sense, allowing the
status issue to remain unresolved and in turn delaying the creation of legiti-
mate and functioning legal systems allowed Kosovo to remain as a zone of
uncertainty and instability – a fact which many actors manipulate for
personal and political gain. 
Taken as a whole, analysis regarding concerns of apolitical conceptuali-
sations by those leading and implementing judicial reform, and the net effect
of this on dealing with the criminal element of war economies, reveals a
diverse and complex story. At times a clear preference for the apolitical
discourses related to law and security do appear to dominate, with a negative
impact in terms of effectively understanding and managing criminal legacies.
In these instances, the DSI appears to lean towards a rational choice approach
to crime insofar as it suits its need to have states appear as peaceful (with
ongoing violence attributable to criminal as opposed to political forces) and in
order to create stability (as opposed to justice). Perhaps this is the rather
predictable side of the story. But what detailed analysis of practice reveals is
somewhat less predictable, with examples of not insignificant occasions of SPE
analyses, the creation of specific policies to make adjustments based on such
analyses and often positive outcomes from these approaches also evidenced.
However the flexibility to integrate the SPE approach in RoL reform appears to
be limited by the wider political concerns of the DSI. When engaging in SPE is
not a threat to the dominant rhetoric and approach of the international
community, allowances are made, but such flexibility apparently applies only
so long as the core beliefs and interests of the guiding actors are not threat-
ened. In this sense the use of RoL reform as a tool of transformation is clearly
limited by an apolitical approach, but strategies for countering or challenging
this approach are possible, at least in a limited sense – a reality which will be
returned to in forthcoming chapters.
102
Building a peace economy?
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 102
The (mis)practices of internationally led rule of law reform
Several operational barriers within RoL reforms which impact upon war
economy transformation can be identified. The first concerns the tendency for
the DSI to follow trends in terms of which issues and problems receive the most
attention and thus resources. This characteristic is problematic insofar as it
often leads to the exclusion of key issues. In the case of Kosovo (a conflict
portrayed almost entirely in terms of human rights atrocities and ethnic
divisions) this resulted in dysfunctional political-economy relationships being
overlooked in the early days of the intervention. Consider the following assess-
ment on the setting of priorities in Kosovo by one police officer:
You look at the mission life, and what’s a priority in mission life, and it’s interest-
ing, it all boils down to whoever is the commissioner of police or the SRSG, what
their little personal thing in life is. And you can see what’s important in the
mission. Every few months, we have the catch phrase of the month . . . Returnees
. . . that always comes and goes, that gets to be the big issue. Domestic violence, got
to be a big issue for a while, so all the resources went towards domestic violence.
Then human being trafficking got to be a big issue. Now we must have a strong
environmentalist somewhere in the mix because now illegal woodcutting is
becoming a big issue. (I84)
As another UNMIK official noted regarding their focus on organised crime, ‘it
took us far too long to do it. Far too long probably because it wasn’t in people’s
mentality when the mission was initially set up. People didn’t think of
organised crime as a terribly important thing to attack. They thought very
much in terms of war crimes . . . the focus was on returns . . . they didn’t really
think that organised crime was something that was particularly our job’
(I32).
As a result, operational actors within the DSI were left without a suitable
range of tools to help them manage organised crime. The trafficking and
smuggling of persons was not made illegal until 2004 and Regulation
2005/16 (UNMIK, 2005d), a law managing immigration procedures, was not
set up until over six years after the end of the war. Another example of an
oversight in legislation has been the failure to create or promulgate a law
regarding the handling of informants; neither was there an appropriate
framework for utilising lawful methods of surveillance such as telephone
interception. Both of these are generally seen as necessary measures for effec-
tively addressing illicit activities. By not focusing on such problems from the
beginning, many of them became entrenched and therefore much harder to
transform. Arguably this concern is not always applicable. For example, in the
case of the trade in opium, this has been a policy priority from the beginning.
However, it appears that it is only in the most obvious and well-publicised
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cases, where there is a tangible commodity that is easily identifiable as illicit
and has global repercussions, that the issues seem to make it to the top of the
priority list in the immediate post-conflict phase. This line of critique seems to
contradict the discussion earlier in the chapter regarding the impact of the
criminalisation discourse. However, the impact of the criminalisation
discourse is a movement towards the targeting of groups and individuals, not
the creation of a coherent, well-considered and properly funded strategy to
deal with criminal elements specifically and strengthening RoL generally. 
A second series of problems relates to human capacity and resources. In
relation to the IJPP, serious concerns existed over the lack of training provided
for international jurists. One such jurist advocated for at least a minimum of
two weeks’ training as opposed to ‘just throwing them the code and within a
day putting them into action’ (I51). Another international succinctly
described their entrance into the programme: ‘arrived on Wednesday, sworn
in on Friday . . . and I started my first war crimes case on Monday morning’
(I48). The problem of staff and institutional capacity is directly related to the
problem of mission creep which forces actors to engage in activities not envi-
sioned in initial mandates. Again, the IJPP provides an example of this
problem. As the programme expanded from Mitrovica to the rest of the
territory, the need for higher numbers of international staff, and their
substantive role in post-conflict justice, grew exponentially. As one interna-
tional jurist explains: ‘When we were introduced the goal was to provide
neutrality . . . in the adjudication of interethnic crime. Then, after a year the
goal changed and the goal was to respond to the maximum possible extent to
also organised crime and eliminate the spoilers of the peace process’ (I22).
From its initial mandate of providing support in individual cases, the IJPP
came to be seen as one of the most important tools in tackling serious societal
issues such as organised and financial crime. The programme was not set up
to take such a strong leading role in these cases and as the IJPP’s mission and
mandate crept into these wider societal problems, the resources and ability to
meet these new goals did not materialise. A senior international jurist notes,
‘if you target organised crime, you need much greater resources, you need a
secure court building, you need much more resources for witness protection.
You need a team of investigators and prosecutors that would be able to
commit . . . for a long time’ (I22).
A similar storyline is seen in regard to international policing. Since the
1990s UNCIVPOL missions have greatly increased in both size and scope to
the point where mandates ‘in many ways almost require a UNCIVPOL with
superhuman abilities’ (Månsson, 2001: 116 referring to Emery, 1997). This
need for ‘superhuman’ international police offers is clearly evidenced in the
case of Kosovo. Never before have international police officers had such wide-
ranging responsibilities; being almost entirely responsible for fighting
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organised crime in a foreign country was an unprecedented expectation. Yet
a growth in expectations was again not matched by a growth in resources and
capability. Simply put, neither UNMIK nor the actors through which they
work are set up to manage these types of problems. The tasks being given to
operational actors outstrip the capacity, experience and resources of such
actors. Equipment for wire taps, unmarked police cars, money to pay inform-
ants – none of these are standard (or likely desirable) budget lines on UN or
donor annual reports, yet fighting organised crime through the use of such
processes was expected of ordinary CIVPOL officers. 
Further, as one interviewee highlights, the entire concept of organised
crime requires a lot of covert operations, which are disliked by the UN which
is supposed to be an open and transparent organisation (I18). Serious
questions emerge when development actors become involved in the under-
cover, covert and hidden activity that is required to deal with such problems,
as it directly contravenes many of the democratic values which the DSI is
trying to instil in recipient countries. A choice needs to be made on the part of
development actors who are now engaging in areas of reform which involve
combating illicit and illegal structures. Either they reconsider their role in
engaging in such activities and choose not to do so, given the inherent contra-
dictions of these tasks with their organisational culture, or they move forward
and allow for or create the structures which are needed to engage in such
work. 
Also limiting an effective post-conflict justice programme is the diversity
of staff in regard to nationality. Undoubtedly, there is strength in having a
mixture of staff from different nations, but there is also evidence that diversity,
if not properly managed, inhibits effective transformation. At a basic level,
there can be disagreement and confusion over laws and processes as interna-
tional jurists and security personnel come from different legal systems, and
are not familiar with the laws which they are being expected to apply
(Schröder, 2004/05). One international prosecutor admits that ‘because we
also come from different countries, from different legal systems all over the
world, to some degree we might not always be entirely consistent in what we
do’ (I48). Of course, properly trained jurists should be able to interpret and
apply a legal code regardless of the specificities of its legislation and procedure.
However, this assumes a coherent and logical legal framework, procedures
and training. A recurrent theme in many interviews was that of an unclear
and confusing system of laws and procedures, one which affected local and
international actors alike, inhibiting effective legal and security practices and
the creation of sound jurisprudence on which to strengthen the RoL. There
have been multiple sources of law in place within the territory in the ten 
years following the conflict – pre-89 Yugoslav laws, post-89 Yugoslav law,
UNMIK regulations, directives and laws passed by the new Kosovo assembly,
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directives and documents from new ministries and new criminal and criminal
procedure codes, as well as the tradition of the Kanun (a traditional legal code
used both historically and currently by some Albanian communities). The
multiplicity of laws has created confusion amongst personnel, making it
difficult for them to operate effectively. Consider the following assessment by
an international lawyer: ‘When I arrived on the ground we had three different
criminal codes that were all internally inconsistent with each other’ (I48).
Another interviewee reflected that judges have been ‘left alone in the maze of,
in the mess of new legislation, of new approaches’ (I37). 
Likewise, the multinational structure of the international security forces
has led to differences in procedure in different areas of Kosovo; within the
police, cultural differences regarding the style of policing have led to KPS
officers receiving different directives in the field. ‘For example, you’d have a
Russian running Gjilani, and he would run it as he would back in Russia . . .
And then, up in Podujevo, you’d have somebody from Northern Ireland
running it as they would back in Northern Ireland. Over in Prizren it was run
by Germans, so they run it as they do back in Germany . . . The messages going
through at every level to the KPS were totally confusing’ (I3). Leaving behind
sustainable institutions capable of dealing with entrenched and difficult struc-
tures such as organised crime requires a united and coherent approach, an
approach which the multinational forces mitigate against. Besides issues of
coordination, there is also the problem of distrust or competition between
security actors. One concrete example of this in Kosovo is in recent attempts
at conducting a thorough review of security concerns and security institu-
tions in the territory. There were a number of reviews occurring
simultaneously, one led by a British team, another by the Americans, all
working without talking to each other (I46). Because of these issues a frag-
mented and disjointed security apparatus exists; both temporally and
spatially, security apparatuses have operated unevenly, creating gaps which
have limited the role security services might play in transformation.
Some of the problems associated with international staffing have been
addressed. After the March 2004 riots, KFOR altered its modus operandi to
diminish differences between national brigades. International security inter-
ventions (post-Kosovo) have adopted the system of ‘lead nation’ whereby one
country takes responsibility for one aspect of security programming in an
attempt to ensure coherence. The ‘lead nation’ method is currently being used
in Afghanistan (Sedra, 2006) and the Solomon Islands (Peake and Brown,
2005). This approach was also eventually adopted in Kosovo, at least infor-
mally, with Germans being largely in control of the DOC. 
Another of the many critiques harboured against the DSI is the negative
impact of a contract culture which results in staff being in the field for short- 
periods of time, contributing to high levels of staff turnover. Many interviewees
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mentioned the issue of short-term contracts (generally lasting form six to twelve
months) when questioned regarding the barriers to successful reform in Kosovo.
It should be noted at the outset that short-term contracts are not purely a func-
tion of the policies of international institutions. National governments and insti-
tutions are often unwilling to allow for or pay for their nationals to take up posi-
tions long term. Take for example the account of one international prosecutor:
‘my government let me stay for two years and then they said they wanted me
home and I said I can’t because I’m in the middle of a terrorism trial, I want to fin-
ish it, and they said, fine, but you’re going to have to give up your job [back
home], so I had to quit’ (I48). 
The impact of forced or voluntary short-term commitments is threefold.
First is the problem of recruitment. It is already difficult to get qualified judges
and lawyers to leave their homes, families and jobs to come to a conflict-
affected zone. Such difficulties are made worse by expecting individuals to take
up a position knowing they may not be able to be effective. Secondly, the
reality of short-term staffing has serious repercussions on the investigation
and prosecution of cases, especially ones relating to serious offences such as
organised crime and money laundering, areas in which there has been a
heavy reliance on internationals. Elsewhere in the EU, an investigation
related to organised crime will last approximately fourteen to eighteen
months, even longer in especially complex cases. The hearings, trials and
verdicts can then take another two and a half to three years to complete. The
result of using short-term contracts is that investigations are interrupted and
suffer setbacks as prosecutors leave positions. In some cases ‘criminal proce-
dures had to be initiated twice because an international judge involved
returned home’ (Schröder, 2004/05: 24). A lack of continuity in the process
not only causes delays in the procedure, but leaves the process open to
mistakes, miscommunication or oversights which inhibit effective investiga-
tion and prosecution. Finally, short-term contracts seriously limit a build-up
of institutional memory. As one expert noted, solutions for complex, systemic
and long-term problems should rest in the hand of institutions – however,
because of the nature of the mission, responsibility often lies with individuals
which means that in the region it changes quickly and frequently. An inter-
national jurist confirms and laments this problem, stating: ‘people like me
have ideas, but unfortunately the way the UN here is set up, I know of
absolutely no effort to debrief those of us who have decided to say goodbye to
the mission. I know of several colleagues who have left with anywhere from
six months to nine months to two years of experience and no one has bothered
to ask them, “Before you leave, would you mind telling us what you think?”’
(I51).
This relates to another problem, directly related to the way in which the
development-security industry functions – namely that it tends to favour
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short-term programmes and projects which result in easily quantifiable and
observable results. Although it is often proclaimed that it is engaged in
building up long-term and sustainable structures, all of the above points to the
inaccuracy of these claims. This is largely a function of a funding structure
that requires donor governments to be able to justify spending to national
constituencies and political structures. And while accountability to tax-
payers is a reasonable consideration, it also has serious repercussions on
programming and policy abroad. In the case of legal programming in Kosovo,
consider a conversation with a member of the IJPP: ‘the donors always have
to produce proof that they, that the donation brought results, that’s why they
are so concerned about their own projects . . . So they like to see a Kosovo
special prosecutions office as being conceived, funded and supported with the
project . . . These are like sort of superficially created institutions . . . A much
greater challenge is to support institutions that are meant to last and designed
to last’ (I22). The result of such funding mechanisms is piecemeal program-
ming and an incoherent system. True, it creates solutions for specific
problems. The creation of a special prosecutor’s office for financial crime is
indeed having a positive impact on that area. However, this strategy of single-
issue funding leaves gaps in the system which allow for continued evasion by
criminal elements. Narrowly defined projects may be palatable to national
constituencies, but on the ground they result in risk-averse, blueprint policies
as opposed to innovative and creative programming. The DSI in its current
formulation does not always allow for flexibility or creativity in its approach,
two characteristics which are needed for building new and stable institutions
to respond to long-term problems.
While the above has addressed problems related to human capacity, the
ability to run an effective judiciary is also hindered by a lack of physical and
financial resources. In the case of judicial reform, the problem is one of an
overloaded system – too many cases and not enough staff. The simple lack of
adequate facilities in which to investigate cases and hold trials continues to
hamper the system. The problem of overloaded courts is related to several
more specific issues. First is the somewhat mundane but pertinent issue of
translation. Translation from English to Albanian (or Serbian) and vice versa
is problematic and expensive given debate over the translation of specific legal
terms. There is also the problem of acquiring and holding onto qualified local
staff. Compare the salaries of a judge to that of a driver for one of the interna-
tional organisations and the problem of attracting top candidates becomes
obvious. This is concisely summed up by a senior international working on
law and security who agreed: ‘If you can’t pay a judge more than 450 euros a
month in the Municipal Court or 600 in the Supreme Court, and if you can be
a cleaner in the OSCE and earn 700 euros a month . . . [or] if you can earn
more as a driver in UNMIK, than as a Supreme Court judge, we shouldn’t be
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surprised that we don’t get the best judges’ (I32). A Kosovan working in the
legal sector admits that the quality of local judges is currently very low as
some of the best trained lawyers will choose to practise as private defence
lawyers because the salaries are so much greater than those in the public
sector (I40). 
The problem of financial resources should not, however, be seen as too
strong a determining factor in the creation of institutions tasked with
managing illegal activity. The post-conflict mission in Kosovo is one of the best-
funded missions in recent history. While some have complained that the
CIVPOL mission in Kosovo never reached its authorised strength, resources
committed to reforming Kosovo’s security apparatus massively outstrip
resources committed elsewhere. At its peak, there were 20 military officers and
2.02 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants. Compare this situation to Haiti
where the ratios were 4:1,000 in terms of military presence and 0.13:1,000 in
terms of police presence, or Sierra Leone where the ratios are 3:1,000 and
0.02:1,000 respectively (Law, 2006a: 117 referring to Dobbins et al., 2003).
Of course the amount of resources does not directly translate into success; in
2004 ‘the amount spent by the United States in Iraq was equal to that being
spent in all 17 on-going UN operations combined, without any noticeable
progress in rebuilding the country’s security forces’ (Law, 2006a: 117).
Further, the amount being spent in Kosovo in general, and on its security insti-
tutions in particular, is outwardly deceptive. Funding for the KPS and its
officers’ salaries comes largely from the overstretched Kosovo Consolidated
Budget and not from the large pot of donor money, limiting the funds available
for increasing or even sustaining the levels of pay, capacity and training for the
force. Furthermore, donor funding cannot be sustained over long periods of
time, so as international funding of security apparatus decreases, financing the
relatively large security structures which have been built up in Kosovo will
prove increasingly difficult. The result is an environment which leaves the
police service ‘ripe for corruption ... look at when [police officers are] making
200 euros a month, they see these smugglers raking in thousands a day, and
all of a sudden one of them offers them 1,000 euros to let a truckload of
something come through, he’s thinking “I’m feeding my family”. That’s why
it’s so important, they’ve got to try and get these wages up if they want to
eliminate corruption’ (I84). Other interviewees stressed the importance of
increasing wages to prevent corruption in the police and other security
services: a short-term need that is difficult to achieve given donor preferences. 
Linked to decreased funding in Kosovo is the problem of the withdrawal of
international actors, be it the UN in 2008/9 or the eventual withdrawal of
EULEX. One interviewee suggested that the American desire to have Kosovo
become independent and for this to come ‘fast and furious’, meant that
anything that questioned whether Kosovo was actually ready for independ-
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ence was viewed with great suspicion. A transfer to local authorities and
bodies is a positive step forward in terms of re-establishing relationships of
accountability between local institutions and Kosovars and will help limit the
unhelpful blame game between Kosovars and internationals regarding policy
failures. However, serious questions remain regarding the pace of the transi-
tion. Reports suggest that the control maintained by CIVPOL in the form of
executive policing for such an extended period of time has severely limited the
capacity of the KPS (ISSR, 2006). One interviewee reflected that ‘for too long,
the internationals have been the managers. Now everyone is in “hurry up and
get the hell out” mode’ (I41). This will have serious impacts on programmes
and institutions in Kosovo, including those crucial to dealing with the issues
of political-economy this research is considering. For example, at the time that
the international community began considering its withdrawal from its role
in investigating and prosecuting organised crime, local officers still did not
have the required expertise or certification in forensics to testify in court. Even
though basic training has increased and specialised training on issues related
to organised crime are now available to the KPS, serious capacity-building has
not occurred. In western European countries, for example, those who work on
organised crime would have a training regime roughly as follows: ‘you would
have two and a half years’ basic training, then if you did well . . . two to three
years later you would have specialist training and then another two to three
years of work, so nearly fifteen years’ worth of experience to work in OC. The
police here only have 5–6 years’ practical work experience and twenty-one
weeks of training. Most in the OC unit are intelligent and highly motivated,
but have no investigation experience’ (I47). The rapid pace of reform is under-
standable given both the urgency in creating local institutions that may have
greater legitimacy and allowing more time for advanced training and experi-
ence before an inevitable exit is required. However, the above suggests that
the pace is often rather too rapid and a longer term, more coherent exit
strategy is needed. 
Assessing the role of rule of law in transformation 
The progress made in terms of building physical institutions, creating new
security protocols and legal codes and training domestic staff since the end of
the conflict in Kosovo is considerable. As one officer recounted in 2005, ‘I got
here two months after the war . . . my first job was to clean rooms out of a
building to make a police station, and now there’s 275 KPS in there that are
going to be running it themselves in three weeks’ (I84). Ordinary crime levels
are low and ethnically motivated crime and has decreased. The court system
is staffed with qualified and increasingly experienced and specialised jurists,
and new EU compliant legal codes have set Kosovo on the path to attaining a
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transparent and more efficient judicial system. However, transforming
political-economic relationships that stemmed from or were consolidated
during the war has proved more difficult. 
Despite problems with the growth of the war-as-crime discourse, effective
RoL structures could prove to be an effective tool of transformation – both in
their ability to deal with criminal elements in the territory and also in terms of
ensuring that security actors are no longer key agents or beneficiaries 
of dysfunctional political-economic relationships. While not a solution in and
of itself, it is one facet of a set of policies that are needed to transform the
dysfunctional political-economic relationships associated with conflict. If
these institutions are used to deal with illegal and disruptive forces equitably
and transparently for all citizens, they can serve as a useful tool in the positive
transformation of war economies. However, because the DSI has at times
chosen to use these institutions as means through which to further its own
political aims, the effectiveness of reformed institutions in promoting long-
term transformation is diminished. The use of law as a method of transforma-
tion becomes ineffective when it is utilised as a political tool by the DSI to
install a liberal peace or simply promote stability. Both targeted prosecution
and the shielding of individuals to achieve these goals allows for impunity and
enables former war economy participants to continue in their trade. Such
attempts to ‘buy the peace’ do little to alter political-economic relationships as
those who benefited during the conflict through force of arms continue to use
their positions of physical power to increase their political and economic
power. This ongoing tension between justice and security has not, however,
been ubiquitous as operational actors were, at times, willing to challenge the
status quo, risking destabilising internal politics to bring former KLA/KPC to
justice. However, this occurred rarely and in cases where allowing impunity
may have led to new physical/military security concerns. So despite some
progressive ‘policy moments’, the targeting and shielding of actors via
security and judicial bodies, along with the liberties taken by the UN during
the era of executive control, damaged the independence and impartiality of
RoL institutions in the long term, threatening their potential in the future as
an effective tool against corruption and organised crime. 
Analytically, the growth of the ‘war as crime’ discourse is accompanied by
concerns that strengthening the RoL may become seen as a ‘magic wand’ at
the expense of transforming the historical, social or political facilitators of
crime and political corruption. However, the above analysis of RoL program-
ming reveals an interesting dynamic whereby some actors remained
committed to an apolitical approach, enacting problematic policies as a result,
whilst other operational actors undertook more complex and politically
attuned analysis of the situation. The degree to which these latter actors were
able to turn that analysis into contextually informed policy, however, was
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quite varied – an issue which will be explored further in Chapter 8. In
analysing this, one needs to account for the personal agency of operational
actors which allows them to challenge the apolitical approach that tends to
define the liberal approach. This degree of agency appears to change over
time. The willingness to challenge impunity as well as to create institutions
that challenged Serbia’s sovereignty was in flux and changed over the course
of the mission, which suggests that a closer inspection of sequencing and
timing of policies is required if the negative impacts of the criminality
discourse and rational choice approach are to be challenged. Of course, for
operational actors to make such concerted challenges to the dominant actors
in the DSI would require a more well-equipped and organised practitioner
community, which is prevented from emerging due to a number of basic flaws
and characteristics of the DSI at the operational level.
Summarised in Table 5.1, the findings of this chapter have revealed that
in attempting to transform the criminal aspects of the war economy, including
issues related to political corruption, one finds examples of times where the
supposedly dominant approaches of the DSI are indeed present and impacting
negatively on the goals of both negative and positive transformation.
However, throughout this analysis, one also finds several examples of where
politically nuanced approaches to strengthening the RoL have also been
adopted as a way of addressing some of the political-economic relationships
attributed to Kosovo’s war economy. This suggests that the liberal blueprint
established by the guiding actors of the DSI is either not as problematic as
initially considered or is not always strictly adhered to, allowing for more
innovative or effective approaches to emerge. Indeed, reviews of RoL
programming, whilst often providing evidence of the problematic characteris-
tics of liberal peacebuilding, also lead us to evidence that flexibility or
creativity in policy making can be both encouraged and permitted. In the
forthcoming chapters on privatisation and customs reform, more examples of
such deviations from the liberal agenda will be highlighted, illustrating the
need to understand the dominance of liberalism alongside the heterogeneity of
actors within the DSI. Finding such as these, including reflections on why we
witness such deviations, will lead to a revised framework for understanding
the war economy transformation agenda in the concluding chapter.
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Table 5.1 DSI engagement with rule of law reform and the impacts on war economy
transformation
Plane Characteristic of DSI Impact on transformation 
Ideological Criminality discourse Impunity resulting from preference for 
used as a tool to justify an stability allows some war economy partici-
agenda of control, which pants, including those within the security
emphasises stability over sector, to remain unpunished and continue
justice, resulting in targeted with their economic activity in post-conflict 
prosecution of some actors, phase.
alongside the shielding of
other actors. Dependence on control mechanisms has 
negative impact on development of 
Political goals of this area of domestic institutions capable of dealing with
programming masked/ negative political-economic structures in the
depoliticised by placing long term.
these reforms in more neutral
field of development. Conversely, ‘policy moments’ identified 
where operational actors were able to focus
on local/justice-related needs over goal of
stability.
Conceptual Criminality discourse too DSI has mixed record, with evidence of 
simplistic (focused on RC model), both RC and SPE analysis being undertaken
overlooks political/ social/ and integrated into policy.
economic contributions to crime
(SPE model) potentially leading In some cases lack of acceptance of SPE
to the overuse of the security explanations of criminality and violence
services or judiciary which do results in failure to address socio-economic
not adequately deal with socio- and political structures, hindering the
political issues. effectiveness and delaying the building 
up of effective and fair structures.
Depoliticisation of conflict which Focus on efficiency over accountability
limits the effectiveness of reform allows for political capture and entrenchment
by focusing on technocratic of war economy participants and delays
policies. the building up of trust and accountability
between RoL institutions and citizens.
Geopolitical issues hinder ability of security
actors to operate, leading to loopholes,
limiting regional cooperation and delays in
the building up of accountability. 
Integration of SPE approach is possible when
it does not directly challenge norms and
interests of guiding actor. Opportunities for
integrating this approach may change over
course of intervention.
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Table 5.1 Continued
Plane Characteristic of DSI Impact on transformation 
Operational Operational limitations impact Diminished capacity due to delayed 
ability to deal with complex attention to issues of political-economy;
problems. inadequate human capacity made worse by
mission creep, staff diversity and contract
culture; limited resources, DSI’s preference
for ‘quick fix/observable results’ as opposed
to building up of long-term, sustainable
structures.
International bodies well funded in
comparison to local structures. Limited
resources/salary for local actors thought to
increase corruption.
Gains made could be lost due to poor exit
strategies.
Some issues of capacity and coordination
being dealt with through lead nation
approach.
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Privatisation: liberal reform and the creation
of  new conflict economies
PRIVATISATION AND related commodity governance schemes are meant tobring economic gains for individuals, groups and the state in a fair andneutral way, diminishing the possibility that economic resources will
become a source of violent contestation. Ultimately, the transformation of war
economies requires that assets, whether they be tangible (such as diamonds)
or opportunities (in the form of business prospects), be transparently and
justly governed. Whether that governance is in the form of privatisation or
other resource management schemes such as those discussed in Chapter 2,
the logic is to extract the economic from the political to the degree that the
economic benefits cannot be manipulated by elites or combatants for self-
interested political or economic gain. The goal is to ensure that the struggle
over resources occurs in the regulated and ‘peaceful’ private sphere and not
the complex and self-interested political sphere. In theory, these reforms are
meant to act as a way of wresting control from military or political elites over
key resources which have been used by these actors to consolidate power in
an undemocratic and violent manner (contributing to the goal of negative
transformation) and to return these resources to private hands, leading to
broad socio-economic development (thereby contributing to a wider form of
positive transformation). In reality, and as with many policies, the outcome of
privatisation is never so predictable and in some cases may actually
contribute to the formation or consolidation of economic relationships which
it actually sought to transform. 
Post-conflict privatisation in Kosovo
While privatisation and resource governance schemes are perhaps most
closely related to war economies dominated by the trade of primary commodi-
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ties, such forms of governance are also deemed useful in transforming political
economic relationships more generally. Any economic resource may be
considered a target for such schemes, with the aim being to regulate whatever
part of the economy conflict entrepreneurs and elites have attempted to
control through fear, intimidation or violence. In the Balkans this control has
often taken the form of manipulating the transformation of Socially Owned
Enterprises (SOEs). So, while there is no single, physical commodity to be
privatised in Kosovo, the privatisation of former SOEs has provided a new
arena for war entrepreneurs and political elites to consolidate their economic
and political power. 
Privatisation in Kosovo has been complicated by the unique form of social
ownership which emerged in the former Yugoslavia, making it difficult to
make direct comparisons to other transformations. The 1974 constitution
deemed that neither enterprises nor property in Yugoslavia would be owned
by the state (Skof and Vukmir, 1993). Enterprises and assets were socially
owned, as opposed to publicly owned, and were managed by employees
through workers’ organisations (Babić, 1998; Riinvest, 2007). Local munici-
palities appointed directors to the managing boards of enterprises, creating a
strong link between local political and local economic institutions; managing
economic interests was seen as one of the key responsibilities of municipal
authorities (Riinvest, 2002). From the 1960s until the 1980s, SOEs played a
key role in the socio-economic development of the region. Yugoslavia
remained a ‘regional industrial power and economic success . . . annual GDP
growth averaged 6.1 percent, medical care was free, the literacy rate was of
the order of 91 percent, and average life expectancy was 72 years’
(Chossudovsky, 1997: 376 referring to World Bank, 1991). However, in the
early 1980s a series of economic reforms coupled with high levels of debt due
to extensive borrowing from foreign actors led to economic crisis in
Yugoslavia. The IMF-imposed structural adjustment contributed to a drastic
reduction in purchasing power, an increase in unemployment and heightened
levels of poverty. 
At the local level, enterprises found themselves poorly placed in the new
liberalised economy. As the focus had always been on trading within the
socialist block, they were not in a strong position to compete on the interna-
tional stage (Estrin, 1994). Domestic trading was also hurt as the
deregulation of the trade regime led to local markets being flooded with
foreign goods (Chossudovsky, 1997). These economic factors and disintegra-
tion are considered by some to have been key contributors to the tension and
eventual violence that led to Balkan conflicts in the 1990s (Brown, 1997;
Liotta, 2002; Talbot 2000). Nonetheless, the government continued in its
efforts to liberalise the economy, reducing state involvement in increasingly
unproductive industries and appeasing IFIs by undertaking an extensive
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privatisation process. A series of laws passed between 1988 and 1990,
referred to as the Markovic laws, were meant to govern the process of privati-
sation in Yugoslavia. The process was stalled, however, by the outbreak of
war in Yugoslavia’s former republics. Following the wars, the newly inde-
pendent states of the former Yugoslavia created and followed their own laws
and processes for privatisation (Ristić, 2005). The Serbian state continued to
administer the process of privatisation in Kosovo up until 1999 in what is now
widely considered an illegitimate, if not illegal, manner. Many Kosovan SOEs
were merged with Serbian companies and an estimated 130,000 Albanian
workers were fired from their positions at SOEs (Riinvest, 2004). 
In the first few years of the UN mission, the international administration
avoided the question of privatisation, deciding instead to set up a Department
for Trade and Industry (DTI) in charge of administering, commercialising and
leasing SOEs. This approach did not attract investors or solve the more funda-
mental question of ownership (Eyre and Wittkowsky, 2002). In response,
both the head of the UN’s Pillar IV (the sector of the international mission
responsible for reconstruction and economic development) and the DTI
produced their own plans for privatisation. Both of these plans were rejected
by the UN, largely on the grounds that they would have resulted in legal
changes of ownership. Facilitating such changes was initially considered well
outside the mandate of Resolution 1244 (Perritt, 2005). Some argue that this
concern was misguided and that internationals misunderstood the nature of
social ownership. Indeed, ownership in regard to SOEs appears as a blurred
concept with various levels of government, society and individuals all having
a legitimate stake in enterprises (Perritt, 2005). Who owned assets, and by the
same token who was responsible for liabilities, was called into question. Of
course, such debates also occurred in other parts of the former Yugoslavia,
where SOEs were sold off despite potential interests being held by Yugoslavia.
However, in these cases the issue of ownership and liabilities was dealt with in
the Agreement on Succession Issues (2001) which did not cover the issue of
privatisation in Kosovo, and unlike the other former Yugoslav republics,
Kosovo technically remained part of the Serbian state.
Due to pressure from both domestic and international actors to privatise,
UNMIK created the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA) in 2002 (UNMIK, 2002c,
2003a, 2005a). As with law and security, privatisation was considered a
reserved power; only the SRSG could grant authority to privatise SOEs in
Kosovo. The KTA had two mandates: to supervise the management of publicly
owned enterprises (POEs) and to privatise SOEs. POEs include the major public
services including power, water, sewage and waste removal enterprises.
These processes have had mediocre results by all accounts. Many POEs
continue to operate at a loss, a burden shouldered by international donors in
the early days of the mission (Moalla-Fetini et al., 2005). This obligation has
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now been transferred to Kosovo’s government. Furthermore, public service
delivery is unreliable, with frequent water and power cuts. Kosovo’s power
provider (KEK) often finds itself at the top of Kosovo’s most derided institutions
(ISSR, 2006) because of its poor performance and rumours of corruption.
Many of its problems are related to illegal use of the power supply and its
inability to effectively collect payment for services. However, despite these
problems, POEs perform a key socio-economic function as one of Kosovo’s
largest employers, at one stage providing employment for approximately
14,000 workers (KTA, ndb).
The KTA’s second task was to undertake the privatisation of SOEs. Any
enterprise listed as an SOE in 1989 was considered for tender. The first and
most important part of the KTA’s work was to determine the status of
companies, to establish whether or not they were in fact an SOE before the
‘illegal transformations’ conducted by the Serbian regime. Legal services of
the UNMIK mission made decisions based on KTA reports, a process which
came to be seen as the most delicate part of the process. Estimates of the
number of SOEs vary from 300 (Demekas, Herderschee and Jacobs, 2001) to
around 500 (KTA, nda) and it has been suggested that 25–50 per cent of these
are unlikely to become viable businesses (Demekas, Herderschee and Jacobs,
2001). Several years after the conflict, approximately 20,000 people
remained actively employed by SOEs and 60,000 people remained on
workers’ lists (KTA, nda). In terms of non-employment economic contribu-
tions, SOEs account for approximately 90 per cent of Kosovo’s industrial and
mining base, 50 per cent of the territory’s commercial and retail space and
nearly 20 per cent of its agricultural and forestry areas (KTA, nda). While
many SOEs are summarily dismissed as unproductive entities that will not
impact upon Kosovo’s economy, the above statistics show them to be a key
economic resource in the territory. 
Former employees of an SOE are entitled to 20 per cent of the proceeds of
the sale of that enterprise. Workers’ lists were reviewed and verified by the
trade union and the KTA. The other 80 per cent of the sale proceeds were
placed in a fund to address creditor claims against former SOEs. Enterprises
had many debts to foreign creditors and it is estimated that the average
liability per SOE was approximately 1 million DM (Riinvest, 2001). Both
during and after the UNMIK mission any disputes arising from the process of
privatisation in Kosovo have been dealt with by a Special Chamber within the
judiciary which was created and governed by UNMIK Regulation 2002/13
and subsequently managed by EULEX (UNMIK, 2002d). It is made up of a
panel of judges, with international judges holding a majority on any given
panel. Claims could be made by individuals who felt they had been left off
workers’ lists due to discrimination. In every single case of privatisation,
workers’ lists were challenged in the chamber (EU, 2006c). The chamber was
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also responsible for dealing with any creditor claims against former SOEs. It is
stipulated, however, that the chamber could not provide any form of compen-
sation which requires the rescission or nullification of a sale by the KTA. Thus,
while actors have had recourse to compensation, there was no legal recourse
for reversing a case of privatisation. 
With the legal and procedural requirements in place, privatisation began
on 14 July 2003 with the first wave of privatisation. The first two waves were
completed with the final contracts for the third wave being verified and signed
when the process came to a complete halt at the end of 2003. There are
several competing narratives regarding the reasons for the freezing of the
process. According to some, there was a fear by the KTA’s international
managers of being personally sued in international courts for the selling of
Serbia’s assets. Unlike other UN staff members and KFOR, internationals
working for the KTA were not granted immunity for the work they were to
complete as part of their mandate. This was not a simple oversight. The UN
was keen to distance itself from the process and refused to grant KTA staff
immunity (Knoll, 2005; Zaum, 2006). In addition, the concern was once
again raised that privatisation did not fall within the parameters of Regulation
1244 and that the KTA was therefore engaging in illegal privatisation. Some
enterprises had been transformed between 1989 and 1999 and it was not
clear that all transformations between 1989 and 1999 were in fact illegal.
There was also concern by members of the KTA regarding the integrity of the
process and the background of some of the bidders, with concerns that enter-
prises were being bought up by military-political elite and criminal actors. The
official version for the stalling of the process is that ‘following the first two
waves, the UN and the EU engaged in a review of the process’ (I25). 
Regardless of the reasons, the result of the sudden cessation led to a high
degree of tension and ill will between the KTA, EU, UNMIK, UNHQ, PISG and
the public, especially employees of SOEs. It also resulted in the dismissal of the
managing director of the KTA, Marie Fucci, who had initially called for the
process to be stopped. After a review of the law, and with some minor changes
to procedure (Riinvest, 2004) privatisation under the KTA resumed mid-
2005. From that time onwards, progress was swift: in April 2005 only two
waves of privatisation had been completed, but, within the space of one year
the fifteenth wave was launched. Statistics released in February 2007 show
that 219 SOEs had been privatised (UNMIK, 2007b), and by April of 2007, the
twenty-fifth wave of privatisation was launched. This pace continued
following the takeover of the process by the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo
(PAK) in 2008 – by autumn 2010 the forty-fifth wave of privatisation was
advertised with the PAK announcing that 560 NewCos (the name given to
former SOEs that have been prepared for privatisation) had been created
(PAK, 2010). Many of what are referred to as Kosovo’s ‘crown jewels’ have
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been privatised, including the Ferronickel plant, the Peje brewery and the
winery in Prizren. 
There was a desire amongst the UN administration and the KTA for more
Serbs to bid on SOEs and to help the KTA identify SOEs in Serbian areas that
would be appropriate for privatisation (EU, 2006c). However, privatisation in
Serbian-dominated areas of Kosovo has been considerably less successful as
neither Serbia nor Serbs have been willing to participate in the process. This
concerned many staff at the KTA given that SOEs not privatised by the end of
the UN mission would be put under the control of a new Kosovan government,
under which there were concerns that Serbian interests would not be as well
protected (I13). In the end, following the declaration of independence, the
KTA’s assets and tasks were in fact handed over to the PAK. This new
Kosovan agency, however, operates in an extremely complex politico-legal
quagmire. Whilst the makeup of the management of the PAK suggests
Kosovan institutions and actors control the agency (with the majority of
board members being from Kosovo and a minority of the board made up of
internationals), the DSI retains a great deal of control over their activities. For
example, the ICO maintained a substantial degree of political and diplomatic
power in the process, playing a formal role in the appointment of board
members, and in confirming the role of the Special Chamber (also heavily
influenced by internationals) in resolving disputes related to privatisation
(ICO Decision, 2011). In practice, this means that the EULEX mission retains
power in legal cases involving privatisation by both the KTA and the PAK,
with international jurists sitting on appeals panels and passing legally binding
judgements. This continued level of control by the international community,
despite independence, has been put in place to ensure that ethnic bias and
political interests do not drive the privatisation process, thereby ensuring the
‘spirit’ of the KTA remains in the post-independence phase. This control is
seen by some as contravening Kosovo’s independence, with one commentator
arguing that ‘Despite the new legal reality, the Special Chamber of the
Supreme Court still considers the KTA regulations as the law in force and does
not recognise the law passed by the Kosovo Assembly on PAK. In this sense
the domestic law in Kosovo, the denial of PAK as a full legal entity . . . is a
breach of procedural regulations . . . as well as a breach of constitutional rules’
(Gashi, 2011: 1). Thus, in relation to the privatisation process, the shift from
trusteeship to independence is a story characterised by continuity, not
change, with internationals still attempting to maintain control over the
process.
The case of the Trepça mining complex deserves special consideration.
Located primarily in the northern region of Kosovo, with many of its key
components near Mitrovica, Trepça also comprises factories in Serbia and
Montenegro. In the 1980s approximately 20,000 people were employed by
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Trepça (ECIKS, 2005b). It contained nearly 70 per cent of Yugoslav mineral
wealth and was a principle source of exports, accounting for close to 25 per
cent of the region’s production (ECIKS, 2005b). Production dwindled and the
mines were neglected during the 1990s due in part to the Yugoslav wars and
the deteriorating economy. Immediately following the war, Trepça remained
under international administration, the goals of which were to protect Trepça
from creditor claims, restart production and employment at the mines and to
prepare it for eventual privatisation (EU, 2006c). Of its nine mines, five are
believed to hold significant resources including lead, zinc, copper, silver and
gold (KTA/UNMIK, 2005). Some estimates have valued Trepça at $5 billion
(Talbot, 2000: 105). It remains a symbolic, economic and political point of
struggle, with one commentator referring to it as Kosovo’s Berlin Wall (ICG,
1999b). In the post-independence era, the Trepça complex remains a point of
contention – with EULEX, the ICO, the Government of Kosovo, Trepça’s
management board and Serbian interests locked in negotiations aimed at not
only reviving activities across the complex, but also ensuring this is done in a
fair and transparent manner (Smith, 2009). 
The centrality of the market: liberal peacebuilding and the
push for privatisation
Since the end of the Cold War, developed and developing nations alike have
undergone a deepening of privatisation, with this reform also being a central
policy prescription in post-communist and post-socialist states. Indeed,
privatisation has been a favoured tool of intervention in transitioning states as
international organisations ‘put aside their proposed ideological neutrality to
adopt an overt neo liberal programme’ (Bhatia, 2005: 206). Thus, while often
portrayed as a neutral economic policy, privatisation is in fact an inherently
political tool through which liberal peace is installed. As early as the
Ramboiullet conference which took place before the NATO-led war in Kosovo,
the goal of transforming Kosovo into a free market economy was clear with
Article 1 of the agreement specifically calling for privatisation (Talbot, 2000:
105). This desire to liberalise Kosovo’s economy can thus be seen as part of the
wider political project of liberalising former communist and socialist
economies. 
As Estrin notes, privatisation has ensured the ‘irreversibility of the reform
process’ (1994: 18) as it has replaced a ruling class of authoritarian-commu-
nists with democratic-capitalists. Privatisation is a key tool in keeping
communists, socialists and actors with leftist sympathies out of power and
keeping regimes friendly to the developed liberal nations in control of transi-
tioning states. Batt agrees with these assessments, concluding that economic
policy in post-communist and socialist states is effectively a political strategy:
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Its fundamental purposes are to redefine the state on the basis of liberal democrat-
ic principles, and thereby to secure the ‘return to Europe’, meaning an
international realignment and reintegration into Western economic and security
structures . . . Post-communist governments embarking upon privatisation . . .
have only one consistent, effective and organised source of pressure in support of
the policy: the international financial institutions backed by Western govern-
ments, which insist on the inclusion of privatisation as a condition for financial
support and technical and economic assistance. (1994: 83–89)
Evidence from a wide variety of documents and agreements regarding
economic reconstruction in Kosovo confirm the plan of bringing Kosovo into
the global capitalist economy. Although the PISG was not able to negotiate
formally with IFIs given the lack of statehood, the World Bank had several
ongoing projects in Kosovo prior to Kosovo’s declaration of independence. The
IMF also assisted the pre-independence government in creating medium-term
macro-economic strategies. Together with the SRSG, Kosovo’s PISG signed a
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (2005). A statement of inten-
tions regarding the running of Kosovo’s economy and addressed to the
international donor community, it reads as a series of promises that Kosovo
will play by prescribed neo-liberal doctrine. 
Statements made by the DSI regarding the running of some of Kosovo’s
POEs confirm internationals’ desire to bring the running of the economy in
line with free market principles. An IMF document derides plans by KEK, the
public power provider, arguing that ‘An ill conceived “social policy” of
providing free electricity to the poor and to Serb enclaves is one of the root
causes of the problems at KEK’ (Moalla-Fetini et al., 2005: 42). In a similar
vein, a KTA press release regarding the management of the railways states:
‘Last year, the unions have acknowledged that the railways are overstaffed,
but the only solution they offered was to maintain the entire staff and cut
salaries by 52% for all workers. “This is the wrong, old communist way to do
it. In this case the good workers are paying for those who do little or nothing”,
says Mr Rich [MD of UNMIK Railways]’ (KTA, 2004c). Similar statements
regarding plans to nationalise key enterprises were made by the head of the EU
pillar in 2006 who said such a move would be interpreted as ‘going back to
communist times’ (EU, 2006c: 6) These examples illustrate the desire that
businesses should be run in line with modern capitalist ideals and that social
provisions should not be built into the running of businesses, as they were
under communist or socialist economies. Social provision is the role of
political actors, not economic actors. 
What is pertinent here is that that the push for privatisation is part of a
wider set of goals which will complete and confirm the victory of capitalism
and which is based on the liberal belief that such forms of economic reform
will encourage global security through economic integration and interde-
122
Building a peace economy?
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 122
pendence. In this sense, privatisation has little to do with transforming the
local, violent political-economic relationships. More problematic in relation to
promoting positive transformation, however, is the insistence by the DSI that
the historical and cultural reliance of citizens on public or social enterprises
for economic opportunities and protection must be discontinued. Efficiency
and performance must now guide the running of enterprises. However, as
Pugh notes, ‘the removal of state from economy reinforces reliance of the poor
on the shadow coping and survival economies’ (Pugh, 2005b: 13). Removing
social provisions through the liberalising of the economy and through forced
employment cuts at POEs serves to push individuals and groups further into
informal support networks, which as seen in Kosovo often involve illicit or
illegal activities. In this sense, a privatisation process which discourages
enterprises from contributing to social safety nets in order to ensure economic
efficiency, only heightens the necessity and attractiveness of the informal,
illicit and illegal. 
Of course, the idea that privatisation is a process forced upon an unwilling
population by powerful external actors is misleading. While some have
suggested that Kosovo’s leaders begrudgingly accepted the shift to a market
economy in order to gain support for their quest for independence (Pugh,
2005a referring to Henders, 2003), support for liberalising the economy, and
in turn for privatisation, is strong in Kosovo. Surveys conducted in Kosovo
following the war found that only 10 per cent of surveyed enterprises opposed
privatisation (Riinvest, 2001). In Peje municipality, the initial strategy of
commercialising SOEs was opposed and local leaders argued for privatisation.
Furthermore, Kosovan political institutions were highly opposed to the
stalling of the process and strongly urged the SRSG to restart the process as
soon as possible. That the process is locally accepted and desired is not
unproblematic given the opportunity for the benefits of privatisation to be
captured by individuals in ways that potentially consolidate the power and
wealth gained by actors through violence. Reflecting on the post-conflict
privatisation of SOEs in Bosnia, for example, Donais finds that ‘What interna-
tional advisors originally envisaged as an apolitical, rapid and orderly transfer
of assets from public to private hands has become a corrupt, ethnicised and
protracted struggle for power which has done little to stimulate economic
growth or promote inter-ethnic reconciliation’ (2002: 2). Other studies
confirm the capturing of the fruits of privatisation by local political interests
(Castel-Branco, Cramer and Hailu, 2003; Ristić, 2005). 
Of course the economic motivations of local actors should by no means
always be viewed pejoratively. Economic motivations may be based on perceived
societal benefits – this acknowledges that attempts by local actors to acquire
assets may stem from legitimate desires to restart economic production 
and progress in Kosovo. For example, Kosovan economic commentators and
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supporters of privatisation have called for proceeds from sales to go directly into
the Kosovo budget to aid in the territory’s reconstruction and development. Also,
the idea of personal enrichment needs to be questioned as it may be that capture
of privatisation processes may not involve vast accumulation of wealth, but
rather basic financial stability. For example, in the case of one enterprise where
managers had been accused of stealing profits,  the supposedly corrupt manage-
ment in fact had the support of its workers, based largely on the fact that the man-
agement kept 500 people employed at higher than average wages in an enter-
prise that only required 250 employees (I71). Cases where the municipal courts
have tried to compensate workers of former SOEs (KTA, 2006e) also show that
there is a desire to use the sale of SOEs to provide a degree of financial security for
individuals in Kosovo (EU, 2006d).
Still, in opposition to the altruistic motivations described above there is
also evidence that some actors are motivated by the desire for personal
economic and political gain and are willing to engage in corrupt, violent and
criminal acts to further these aims. For example, at the Jugoterm SOE, the
director was found to be diverting business orders to his own company (Eyre
and Wittkowsky, 2002) – a strategy noted by Ristić (2005) who found that
many SOEs were purchased in order to minimise competition for enterpris-
es already owned by the purchaser. Privatisation in Kosovo has also become
another battleground for ongoing political rivalries between Albanian parties
and factions. Kosovo is largely divided between three major parties (the LDK,
PDK and AAK). These actors have all attempted to capture the resources,
and thus power, generated through the privatisation process. Evidence of
attempts to capture the process is extensive. Government ministries try to
influence the direction of the KTA, Special Chamber and POEs by appoint-
ing directors to management boards – although arguably, this had a limited
impact during the period that internationals continued to constitute a
majority on all panels and boards (Riinvest, 2007). Furthermore, despite its
illegality, municipalities have continuously tried to appoint directors of their
choosing to manage SOEs, and have at times expropriated SOEs’ land and
assets for their own use (KTA, 2006a, 2005f). Eyre and Wittowsky, both of
whom worked for Pillar IV in Kosovo, provide several examples of cases
where domestic political competition erupted within SOEs and POEs, in some
instances involving intimidation and violence, noting that this is ‘directly
attributed to the change in the balance of power after the LDK had won most
of the Municipalities, while many managements had been placed by or with
the consent of [the KLA] (later PDK) dominated Provisional Government in
1999’ (2002: 29). Holzner confirms this, determining that following the
elections in 2000 ‘newly elected municipal governments started to remove
all political opponents in the management of SOEs’ (2003: 11). Referring to
one case involving a rock quarry and dubious financial transactions
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occurring amongst the companies and individuals involved, it is noted that
‘UNMIK suspected that rivalries between major political parties in part
accounted for the willingness of the municipality to tolerate this action, as
the workers placed at economic disadvantage by the action were primarily
in LDK controlled Pristina, while the benefits accrued to workers in PDK
Gllogovc’ (Eyre and Wittowsky, 2002: 27). 
The privatisation schemes, whilst failing to transform political economies
of violence, as shown above, have also at times led to new forms of violence
in the form of threats and intimidation of individuals and institutions. Some
interviewees connected to privatisation procedures would not characterise
intimidation as a systemic problem, but admitted that evidence supports the
conclusion that some attempts at transforming former SOEs have been
hijacked by either criminal or politically biased interests. Several intervie-
wees believed that bidders were being scared away by individuals with
political or military backgrounds (I72, I5), or that people would simply not
bid against ex-KLA (I71). In one case, a bidder admitted to the KTA that he
knew no one would bid against him (I72). Another example was given where
an ex-KLA member with no business experience was appointed by a munic-
ipality to run one of Kosovo’s more prosperous SOEs (I71). It is widely
believed that the management of this same SOE was stealing profits by
claiming to sell less than they actually were (I71). Intimidation continues
years into the privatisation process, with the postponement of a tender in
December of 2006. In this case, the KTA clearly confirmed violent intimi-
dation as the reason for withdrawing the tender stating: ‘The decision to
postpone the sale has been taken due to 1) the intimidation of a pre-regis-
tered bidder in an attempt to deter the potential investor from bidding in the
public tender. 2) The assault on an archive clerk temporarily employed by
the Liquidation Committee of the enterprise and his brother . . . and 3) the
intimidation of a staff member of the KTA dealing with the public sale’ (KTA,
2006f).
The KTA staff member in question was taken off the case for their own
protection. Intimidation of KTA staff, or at least the fear of it, was also illus-
trated by the insistence of some interviewees that interviews with the author
did not occur within KTA offices as they did not want any conversations to be
heard by colleagues. There was a fear that both local and international staff
might be leaking information of what is happening within the KTA. Besides
intimidation and collusion, there is also a strong belief that laundered money
is being used to buy businesses (I5). Evidence that the purchase of SOEs is
being used as a way of laundering money stems for the incredibly high prices
people are willing to pay for some SOEs (I71). SOEs bought with bank loans
remain suspect as well, as laundered money is believed to have also infiltrated
the banks (I5, I25). 
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In order to deal with some of the issues described above, several proce-
dures were adopted by the KTA. First, the decision to have private, sealed bids,
as opposed to an open public auction has been considered a key component in
protecting the identities of bidders prior to the sale. Having both rounds of
bidding on the same day is also thought to be a way of limiting intimidation
between rounds of bidding. To prevent money laundering, money for
purchases has to go through a cleared bank which is not on the Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) black list. Background checks on bidders and their
sources of funding is completed by international bodies. Individuals who have
declared bankruptcy, have criminal records or are under investigation may
not bid. The strategy of attempting to solve these problems through regulation
and investigation techniques has continued in the post-independence era
with both ICO and EULEX attempting to control the corrupt and criminal
practices discussed above. However, the DSI has at times voiced its preference
for a less invasive strategy, expressing its desire that political corruption or
criminality will eventually morph into an environment in which in a cadre of
‘good capitalists’ (Donais, 2002: 6) emerge over time. 
In sum, the role of ideological politics in this area of transformation policy
is mixed. Although the governance of resources through policies such as
privatisation remains as a key strategy in installing a liberal peace, both
guiding and operational actors within the DSI initially took a very cautious
approach to privatising in Kosovo. However, such cautiousness was not a
function of a limited commitment to liberal ideology, but rather a fear of the
legal and personal ramifications for operational staff. Once legal concerns
were addressed, the commitment to free market ideologies and technologies of
economic governance was revived and implemented at rapid pace. The
renewed commitment to this cornerstone of neo-liberalism in Kosovo became
wrapped up in attempts to appease domestic actors and ensure stability and
cooperation from Kosovo’s political elite. Concessions were made which in the
end favoured certain actors over others, and has allowed for a problematic
degree of political capture, or politicisation of the process. This has allowed
former war economy participants to consolidate gains made during the
conflict, and for these actors and new political elite to further their own
interests, often through force and intimidation. While resource governance
schemes may alter who is control of resources, there is little change in how
resources are acquired, with power and force still characterising who is able
to control key resources as opposed to processes based on equity and justice.
Of course in all cases, cautious operational actors will try to minimise such
capture and prevent the above scenarios from developing. However, the use of
short-term control strategies is often ineffective and the long-term hope that
actors will eventually ‘fall in line’ with the fundamental principles of neo-
liberal economics is faulty, based more on desire than actual examples of such
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changes in other transitioning states. Essentially, resource governance
schemes put much faith in the theory of free market economics which in
practice rarely produce the desired transformative effect.
Separating the economic and the political
Privatisation is itself an attempt to depoliticise economic life – the aim being to
remove narrow political interests and allow free market forces to guide
economic development. It is meant to be apolitical and is largely premised on
the assumption that individuals will base their decisions on rational economic
considerations. The wealth created by these rational economic choices will
supposedly trickle down, leading to broad development based not on political
affiliation but on market principles. That such beliefs are valid in relatively
peaceful political environments is questionable. In politically unstable situa-
tions such beliefs are even more dubious, with empirical evidence challenging
these fundamental assumptions. As one study on post-conflict privatisation in
Mozambique concluded, ‘Privatisation is not a socially neutral, technical
process of achieving Pareto optimality. It is unavoidably political; wealth and
economic power is transferred between social groups through negotiation and
conflict (sometimes violent)’ (Castel-Branco, Cramer and Hailu, 2003: 166).
As seen in RoL reforms, there is a need to differentiate between the aim of
depoliticising an institution and the need to consider the ways in which
political factors influence that institution. What follows is a consideration of
several political factors which affect economic governance schemes and a
discussion of the degree to which these factors have or have not been inte-
grated.
Consideration of local context – ongoing internal disputes
Several internal political problems have continually affected Kosovo’s privati-
sation process. At a very basic level, many of the documents required to
determine the ownership and attributes of SOEs in Kosovo were destroyed,
went missing or were taken to Serbia during the conflict and Serbia has
largely been unwilling to provide requested documents to the KTA and PAK.
This makes the task of determining the status of an SOE, along with what
assets and liabilities it comes with, inherently difficult. A second and more
entrenched set of problems relates to ongoing tensions between Serbs and
Albanians within Kosovo over the past, present and future of SOEs. Many
Serbs do not understand or accept the claim over the illegality of pre-1999
transformations. During the 1990s Serbs were told that Albanians had in fact
quit their jobs in protest (and were not fired), and that those who did not quit
were intimidated and threatened by militant Albanians (I6). Therefore, there
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is doubt and conflict over claims of past wrongs in the SOE sector. In the
present era, there is again a problem of perception in that within Serbian
communities, the UN the KTA and PAK are seen as occupiers. For this reason,
members of Serbian enclaves are unwilling or unable (due to pressures from
Serbia) to fully participate in privatisation schemes. These problems are
heightened by concerns over the future. Many Serbs have been worried that if
they do help privatisation agencies identify SOEs which are appropriate for
tender in Serbian areas, Albanians will bid on and buy these enterprises,
pushing out Serb employees and managers and that this will lead to an
‘Albanianisation’ of Serbian areas (I5) – ethnic cleansing by privatisation.
This fear is not unfounded given that due to the nature of the tendering
process, which must be free, open and transparent, there is no way to prevent
Albanians from buying these SOEs. Tender cannot be restricted along ethnic
lines. In this way it is very clear that policy has not been altered in order to
deal with the historical and current political problems in the territory as the
real beliefs and fears of a range of local actors have not been integrated into
this facet of economic policy.
Alongside the above examples, more blatant illustrations of KTA staff
avoiding political issues in privatisation programming was found. When
asked why, when it was supposedly common knowledge that the manage-
ment of an SOE was stealing from the company, nothing was done, the
response from one interviewee was simply ‘it would be too political’ (I71).
Another informant in a different municipality admitted that if they went to
their superior with a problem regarding privatisation that was political in
nature they were told ‘stop – let’s just do our job and privatise’ (I6). The
mandate has been to complete privatisation, regardless of any internal
political problems. As was seen in relation to security sector reform, while
there appears to be an acceptance by some operational actors of the role
ongoing political issues may play, this has not necessarily translated into
policy that creates room or allowances for these political intricacies. Unlike
some aspects of RoL reforms, discussed in Chapter 5, there have not been iden-
tifiable ‘policy moments’ in which actors have been granted opportunities to
allow for political context to influence policy. It appears that in the highly
contentious area of privatisation, there is little if any opportunity to integrate
politics into programming.
What is the effect of this on efforts to transform the political-economy of
post-conflict Kosovo? First, the inability or unwillingness to deal with the
perception, concerns and blocking of the privatisation in Serbian areas has
entrenched a processes of informal and parallel privatisation by local
strongmen and the Serbian government in the north. It is also creating fertile
ground for future conflict, as it is putting in place political-economic relation-
ships in the Albanian areas which are not seen as legitimate by citizens in
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Serbian areas. By allowing the privatisation of SOEs before relations between
the two ethnic groups were resolved, it has de facto prohibited minorities from
bidding on enterprises in the country, ultimately favouring one ethnicity over
another in terms of economic opportunities in the future. This is creating a
system in Kosovo whereby economic power is being consolidated in the hands
of one ethnic group. While privatisation was meant to depoliticise economic
life, it is in fact laying the foundation for a future where economic dominance
by one set of actors can be used as a political tool against a competing group,
potentially creating a new form of conflict economy. Here, the political-
economy of the conflict is being transformed, but not in a positive way. The
privatisation process, in its attempts to right the wrongs of Serbian domina-
tion over Kosovan economic assets is creating a system whereby there will be
Albanian domination over Kosovan economic assets. 
The geopolitics of local privatisation
Just as conflicts between Albanian and Serb perceptions of privatisation
within the territory have impacted the process, the unresolved conflicts
between Serbia, Kosovo and the international community have also had
significant repercussions on the transformation of political-economic rela-
tionships. While the UN has tried to present the process as a neutral economic
reform, privatisation has been debated amongst commentators in terms of
both its legality and political legitimacy. Referring to Kosovo, Perritt deter-
mines that ‘enterprises were already privatised or transformed into private
ownership [under the Serbian regime], then renationalised by the political
trustee [UNMIK], and finally privatised through a process deriving its legal
power from an ambiguous legal mandate to the trustee. Some claimants argue
that the first privatisation was invalid. Other claimants argue that the first
privatisation process was valid and the second invalid’ (2005: 137).
None of the parties to the conflict appears satisfied with the outcome.
Internationals have been accused by the Albanian side of giving too much
weight to concerns of the Serbian state (Riinvest, 2004). Alternatively, there
is pressure from Serbian companies with interests in Kosovan SOEs and the
Serbian government itself to halt the privatisation process. The opinion held
by Serbia is that Kosovo legally remains part of the state of Serbia and that any
change in the ownership of socially owned property (past, present or future)
falls distinctly within its sovereign rights. Interestingly, several interviewees
working on privatisation supported this claim arguing that technically, the
KTA were re-privatising companies that are part of the Republic of Serbia
(I29, I16, I6). Alternatively, Albanians believe that due to changes to the
1974 constitution the Autonomous Provinces were granted the rights of
social ownership over enterprises within their territory, meaning Kosovo
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should have the right to privatise according to its own laws and procedures. It
is this latter view that has been largely accepted by the international
community. In fact, the DSI has allowed the desires of the Albanian majority
to guide the process in many ways. In Kosovo, the eventual shape of laws and
regulations regarding the privatisation process has furthered Albanian
interests. Internationals in control of the privatisation process before it was
stalled had wanted to transfer the liability of SOEs to the NewCos. This was
opposed by Albanians who felt that much of the debt had been accumulated
by the SOEs after the so-called illegal expulsions and transformations of the
post-1989 era. Alongside debts owed to foreign creditors, it is estimated that
Kosovo enterprises owe Serbia approximately $1 billion (Pugh, 2004: 57).
Those hoping to purchase SOEs were keen to limit the amount of liabilities
that were transferred to the NewCos, partly to decrease their financial respon-
sibilities to past creditors and thereby increase the value of their investment.
The acceptance of limited liability being transferred to NewCos was therefore
viewed as a victory by the Albanian majority. 
The ‘middle ground’ privatisation which was finally decided upon
(although to the Serbs, the scheme falls drastically to the Albanian side as
opposed to the middle), was in keeping with the general approach of the UN
and the DSI in Kosovo to not take sides and remain neutral. However, while
attempting to appear neutral, international actions in the field of privatisation
have inevitably favoured the Albanian cause, revealing a hidden or reluctant
acquiescence. Regardless of the reasons for their actions, be they an attempt
at diplomacy or evidence of risk aversion, trying to be even-handed and avoid
fundamental political disagreements has created a privatisation scheme with
which neither side is satisfied. The goals of the DSI have been to privatise in a
way which allows for economic development in Kosovo, satisfies the call for
justice by Albanians and does not infringe ‘too much’ on the sovereignty of
Serbia. All this has been attempted while trying to avoid the larger issue of
status. The effect of this is the creation and implementation of a privatisation
scheme based on legal principles and jurisdictions not recognised as legitimate
or fair by many Kosovans, some internationals, many Serbs and Serbia
proper. According to some it has re-privatised already privatised enterprises
and/or sold assets of a sovereign state against their will. To the opposing side,
it has wrongly granted Serbia a stake in Kosovan economic interests. In this
sense, it has legitimised (to all parties) the use of force, coercion and
unchecked executive power as a means by which to appropriate economic
resources for political gain. Just as the previous section pointed to the effect of
creating a domestic political-economy which could provoke future conflict,
disregarding wider political issues could similarly create dysfunctional
regional political-economic relationships. 
In all, economic governance schemes which attempt to draw a clear line
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between politics and the economy create barriers to their own success. By
working under the supposition that its work is economic and not political in
character, the DSI attempts to shield itself with a false cloak of neutrality.
Ignoring the politics that inevitably will come into play in all economic trans-
actions, but specifically in economic transactions occurring in conflict-
affected areas, is dangerous, as such ‘neutrality’ can inadvertently lead to new
tensions and thus new conflict over economic resources. None of this is to
argue that resource governance schemes are futile exercises. Indeed they are
needed to root out many of the political-economic relationships linked to
violence. However, what is illustrated by the case of Kosovo is the problem of
attempting to introduce such contentious reforms before either local or geopo-
litical dilemmas have been addressed or incorporated into economic planning.
If tensions and competition still rule the political sphere, it is a certainty that
these same issues will reveal themselves in the economic sphere. Thus, the
benefits of resource governance schemes become little more than another
source of competition with political-economic reforms indeed being trans-
formed, but not in a progressive sense. 
The DSI as privatising agents: complicity and capacity
International actors, be they donor states, multi-lateral institutions or IFIs,
are often considered to be neutral external observers or benevolent interven-
ers. However, evidence shows that these same actors and the policies they
implement are often deeply involved in the political-economic structures
central to conflicts. This involvement is problematic in terms of transforming
dysfunctional political-economic relationships on two fronts: first in terms of
its impact on providing a model to local institutions and second in terms of its
effect on increasing opportunities and motivation for corrupt practices.
Therefore, one must address international actors’ and their policies’ contribu-
tions to war economies in order to fully assess the problem of transformation.
As noted, one of the most substantial conflicts over economic resources has
been, and continues to be, the Trepça mining complex. Temporally, Trepça
has been the site of a struggle over resources that spans centuries. ‘The
Roman and Ottoman Empires fought to take control of silver mines in Kosovo
and at a later stage the Serbian Middle Kingdom produced much of its coinage
from silver mines at Artana/Novo Brdo’ (KTA/UNMIK, 2005: 2). In the
1930s, Seltrust, a British company, helped create modern mining around
Mitrovica and in turn, during the Second World War, allied forces used
batteries produced at Trepça (KTA/UNMIK, 2005). In relation to the most
recent conflict over Trepça, the revocation of autonomy at the end of the
1980s and the subsequent transfer of assets to Serbian interests also involves
several international actors. Assets transferred to Serbia were in turn sold to
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foreign actors including French, German and Italian firms. Many foreign firms
continue to claim compensation for the privatisation of former SOEs in
Kosovo, claiming they had invested in or purchased parts of these enterprises
during the 1990s. It is estimated that over 90 foreign companies have claims
for the Trepça complex (ECIKS, 2006a). That the DSI decided that a substan-
tial proportion of the monies from the sale of SOEs would go towards paying
creditor claims as opposed to being reinvested in infrastructure, business
development and reconstruction is not surprising.
This raises further issues related to the DSI’s involvement in political
economic transformation While many of the sales of SOEs are to domestic
actors, there has been some foreign investment, a trend which the KTA, along
with Pillar IV, were keen to see increase (KTA, nda; USAID, nd). In the early
stages of post-conflict rebuilding, an international consortium of mining
companies signed an agreement with UNMIK to rehabilitate the Trepça
complex. The consortium was made up of TEC-Ingénierie of France, Boliden
Contech of Sweden and Morrison Knudsen International, Inc of the USA. The
hope was that the influx of financial and human capital from these foreign
companies would help spark economic recovery in Kosovo. However, several
years later, Trepça remained a site of struggle between Serbs and Albanians as
well as Serbia and Kosovo. Negotiations will become more complex as the
number of stakeholders increases through foreign investment. Encouraging
international investment in a territory where the issues of property rights and
rule of law remain in flux is problematic. In the short term it does hold the
potential to rebuild elements of the economy which in turn provides much-
needed employment and resources. However, besides the aforementioned
complication of increasing potential stakeholders, encouraging foreign
investment in the midst of instability further entices those willing to engage in
corrupt practices by providing the possibility for even greater profits and thus
power. Pushing for large influxes of foreign investment before corrupt and
dysfunctional political-economic structures have been dealt with serves to
widen and increase potential payoffs and thus potential abuses. None of this is
meant to imply that foreign investment should be abolished, especially in
cases where public service provision is at stake, as in the cases of POEs.
However, international bodies and actors must be cognisant of the roles they
play as well as the incentives they provide in domestic political-economies and
reconsider the timing, sequencing and depth of such involvement. 
At times, the role of external actors has been overtly damaging, contribut-
ing in very obvious ways to the dysfunctional political-economic relationships
the KTA has sought to transform. The most infamous example of this is the
case of a German director stealing from KEK (I72; Pugh, 2002). A Norwegian
company, Norway Invest, involved with Kosovo’s Post and Tele-
communications POE (the PTK) was also involved in a case in which formal
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charges of money laundering, abuse of official position and entering into a
harmful contract were laid. This incident also saw international managers of
the KTA being formally charged (UNMIK, 2006a). In such cases, internation-
al actors have clearly contributed to the corrupt and illegal practices which
other actors, and in the case of the KTA staff charged, their colleagues, are
seeking to eliminate. Likewise, as a result of the work of UNMIK and KFOR,
many assets of SOEs (mainly equipment and machinery) have been destroyed
by security operations or through the clearing of buildings for administrative
purposes. Neither the UN nor KFOR has been held legally responsible for such
damage. In these cases, potentially productive industries have been expropri-
ated for the ‘public good’, but in ways not always seen as legitimate by the
local population. The overall impact of the involvement of international
actors in overtly criminal and destructive ways on the transformation of
political-economic relationships in Kosovo relates to the problem of account-
ability. International actions vis-a-vis the fraud and criminal activity
perpetuated and the expropriation of social or public property provides a poor
model on which to base future governing practices. It has signalled that
powerful actors are above the law, contradicting many of the values and
practices they are attempting to instil in Kosovan institutions. This kind of
activity suggests that actors with obvious financial interests in the economy
should not be allowed to dictate transformation processes, especially when
they are not subject to local laws, have the power to grant themselves
immunity and award themselves majority status on panels making key
decisions.
Despite their role in contributing to problematic political-economic
processes, the DSI has generally positioned itself as the actor best placed to
provide solutions. However, as with the previous areas of reform discussed in
Chapter 5, the practices of privatisation have proved difficult to perfect. Much
of the problem in relation to this area of reform is that the actors involved
generally do not have the requisite experience that would allow them to
address the many difficulties of privatising in conflict zones that have been
discussed thus far. This is again largely down to the problem of mission creep.
As post-conflict missions become broader and deeper in scope, the DSI will
inevitably be faced with programme areas and problems which its institutions
have not yet encountered. An international mission privatising enterprises in
a protectorate against the wishes of a sovereign state is one example of such
an encounter. Yet despite bringing in expertise, inexperience in the field of
privatisation has hampered the process. The problem of a lack of experience by
international institutions in privatisation has been made more acute by a lack
of legal guidance. As one interviewee notes, the problem is that in terms of
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A function of mission creep and the resultant lack of legal protocols was
the stalling of the process which had serious repercussions on transformation.
During this delay over what to do with assets, many SOEs fell into disrepair
due to neglect, destruction or looting. The delay also allowed for an illegiti-
mate entrenchment of individuals in SOEs. Some of these seizures were viewed
positively – in the first few years following the war, there appeared a
somewhat spontaneous and natural entrepreneurial and economic recovery
as many enterprises appeared to re-open for business. However, such
optimism was soon balanced by the fact that ‘commercialisation of assets did
not happen in an orderly way. On the contrary, what evolved were all features
of a “pirate” economy where assets of SOEs were stripped for short term
benefit, and monies disappeared in an opaque way into both private pockets
(at least some with dubious legitimacy and shady connections) and political
party coffers’ (Eyre and Wittkowsky, 2002: 25) While the internationals
delayed and debated questions regarding legal ownership, Kosovan actors
were busy claiming and using the assets of these enterprises. Poor planning
and insufficient experience thus allowed former war and political elites to
capture economic assets.
Despite the slow and hesitant start to privatisation in Kosovo, since the
process restarted in 2005, and as the UNMIK administration planned its exit
from the territory, the pace of privatisation increased dramatically. One inter-
viewee working within the KTA admitted that their mandate was to sell
everything quickly (I72). The speed of privatisation is, however, problematic.
Often the choice is between privatising carefully or privatising quickly (de la
Dehesa, 1991: 11). If one considers that the privatisation process in Kosovo
did not begin in earnest until mid-2005 and that it ended with the cessation of
the UNMIK mandate at the beginning of 2008, the rapidity of the transforma-
tion is palpable. Changes in property rights in liberal developed nations
emerge slowly over centuries (Brown, 1997; Iatridis, 1998); in Kosovo they
have happened over a matter of years. The effect of such rapid transforma-
tions is twofold. First, the speed of the latest rounds of privatisation does not
allow time for the financial and investigative checks which could help prevent
the privatisation processes becoming a tool for money laundering, political
corruption or intimidation. Secondly, the speed of the process and the focus on
a quick exit calls into question the sustainability of the programme. In 2006
one interviewee noted that the PISG was already attempting to pass laws on
social property that contradict Regulation 1244 and the authority of the
SRSG (I58); at the municipal level, the courts were also trying to circumvent
UNMIK’s authority and the decisions that have been made on social property
(KTA, 2005f, 2006a, 2006e). It is for these reasons that we will likely witness
ongoing control of the process by the likes of the ICO and EULEX. 
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Assessing the role of privatisation in transformation 
When the SRSG Michael Steiner spoke to the KTA at the beginning of their
mandate in 2002, he cautioned them: ‘Your task will be aggravated by the
fact that many of your decisions will take a toll now, while the benefits will
accrue only in the future’ (UNMIK, 2002a). Unfortunately, the future benefits
of privatisation must also be called into question by the manner in which past
and present privatisations have occurred. There are cases where privatisation
has occurred in a legitimate manner and positive contributions are being
made to Kosovo’s economy. However, the enrichment of former war elites,
current political elites and the Albanian majority in general through the
privatisation scheme have also proved to be post-conflict realities. Both the
international community as well as domestic actors have used the process to
further their own aims in the territory, preventing the potential of privatisa-
tion to be used effectively – to positively transform economic relationships.
With economic and resource governance as cornerstones of installing a liberal
peace, the DSI has pushed ahead with the process despite recognition that it is
allowing for elite capture and thus the entrenchment of a politico-military
elite. Besides allowing for the consolidation of war economy gains, the social-
welfare effects of privatisation in the territory push individuals further into the
informal and illicit sectors of the economy. While some short-term control
mechanisms have been put in place to prevent the above problems, the over-
arching strategy appears to be a reliance on the hope that in the long term a
‘good capitalist class’ will emerge, although the continued control mecha-
nisms of the ICO and EULEX suggest that the DSI is not altogether prepared to
risk that strategy. 
The econometric approach of privatisation processes specifically, and
resource governance schemes more generally, is extremely problematic.
Pressing forward with these types of reform without due regard to the
remaining tensions between antagonists, whether local or international,
often results in programming through which economic resources continue to
be used as a source of power, potentially setting the groundwork for future
conflict economies. Without careful analysis of local politics and thoughtful
consideration of the impact of supposedly neutral reforms such as resource
governance and privatisation, reforms may become little more than a victors’
peace that sets foundations for future war economies. The international
community has not been blind to these problems, as the hesitant start and
cancellation of the process shows. However, as has been seen in other
programmes, an awareness of the problem has not translated into effective
solutions. Although attempts were made to slow down the process in the early
days of the mission, the concerns of staff were quickly brushed aside and the
process restarted – there were few ‘policy moments’ whereby political context
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was integrated. When the DSI realised that local political interests would be
revived in the post-independence phase, there was no real alteration to its
policy – just continued attempts to manage the process via executive
authority and power. That there was little room for manoeuvre for opera-
tional actors in this field of reform, compared to what was witnessed in RoL
reform, raises the question of whether the fact that these reforms fall closely
under the more dogmatic doctrine of neo-liberal economies reduces the flexi-
bility of actors to integrate political context to any real degree. 
Of course, discussion of privatisation as a tool of more positive modes of
transformation must include a discussion of the DSIs’ contributions to these
economies to begin with. The actors who often grant themselves the role of
problem solvers are often central players in these dysfunctional relationships,
as opposed to neutral observers. Both through individual cases of corruption
as well as through foreign investment, international actors tasked with devel-
oping fair and lawful economic systems actually contribute to and provide
motivation for the economic structures privatisation is seeking to dismantle.
Alongside this, the agents of development are hindered by basic operational
structures that in this case have impacted upon the success of privatisation.
The inexperience of international bodies results in processes into which
corruption, intimidation and political interference are able to infiltrate.
Finally, the short time frame in which complete changes in the system of
ownership and governance are expected to take place, alongside a quick exit
strategy by international actors, diminishes chances of ensuring the sustain-
ability of the process – although this problem has arguably been delayed with
the decision of the ICO and EULEX to maintain a degree of control over the
process. These issues, summarised in Table 6.1, suggest that the use of privati-
sation and similar resource governance reforms to fundamentally transform
conflict economies needs to be reconsidered, as in their current form they
appear to offer little in terms of positive transformation, and might actually be
contributing to the entrenchment or creation of political-economic relation-
ships capable of fuelling future conflicts. Taken alongside findings from the
previous chapter on rule of law programming as well as some of the distinctive
(and in some instances differential) findings from the forthcoming chapter on
customs service reform, these findings related to privatisation offer a clearer
sense of both the failures of and opportunities for improving the wider war
economy transformation agenda.
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Table 6.1 DSI engagement with privatisation and the impacts on war economy 
transformation
Plane Characteristic of DSI Impact on transformation
Ideological Privatisation a key strategy Privatisation diminishes traditional role
in installing a liberal peace, of enterprise in welfare provision, 
therefore processes often increasing reliance of individuals on
pushed through without illegal/informal economy.
consideration of long-term
impact. Privatisation allows for capture – former
warlords/political elite consolidate gains. 
Operational actors try to limit capture
through control strategies. However, long-
term strategy appears to be hoping for
‘good capitalist class’ to emerge.
Conceptual Privatisation provides most Use of force and violence to accumulate
clear example of apolitical wealth continues and is legitimised. 
approach in which political Allows for entrenchment of former
factors ignored. warlords and political elite. 
Failing to integrate political realities
(local/regional/global) creating new
‘conflict economy’. Control over produc-
tive industries a new site of struggle.
Operational DSI contributes to past war Contributions both specific (fraud,
economy and to legacies of corruption) and general (increased
war economy. opportunity/motivation for fraud and
corruption through foreign direct
investment); setting poor example
by allowing appropriations.
Limited capacity/knowledge. Mission creep results in poor capacity.
Quick exit strategy does not allow time for
proper investigation into bidders and calls
long-term sustainability of transformations
into question,  although this problem
delayed by control mechanisms put in
place by DSI.
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Customs reform: protecting borders,
confirming statehood and transforming
economies?
AS THE TRANSFER of commodities across national borders is a primaryfeature of conflict-related trade, customs services, tasked with moni-toring the movement of goods and people across borders, emerge as
central institutions in the transformation of war economies. Not only do
they deal directly with the problem of smuggling in their work at border
crossings, but they are also involved in the investigation and tracking of
trade irregularities which often indicate illegal trade, tax evasion and
money laundering. These financial crimes are often part of the war/post-
war economies that have been discussed throughout this book, given their
links to smuggling and political corruption and that they are often
committed by actors who are continuing with or consolidating political-
economic gains made during the conflict. Further, as customs violations
have become one of the most common forms of financial crime (Courakis,
2001; Sarvananthan, 2001; Velkova and Georgievski, 2004), addressing
them is also essential in terms of achieving the wider, more positive modes
of transformation discussed in Chapter 1. This element of customs reform
deals with the fact that economic and financial crimes rob governments of
revenues needed to run state services, and in the case of post-conflict states,
such crimes reduce the available budget needed for essential reconstruction
projects. Furthermore, high levels of smuggling also make it more difficult
for legitimate businesses to compete: paying the appropriate duties and
taxes increases their costs, making them less competitive in relation to
traders who have not paid the relevant charges. In states attempting to
restart their economy, local business interests will be hurt by the unfair
competition of smugglers, possibly discouraging much-needed local or
foreign investment.
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Thus, both in the physical inspection of goods crossing the border as well
as in monitoring customs and excise revenues for evidence of corrupt and
illegal practices, these agencies can contribute to the transformation of
conflict economies. In their potential to both sever the links between the illicit
forms of trade that support political violence and corruption and to contribute
to a more equitable national economy, customs services can be seen as
contributing to more peaceful and just political-economic environments.
However, the primary role granted to reformed customs institutions is compli-
cated by the past actions of many of these services. Potential abuses of power
and involvement in war economies by customs agents has been well docu-
mented. Milosevic’s capturing of customs revenue was central in allowing
him to consolidate the economic and political power required to continue his
violent campaigns in the region. Customs reform must therefore focus on at
least three areas: addressing corruption within the service itself; decreasing
potential avenues to bypass border controls through the physical protection of
border crossing points; and finally, managing financial crime by importers
and exporters. 
Customs services in Kosovo
In the 1990s the Serbian customs service emerged as a key actor in the Balkan
conflicts, playing a significant role in the regional war economy. Many actors
in Serbia and across the region benefited economically from the conflicts
through their connections to smuggling networks. Customs agents were
central in these systems, and their political and economic connections can be
traced to some of the region’s most senior political figures. For example, the
former head of Serbia’s State Security Service, Mihajl Kertes, was appointed as
the head of the Customs Service during Milosevic’s rule (Hajdinjak, 2002) and
many of Serbia’s customs agents are known to have diverted large proportions
of customs revenue to Milosevic’s war chest –  ‘the Customs Service became
the heart of the regime’s clandestine financial structures. As the head of
Serbia’s Central Bank observed in 2001, the Customs Service “was Milosevic’s
primary source of cash, and it never ran dry”’ (Andreas, 2005: 342). 
The withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo in 1999 included the
cessation of work by Serbian customs officers along Kosovo’s borders. The UN
was quick to respond to these unmanned borders, with the UNMIK Customs
Service (UCS) being one of the first institutions created following the end of the
NATO campaign. The new service was operational by the end of July 1999
and within months the UCS was managing border crossings with Albania and
Macedonia as well as at the airport in Pristina. Borders with Serbia and
Montenegro were initially monitored by KFOR for security reasons, but the
UCS began monitoring these points in 2001. Like other institutions in Kosovo,
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the customs service was not simply reformed but created as a new institution.
Many of the officers from the previous Serbian-dominated service had left the
territory and Albanians had been notably absent from the old service, leaving
little in terms of human or physical infrastructure. The idea of having an
international customs service, similar to the international CIVPOL force, was
considered at the start of the mission. However, it was instead decided to set
up a local force which would be executively run by a small international
management team. When the UCS first began operating along the Serbian
border in 2001, international customs officers were used, leading to friction
with the local community and their rapid removal with the help of KFOR
(I55). Despite this brief use of international customs agents, the makeup of the
UCS from 1999–2008 was distinctly ‘Kosovan’ in comparison to some of the
other sectors of reform discussed in this book, with only a handful of interna-
tionals working within the institution. In 2005 there were approximately 600
employees, only three of whom were international. Like other institutions in
the territory there has also been a strong focus on diversity. Statistics show the
force to be made up of approximately 82 per cent Albanian and 12 per cent
Serbian with the remaining percentage consisting of non-Serb minorities
(UCS, 2005: 32). Nonetheless, it is important to note that the service was also
run as a reserve power of the SRSG until the declaration of independence,
meaning that responsibility for and decisions regarding its management
rested in the hands of the international administration in the service’s
formative years. 
During these years, customs officers in Kosovo became armed, allowing
them to deal with serious cases of criminality without always having to
depend on the KPS or KFOR for security. The UCS also participated as an
observer in several regional and international bodies including the Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative Centre for Combating Transborder Crime
and the World Customs Organization (WCO). It signed Memorandums of
Understanding with all regional customs services, including Serbia. In April
2004, the new EU compliant Kosovo Customs Code was introduced (UNMIK,
2004d) and the Integrated Tariff of Kosovo (TARIK) introduced in 2007. A
goods nomenclature and coding system based on a WCO harmonised scheme,
also guides revenue collection procedures. 
Following the declaration of independence in 2008 the UCS was replaced
by a domestic institution, Kosovo Customs (KC). This agency is supplemented
by the EULEX mission which has a specialised Customs Component. With
several dozen international staff, this unit has largely been in charge of moni-
toring and advising the new KC service, although they do maintain some
executive powers. These powers have allowed them on occasion to take
control of certain situations when deemed necessary – this included their
decision to take over the running of border crossing points in the Serbian-
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dominated northern region of Kosovo in 2011. This decision was taken after
violence at these crossings, which occurred when the Kosovan government
attempted to remove ethnic Serbian police and customs guards whom they
accused of not implementing the customs code. The violence had led to KFOR
temporarily returning to its role of monitoring and securing border crossing
points in the north.
Both the UN service and the new Kosovo service have had two primary
roles – firstly revenue collection and secondly dealing with fraud and the
smuggling of goods in and out of Kosovo. The service’s role as a revenue
collection agency must not be overlooked as customs collects approximately
69 per cent of Kosovo’s budget from year to year (UCS, 2005: 8; Kosovo
Customs, 2010). Initially, this role was threatened by other informal forms of
tax collection. In the immediate post-conflict phase, the parallel structures
created by Albanians led to a form of informal taxation in the territory which
was not immediately dismantled, and revenue that should have gone into the
Kosovo Consolidated Budget was lost. One interviewee suggested that ‘at the
main border crossing . . . [individuals were] . . . siphoning off large elements of
the revenue into the underground wings, of what were now proscribed organ-
isations, formerly the parallel institutions, that would have been a noble cause
to support. So, the money wasn’t going into the Kosovan budget’ (I55). This
interviewee estimated that approximately half of the revenue collected at
border points in 1999 and 2000 found its way into parallel institutions and
the individuals associated with those groups (I55). This activity seems to have
ceased due in part to dismissals and the non-renewal of contracts of many
original UNMIK customs staff, but also because of the increasing cooperation
of the various political actors in Kosovo that agreed to cooperate with the
UNMIK administration in the creation of the PISG. 
Despite such successes, smuggling, customs fraud and corruption within
the service remain ongoing concerns. Tackling these issues involves two
processes – addressing internal corruption and fraud, and eliminating
smuggling and customs fraud outside the service. In relation to the former
issue, several tactics can be identified. In the early days of the mission, there
was a realisation that the amount of taxes being collected on imports did not
coincide with the amount of goods appearing in the province and the levels of
traffic coming across the border. This led to suspicion of customs fraud and
corruption. With executive powers in place, customs management ‘simply
refused to renew contracts for people who did not command [their] confi-
dence’ (I55). Such a strategy, it should be noted, is not novel. Similar
disciplinary action in other customs services, often referred to as ‘purges’
(Hors, 2001) are a familiar strategy in managing fraud in these institutions.
The success of this tactic is difficult to verify, although the same official notes
that, ‘it is highly illustrative that when we removed the whole of the shift, the
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tax collection increased by 300 per cent within three weeks’ (I55). Following
this purge in Kosovo, strict hiring procedures were introduced and UCS
customs agents were required to ‘justify their lifestyles’ (I55). Despite a few
notable cases of corruption, including the arrest of the local head of the service
in 2002, corruption does not appear to be systemic, though both the KC and
EU remain vigilant as ongoing concerns regarding corruption remain.
Further, and as addressed in upcoming sections, there are increasing concerns
regarding the corruption in the north of Kosovo and in the post-independence
phase, which led to the aforementioned violence at northern border points in
2011.
Smuggling is primarily dealt with through the law enforcement side of the
UCS, which began to develop in 2001. The use of the FASTs (flexible anti-
smuggling teams) has been central to this arm of both the UCS and KC. Units
focused on auditing, risk management, intelligence and investigations have
also continued to grow within the service. Tax policies have also been shaped
in a way that would decrease incentives for smuggling, with the Pristina
Declaration on the harmonisation of excise tax on tobacco and the signing of
the Central European Free Trade Agreement. Another strategy in the fight
against smuggling has taken a broader approach, attempting to change
society’s knowledge of and attitudes towards illicit trade and products. Media
campaigns educating people about the dangers of illicit cigarettes as well as
the role customs plays in collecting tax for the central budget and thus
essential public services has also been central to Kosovo’s customs
programme.
The engagement of customs services with the structures and legacies of
war economies in the above ways again provides several interesting insights
into the role of the DSI in transformation. While there are similar stories to be
told in terms of the dominance of ideology in programming, this particular
case study reveals some interesting trends and heterogeneity in terms of the
way politics and context have been integrated by some actors and how some
of the operational issues that plague other reform areas have on occasion been
avoided.
The primacy of state borders and modernity 
Despite claims that state borders have become less relevant to global politics
with a rise in both the numbers and power of non-state actors, the world of
international development and security policy remains very much a state-
centric enterprise. The DSI is both committed to and most comfortable
working within a traditional state framework. As such, it maintains a strong
interest in the recreation and solidification of state borders. Customs reform 
is a key mechanism though which this goal can be advanced as it allows
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governments, both external and internal, to define and secure boundaries
between states. In an increasingly complex international arena, populated by
a diversity of actors, customs reform is seen as a way of ensuring the relevance
of traditional and familiar forms of statehood. While these reforms are not
always state led, they are focused on creating states and installing systems
which manage said states in a manner which ultimately suits the wider liberal
agenda. As Chaflin effectively argues,
As governments are restructured because of the ascendance of supranational
bodies, transnational commerce, and national security threats, customs policies
around the world emerge as key sites for the production of new criteria of
statehood and new forms of sovereignty. Necessary to the state, these standards
are neither developed nor controlled by national governments but involve the
interventions of two international institutions: the World Trade Organization and
the less well-known World Customs Organization. (2006: 243)
Customs reform in Kosovo appears as a prime example of Chaflin’s descrip-
tion. Both the UN and new Kosovo service have been created and managed by
representatives of foreign, supranational bodies, and the fulfilment of their
duties in a modern, standardised fashion is a requirement for future sover-
eignty and admission to key international institutions. 
These institutions also support the position of Megoran and his colleagues
(2005) who suggest that border control mechanisms perform a theatrical
role; UNMIK Customs and now Kosovo Customs have managed Kosovo’s
‘international borders’, which are (or are not, depending on your political
stance) de jure Serbia’s international borders. They have also managed
crossing points between Serbia and Kosovo as if they were international
border crossings. In terms of performance value, this serves as a clear signal
regarding Kosovo’s status as an independent entity as the creation of a service
which manages borders suggests some form of sovereignty. The performative
value of border control can be seen in several conflicts, including Afghanistan
where much has been made of securing the Afghan–Pakistan border; the
ability of Afghan forces to do so without the assistance of NATO would widely
be perceived as proof that Afghanistan was a state capable of existing inde-
pendently. Chaflin (2006) takes these arguments further, arguing that
territories are now able to ‘purchase sovereignty’ through the e-customs
services and software packages. Kosovo’s installation of the Trade
Information Management System (TIMS), a software package that states can
purchase to help manage their customs procedures, is illustrative of this. In
the UCS era it was seen as bringing the customs service one step closer to being
a fully functioning, modern customs service, one step closer to EU compliance
and thus ‘worthy’ of becoming a sovereign state. 
For the guiding actors of the DSI, the desire to homogenise customs
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services around the world relates to customs’ essential role in both economic
and security goals which constitute a liberal peace. A modern customs agency
ensures the smooth functioning of global capital. In this sense customs reform
is part of the wider political project of global governance where ‘Reforms of
customs regulations, tax systems and the police are constantly being
demanded by the global governance missionaries’ (Hozic, 2006: 244).
Customs is also seen as a way of preventing the spread of organised crime to
Western Europe (Bruggman, 2001) and is further seen as another check
against the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 world (Chaflin, 2006;
Heyman, 2004; Megoran, Raballand and Bouyjou, 2005; Walsh, 2006).
However, customs assistance has not always had the desired effect and besides
not bringing the expected economic benefits (Bartlett and Samardžija, 2000),
the agenda of installing a modern customs agency based on neo-liberal
economic assumptions could actually prove counter-productive in transform-
ing the smuggling facet of Kosovo’s political-economy. 
The neo-liberal policies on which modern customs and trade policies are
based could actually be a cause of the activities customs agencies are trying to
eradicate. While a modern customs service is meant to cut down on trade
barriers and facilitate trade, documents which prove the origin/value of
goods, and other details such as health and safety requirements, are biased
towards modern, advanced and established traders (Kaminski and de la
Rocha, 2003; Pohit and Taneja, 2003). In relation to transformation, this has
two effects. First, small traders, incapable of meeting the new standards, will
seek ways to circumvent control. Second, as Heyman’s research (2004) finds,
new automated clearance systems often rely on the reputation of the shipper
in question and favour elites who are in a position to build stronger relation-
ships with customs brokers. This is in a sense a de facto system of white listing,
allowing those with the economic, political and social capital to trade with
greater ease than the less well connected. In the case of Kosovo, the IMF notes
that despite the 0 per cent tariff on goods, high transport costs, difficulty in
providing proper documentation and even getting the proper license plates
has limited the ability of Kosovans to trade with the EU (Demekas,
Herderschee and Jacobs, 2001). What we find is that it is mainly those who
already have the resources and connections to formal trade channels that
benefit from the internationals’ modern customs service, many of these actors
having gained this ability through connections built up through the war
economy. Political-economic relationships have not been positively trans-
formed in the sense that economic opportunities remain neither fair, nor
transparent. Instead, the new modern customs regime solidifies and legitimis-
es previous political-economic power imbalances. So, while the DSI benefits
from increased control of trade, the benefits for small traders are limited and
the barriers which induce them to smuggle remain. Those who have been able
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to build up the required wealth and resources (in some cases through their
participation in the war economy), however, are able to meet the requisite
standards.
All of this activity and focus on the management of Kosovo’s borders, its
trade and thus its economy, points to a wider tendency within the interna-
tional development-security mission. The attempts to control the movement
of goods and people across this small territory illustrate ‘increasing efforts by
the United States, its allies and the international organisations it dominates to
micromanage the world system’ (Heyman, 2004: 322). Indeed, control of the
borders not only makes a strong statement about the status of Kosovo as an
independent entity, but is also a clear tool for the international community to
monitor the movement of goods and people across all borders, preventing
economic, political or social problems from arriving at their own borders. In
this sense, customs services are not necessarily created in order to transform
domestic political-economic relationships, but rather are created as a form of
containment with the primary goal being to protect the economies and
borders of powerful states. Moreover, the reform of customs services and
processes often do little to alter the political-economic structures which force
small-scale traders to circumvent customs controls and privileges those with
the required wealth, power and connections to meet the demands of global
regulations. This latter point again alludes to the willingness of guiding actors
within the DSI to allow for a capturing of development programming in order
to ensure stability and further their aims of a liberal peace. 
The issue of capture, as with all areas of reform addressed thus far, is
extremely important to address in regard to customs reform as it is in this area
that the potential payoffs for illicit activity and corruption are quite high. As
an executive power of the SRSG and with a team of international managers
focused on maintaining political neutrality in the service, UNMIK Customs
appeared to avoid systemic manipulation by Kosovo’s main political actors.
This is not to say that there have not been attempts by political interests to
interfere in the running of the service. In one case, the head of the UCS
removed several officers working at the Kosovo-Macedonia border crossing of
Blace due to suspicion over their involvement of smuggling at the crossing
point. This move resulted in a 40 per cent increase in collection at this partic-
ular crossing but also resulted in death threats against the head of the UCS, as
well as pressure by Thaçi’s PDK party to reinstate the officers (Hajdinjak,
2002: 36). At the beginning of the mission, there was also pressure from a
politician to allow him to make decisions regarding the hiring and promotion
of customs officers (I55). A strong stance was taken in both these cases by the
UCS with the refusal to renew contracts of certain individuals and the intro-
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However, there are concerns that once the DSI loosens its controls on the
territory (both at the end of the UN mission and with the eventual withdraw-
al of the EULEX mission), the opportunity for politicising the customs service
will be seized. Consider the following exchange in 2006 during the time the
UN was working to extract itself from the running of the customs service:
Q: I’m interested in when you were saying that there was pressure on the customs
agency to appoint people that the politicians wanted, how is it that you were able
to resist that?
R: Because the powers in the customs legislation, made the Director General
responsible . . .
Q: So the politicians still can’t get their people into customs?
R: Who knows what will happen . . . If you look at the draft customs regulation,
law, drafted by the PISG . . . it changes all that, it puts all that under ministerial
control.
Q: And that’s the draft regulation. Any idea when that might come into effect?
R: Never we hope . . . we’ve got all the main legislation and its EU compliant. The
EU compliance and Kosovo Standards says ‘a service free of political interference’
so, legislation drafted in that way wouldn’t be EU compliant. But, it didn’t stop
them. (I55)
Concern over a potential politicisation in the future was also raised by a
Kosovan officer who expressed a desire for customs to remain an executive
power for as long as possible (I82). This wish seems partially fulfilled given
EULEX’s ongoing executive powers. And while EULEX can do little to prevent
any changes a future post-EULEX Kosovan government might make, the ever
present ‘carrot’ of eventual EU membership may encourage compliance in the
long term. 
In sum, customs reform has emerged as a useful tool for the international
community on several fronts. Because of the strong performative value of
securing state borders, success in this area of reform serves as a convenient
conditionality for post-conflict states being granted statehood or heightened
levels of status within the global community of states. It is an essential facet of
the control agenda that allows the DSI to recreate states in an image which
facilitates the preferred modes of global economic transaction. However, in
their quest for modern and well-policed borders the international community
may actually be pushing marginalised groups further towards illicit activity,
as it is often the most economically and politically well connected that are able
to meet the standards of modern systems of border control. As such, illicit
activity by one segment of the population may increase and the political
economic elite, including those who consolidated their power through war
economy participation, are again legitimised and rewarded as they are able to
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manoeuvre and control the system. However, from the case of Kosovo we see
that this latter problem, the capture by elites, has been controlled, at least to
some degree and on some occasions (though this has come at the cost of
ongoing control mechanisms by the DSI). Insofar as customs services have
been successful in this, they have aided in transforming political-economic
relationships in the territory and have laid the foundations for a future service
which will not allow the customs service to become a tool for past or potential
future war entrepreneurs. The sustainability of this development, however,
has been called into question by the 2011 border crossing disputes and the
reality that EULEX and KFOR have had to step in to prevent the border points
becoming a new focal point of political violence. 
Political, social and economic complexities: from understanding to practice 
While depoliticising customs services is a necessity given the fact that the
opportunity for political interests to capture revenue is high, ensuring a polit-
ically neutral customs agency does not necessitate detaching policy making
from political context. Other studies have noted the importance of history,
social linkages and politics in understanding informal and illicit trade
(Frannicevic, 1999; Hozic, 2006; Pohit and Taneja, 2003), suggesting that
any attempts to manage these forms of trade must also be cognisant of and
address such links. However, Chaflin argues that reforms often ‘reduce
customs work to a common set of administrative and technical problems,
rendering invisible historically and territorially situated interests and
struggles within and between polities’ (2006: 244). If Chaflin’s observation is
true, it would mean that political and social contexts are not being prioritised
or integrated into reform processes and that instead, policy has primarily
focused on the incentives which motivate individuals and groups to smuggle.
In other words, policy would be based on a series of assumptions which
underpin the rational choice (RC) approach detailed in Chapter 3.
This approach carries with it several further assumptions and policy
outcomes, the first being that high taxes and duties create an incentive to
smuggle and engage in corruption – traders unable or unwilling to pay such
fees engage in these activities in order to avoid charges which in turn exposes
customs agents to vast and profitable opportunities for corruption (de Wulf
and Sokol, 2004; Gatti, 2004). The logical solution is therefore to lower,
harmonise or abolish tariffs. Under this perspective, price differentials on
opposing sides of the borders are also believed to encourage smuggling
(Junninen and Aromaa, 2000). For example, a higher excise on tobacco on
one side of the border may encourage smuggling of tobacco products from an
area where excise taxes are lower. The logical solution would again be to
attempt to harmonise prices. Finally, the rational choice approaches also leads
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to beliefs that complicated customs procedures encourage smuggling
(Velkova and Georgievski, 2004). Here, the posited solution would be to make
customs procedures as simple and non-bureaucratic as possible. All of these
perspectives assume that reducing the payoff of smuggling will discourage
people from taking risks and presume that those engaged in illegal activity will
choose legal activities if given the chance or opportunity to engage in less
risky activity. Opening up the economy to these individuals by breaking down
trade barriers appears as a catch-all solution to the problem of illicit
economies. This approach has clearly not worked in Kosovo or elsewhere.
Given the failure of an RC approach, one must consider what an SPE approach
to this would look like, both in analytical and operational terms. Again, the
case of Kosovo illustrates some interesting uses and integration of a more
nuanced analysis in the area of customs reform.
Consideration of history, society and the functions of informality
Many factors influence the formation and continuation of smuggling, tax
evasion and related political corruption in the Balkans in general and Kosovo
specifically. Politically, both their socialist past as well as recent conflicts have
made countries in the region more susceptible to these forms of economic
activity. Socialist economies themselves were ‘rich in unofficial activities’
(Frannicevic, 1999: 121) as individuals and groups sought to circumvent
tight state controls and attain goods in short supply. In Kosovo, the shift from
a socialist-authoritarian system to a democratic-capitalist system of trade and
taxation must be also considered. This change was fraught with difficulties, as
the culture, modes and levels of taxes vary greatly between the communist
and capitalist system. Furthermore, similar to what was found in relation to
citizens’ trust in the judicial and security sectors, a lack of trust in authoritar-
ian regimes has also created a historical aversion to paying taxes to the state
(Ebril and Havrylshyn, 1999; Hors, 2001; Martinez-Vasquez and McNab,
1997; Torgler, 2003). 
The problem of convincing both businesses and society in general to
accept the processes of the new capitalist system was raised in several conver-
sations with contacts in the territory. One Kosovan interviewee described the
present situation as follows: ‘what exists is left over from communism, with
capitalism existing nearby’ (I43, emphasis added), illustrating how the transi-
tion to and acceptance of the new system is in no way complete. The wars in
Yugoslavia served to deepen and widen these tendencies as shortages of goods
created a great demand for smuggled goods and instability provided an envi-
ronment in which evasion of authorities was relatively unproblematic.
Furthermore, geographically, the Balkans has always proved to be site of
irregular trade. Its position between Europe and the Ottoman empire left it as
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an economic and political zone of conquest between the two powers and
competition between the empires left the region ripe for informal trade (Hozic,
2006). The modern Balkans retains many of the same characteristics:
‘Multiple borders . . . different taxation systems, numerous refugee and
diasporic communities all create a set of relations both within the Balkans,
and between the Balkans, Europe and Turkey which seem exceptionally
conducive to informal and illicit (contraband) trade’ (Hozic, 2006: 252).
These historical, political and geographical factors have contributed to the
reality of smuggling in post-conflict Kosovo. It is not simply the case that those
engaged in smuggling have made singular decisions based on conceptions of
risk and payoffs. These forms of activity are deeply embedded in the socio-
economic history of the territory. They are indeed what Duffield (2002b)
might call ‘actual development’: this type of economic activity may not fit
with the form of liberal, legalistic trade which the DSI would prefer, but it has
nonetheless become a very real and at times functional mode of development
for actors in the region, an issue which is addressed below and which will also
be returned to in the concluding chapter. 
The contextual approach to understanding smuggling points to several
different ‘functions’ of these economic activities. For example, crime and
smuggling serve a social function insofar as they play a role in defining 
and differentiating between groups. As a Kosovan journalist who investigates
and writes about organised crime in the region explained,
the phrase of ‘criminal networks’ is not used. They have links to relatives, or
people close to their party who have a business . . . it is not defined as organised
crime, because they would say ‘we’re organised family, we’re not an organised
crime, we’re an organised party’ or things like that, so there’s certainly no percep-
tion that this is a crime, and because it’s so common, it suits everybody’s discourse
to refer to it not as crime. They only refer to it as crime if it’s the opposite party. But
it’s never a crime, if it refers to their own side. (I50)
Criminality is a subjective category which actors often apply to others in an
attempt to differentiate (often pejoratively) between them. The politics, values
and norms of a society will impact upon who considers what activities illegal
and can be considered intrinsic to identity formation. In the case of Kosovo,
smuggling which supported the KLA has been considered by many to be a
‘noble cause’. As in other parts of Yugoslavia, it helped to narrow the gap in
military capabilities between a strong aggressor (Serbs) and weaker groups
who found themselves under attack (Croats, Bosniacs, Albanians). For these
reasons, some would not characterise this trade as criminal, illegitimate or
immoral. Andreas’s study on smuggling in the Balkans supports this stance,
suggesting that such activity is not simply a survival strategy, but in some
cases is viewed as a patriotic duty (2005: 343). In this way, one can see that
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conflict economies often serve a political function insofar as they help either to
physically equip forces combating what is viewed as an oppressive force, or
serve a performative function: participation in a war economy as an act of
defiance. And while it would be inaccurate to suggest that Kosovans are
averse to paying tax (the voluntary contributions to the 3 per cent tax as well
as the ‘Homeland is Calling’ fund provide ample evidence of the Albanian
population’s willingness to support public projects) or more accepting of crim-
inality, there is a lack of compliance with new systems and rules that requires
a more historically and politically grounded analysis.
The conflict also created a demand for goods and services which could not
be acquired through the normal legitimate channels. As such, smuggling and
untaxed informal trade has served a socio-economic function. During and
immediately following the hostilities, many parts of Kosovo remained in
almost total isolation, meaning that basic goods including food and hygiene
products were not available. Serbian enclaves were especially vulnerable as
getting humanitarian goods into those areas was particularly difficult for
political and security reasons. In response, Serbian traders would travel to
Serbia, purchase both basic and luxury goods, return to Kosovo and sell these
products in the enclaves. The grey and black markets have flourished in part
because small and medium sized enterprises were forced to find alternative
channels through which to deal with the supply and demand of local popula-
tions. While the profits were high for such activity, it cannot be denied that
these traders were indeed providing their communities with essential goods
that could not be attained through formal channels. 
In what ways has the UCS considered and integrated the above issues into
its programming? Has it depoliticised its programming in the ways that
critiques such as Chaflin’s have suggested? In relation to the programming of
the UCS one finds a mixed record. Approaches which mirror an RC perspective
on smuggling and fraud are clearly used (for example using the TIMS tech-
nology and altering tax policies). However, an acceptance and integration of
the SPE approach can also be found. In one case, a story was recounted
regarding a local prosecutor who had allegedly ordered that seized goods be
returned to a suspected smuggler. After being questioned, the prosecutor
admitted that the man involved had saved his life during the conflict and thus
he was, in a sense, repaying a favour. A customs official reflected on this case:
‘you can’t pontificate on the type of pressures that the locals have . . . No
human being is going to resist those pressures, unless he’s prepared to
separate himself from his community’ (I35). Furthermore, some actors
working within the area of customs reform accept that the history of socialism
as well as Kosovans’ tumultuous relationship with state officials under the
Milosevic era have shaped society’s view of customs and security officers.
Regarding the growth of the intelligence unit in the UCS, another senior
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customs officer conceded the fact that such units used to operate in secret
under the old, repressive regime and thus had left a legacy of suspicion of
official state intelligence operatives and that this has an ongoing impact on
public cooperation with customs officers in the area (I57). In direct response
to these issues, the UCS made public relations a priority in its work, utilising
the media for several high-profile campaigns, raising public awareness of the
role of customs and the dangers and problems of illicit goods. In the case of
customs reform, it appears that these contextual factors have been largely
recognised and that while maintaining a zero tolerance policy on corruption
within the service, attempting to gain compliance by those outside the
customs service has been approached with an acute awareness of time and
place. And while not perfect (problems with the customs service will be
considered in upcoming sections), the political and historical awareness illus-
trated in some of the UCS’s programming appears to have resulted in a more
balanced, flexible and wider range of programming than simple interdiction,
fining and prosecuting. It is interesting to compare the apparent ability of
actors to integrate contextual issues in this area of reform as opposed to in the
field of privatisation. While difficult to fully assess, it may be that as the inte-
gration of context in this customs reform programme did not threaten core
neo-liberal values (such as the need for privatisation itself) but rather sought
to integrate context in ways that would further the efficiency of trade and
economic growth, such flexibility was permitted.
Ongoing political disputes: barriers and cooperation
The unresolved conflict within Kosovo between the two largest ethnic groups,
Serbs and Albanians, has had a strong impact on the other areas of reform
addressed in this book, with members of the DSI managing this ongoing
conflict in various ways. In regard to customs reform, the ongoing tensions
within the territory and their effect on transformation largely come into play
in terms of the ability of the UCS to operate in the northern, Serbian-
dominated region of Kosovo. Consider the following exchange in 2006 with a
senior customs officer 
Still the big problem is working in the area of the north. [It] is not so safe, we are
not so comfortable send[ing] Albanian officers to work up there . . . all the stations,
all the gates are staffed with Serbian officers . . . and we hear this from officers
amongst those working up there, that there is a feeling that this is their last stand,
[that they should] grab something, as much as they can because after independ-
ence obviously no one feels that they are going to be staying . . . they just simply
feel that they don’t belong to here and that they will not work for an independent
Kosovo agency . . . Because it’s called ‘UNMIK’ so far, OK, but if it becomes inde-
pendent, they won’t work for it . . . we had this restructuring within the service,
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new units, of course you get new managers in higher posts, some of the officers
who wanted to apply were under big pressure by some of their colleagues . . .
because of this reason: ‘Why? Why do you want to get promoted? Do you feel that
you belong to this service? We’re here only temporarily’. (I82)
The details from the above exchange provide valuable insight into effects of
the ongoing ethnic problems in Kosovo. It appears that having a customs
agency run under the banner of the UN allowed Serbs to participate, at least
in a limited way. However, the tension between the two sides has never been
substantially resolved, and has in turn led to serious ramifications as the UN
began the passing over of competencies to the Kosovan-led customs service.
As this occurred we saw the resurfacing of ethnic tensions, with Serbs not
recognising the new KC service. As noted, when the government accused
Serbian security and customs agents of not implementing customs controls,
they attempted to ‘retake’ these crossings, resulting in violence and a renewal
of international executive control mechanisms. In this case, there has been a
regression in terms of peacebuilding and transformation, with what some
might classify as a return to the 1999 status quo at the northern border.
In relation to this, we see that the issue of ethnicity not only affects the
running of the customs service, but also the behaviours it is seeking to
eradicate. Regarding smuggling in the north of the territory, one respondent
observes: ‘it stems really from the polarised political positions where UNMIK
are the army of occupation. So it’s quite all right to subvert. Within that
general sort of civil disobedience situation, the racketeers are taking
advantage and using it as a smokescreen’ (I35). As noted earlier, during the
conflict and its immediate aftermath, there was a certain degree of acceptance
of otherwise illegal activity insofar as it contributed to the political objectives
of the group, or provided a welfare/economic function. In the same way, in the
post-conflict phase, the perception by some segments of society that UNMIK
and the post-independence Kosovo institutions are occupiers has legitimated
smuggling in some circles. Unresolved ethnic tensions are therefore having a
twofold effect on the ability of customs agencies to transform political-
economic relationships in the region. It is creating a problem with corruption
and control within segments of the service and has created barriers to
managing trade in Serbian-dominated regions as the minority population
question the authority of the service itself. However, unlike the situation
discussed in the previous section, where we saw that customs was able to
employ a certain degree of flexibility and creativity in its programming when
contextual issues were at play, dealing with ongoing ethnic tensions within
the territory rests beyond the competencies of the customs services, leading to
violence, an uneven ability to apply customs law and a return to externally led
mechanisms of control. 
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The internal disputes between groups within the territory represent only
one level of continued tension. Kosovo continues as a source of conflict
between powerful liberal actors on the one hand and Serbia and its supporters
on the other. Other research would suggest that this should be a major
hindrance to effective border control – a study on smuggling in Kyrgyzstan
has noted that the unresolved border disputes of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
has been central in facilitating the drugs trade in the area (Madi, 2004). One
would similarly expect that there would be difficulties in cooperating with
regional counterparts. However, a lack of status did not prevent the UCS from
participating in regional or international customs regimes or from forming
cooperative relationships with neighbouring countries. While there were
tensions with the Serbian authorities in the first few years of the mission,
cooperation with Serbian customs authorities normalised near the middle of
the UNMIK era, and there appeared an open and functional exchange of infor-
mation between the two services despite political disputes. Due to the financial
and security implications involved, it has been suggested that ‘the level of the
smuggling has actually led to increased cooperation with the authorities in
Serbia’ (I35). In this case, despite the larger political issues at hand, customs
officials were able to identify common goals with their Serbian and regional
counterparts, creating functional and effective avenues for cooperation. 
Of course, many of the initial contacts with relevant organisations and
their representatives as well as resultant agreements were facilitated by inter-
nationals and on behalf of the UN mission causing concerns over the
sustainability of such agreements. The point remains, however, that the UCS
successfully manoeuvred the larger political issue of status in some instances.
Unlike other areas of reform, it did not treat the wider conflict with the Serbian
state as something which constrained it from acting (as was witnessed in the
rule of law reforms where there was a refusal to set up certain ministries and
codes). But it was also recognised that the conflict with Serbia and Serbia’s
concerns could not be ignored (as witnessed in the privatisation process). This
illustrates both an acceptance and integration of the wider political issue into
policy, which at least in the short term allowed for increased ability in terms
of dealing with the wider geographical facets of transformation. 
Contributions and resolutions: the DSI’s problematic dual role
This chapter has up until now considered the role of the DSI in transforming
political-economic relationships through an internationally managed
customs service. However, it is important to also highlight the role which the
DSI has played in the creation and continuation of illicit and illegal economic
activity linked to conflicts. Although the role of the DSI in terms of the contri-
butions of security actors and those involved in privatisation has been
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explored in previous chapters, other examples which impact specifically on
the illegal modes of cross-border trade faced by customs services specifically
are worthy of further discussion. Examples of the DSI’s contributions to the
political-economy in Kosovo which have affected the operations of customs
agencies range from the general to the specific. In general, the effects of the
international sanctions against Yugoslavia need to be considered. The role of
the international embargo against the Milosevic regime in the 1990s in the
creation, enrichment and entrenchment of criminal activity and groups in the
Balkans is well documented (Hajdinjak, 2002; Stanchev, 2004; Velkova and
Georgievski, 2004). Insightful research by Andreas (2005) and Crawford and
Klotz (1999) provides a taxonomy of the criminalising consequences of
sanctions on several sectors of society. Detailing the impact of sanctions in
both the sanctions and post-sanctions period, they uncover and describe the
pervasive criminalising impact of sanctions across state institutions, the
economy and civil society, both within states and across regions. 
Sanctions, both during the period of conflict and in the post-conflict phase
once sanctions are lifted, impact heavily on the political-economy of the locale
and the region, encouraging individuals, groups and societies to engage in or
accept illicit economic behaviour. Further, actors from several EU member
states or allies are known to have openly flouted international sanctions
including Greece (The Economist, 1998) the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (The Economist, 1994a) and Bulgaria (Andreas, 2005). Oil from
Croatia is believed to have crossed the front line (The Economist, 1992a) and
banks in Cyprus allowed profits from sanctions-busting to be stored in offshore
accounts (Andreas, 2005). In these two general ways, the creation and then
busting of sanctions by international actors, we can see that the dynamic of
the war economy in Kosovo has a wide geographical reach. While the current
customs services can do nothing to change what occurred in the past, it is
these services that must now address the legacies of such activity. Not only
should these dilemmas be considered in future decisions regarding the appli-
cation of sanctions, but they also suggest that the tendency to demonise
groups in the Balkans, and specifically Kosovan Albanians, for their partici-
pation in smuggling needs to be redressed given the scale of involvement of
supposedly ‘reputable’ external actors.
In terms of specific contributions, examining just one illicit commodity is
illustrative. Three issues can be noted, all relating to cigarettes. The first
involves one of the key international institutions tasked with ensuring
security and building peace in the territory. At one point, an estimated 5–10
per cent of illegal cigarettes in Kosovo were believed to have entered the
market via KFOR (UCS, 2005). Referred to as ‘KFOR leakage’, there were
several ways in which these untaxed cigarettes entered the black market. In
some cases, KFOR troops themselves were believed to be selling tobacco
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products on the black market. In one case, customs officials found a valid
import certificate accompanying an illicit shipment of tobacco destined for the
black market. The certificate stated that the shipment contained food for
KFOR troops. In this case, the contractor that was being used to supply goods
to KFOR abused their position as a trusted supplier and attempted to use the
KFOR exemption to smuggle cigarettes into the territory. These examples
raise two points concerning the use of customs in transforming war
economies. First, international agencies often call for a reduction in tax
exemptions as a way to reduce customs fraud. In Kosovo (as in other interna-
tional missions), goods destined for development or humanitarian purposes or
personnel are, paradoxically, exempt. In granting itself such an exemption,
the DSI has itself created an opportunity for would-be smugglers. Second, the
above example calls into question the idea of using ‘white lists’ – allowing pre-
screened importers, exporters and contractors to move through customs
points with greater ease. If contractors for the most powerful military-security
alliance in the world, NATO, are able and willing to manipulate the system in
such a way, the use and effectiveness of white lists must be called into
question. Research conducted in Uganda would also support a cautious
approach regarding the effectiveness of white lists – audits there found that
nearly 70 per cent of customs invoices are falsified, including documents from
reputable firms (de Wulf, 2004: 121, emphasis added). 
Other specific examples of international actors contributing to dysfunc-
tional political-economic relationships involves private corporations, who are
increasingly being seen as partners in international development and security
policy. In 2000, the EU launched a lawsuit against two of the world’s biggest
tobacco producers – Phillip Morris and RJ Reynolds. Each of these companies
is accused of knowingly exporting quantities of cigarettes to Montenegro that
far outstrip domestic demand and have therefore been seen as being partly
responsible for the smuggling of cigarettes throughout Europe (Hajdinjak,
2002: 41; Hozic, 2006: 251). Finally, the raising of excise taxes in developed
nations, in this case the rise in excise tax on tobacco in the UK, is also consid-
ered as a factor in the increased rates of smuggling in Eastern Europe (van
Duyne, 2003) as the payoff for those willing to take the risk of smuggling
increases as foreign actors alter their own tax policy. These examples suggest
the need to widen analyses of the geographical scope of war economies and
their related structures. The customs services in Kosovo can do nothing to
influence the importing and exporting strategies of MNCs such as big tobacco
firms or the tax policies of foreign governments. Therefore, in order to support
the customs services in their attempts to eradicate smuggling and cross-
border crime, the DSI must contemplate the use of stronger measures against
other supposedly legitimate foreign actors. 
155
Customs reform
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 155
The practicalities of internationally led customs reform
A common set of operational problems affecting all areas of transformation
has already been discussed in previous chapters, and while many of these
same operational impediments are evidenced in Kosovo’s customs reform
process, several issues are worthy of further discussion. The first point for
discussion is actually an illustration of policy success – as noted, the number
of internationals in the UNMIK customs service has been relatively low
compared to other programme areas considered in this research and there has
been a high degree of continuity in terms of ex-patriot staff, with several inter-
national staff remaining for years rather than months. In addition, the
international management was largely British. This is not meant to suggest
that UK customs officers are necessarily superior to customs officers from
other nations, but to suggest that the continuity offered by having a single
nationality willing to make a long-term contribution likely led to some of the
success within the agency. 
While coordination with regional counterparts has been addressed in the
previous section, another concern in large international missions, such as
UNMIK, is coordination with other internal bodies working on similar issues.
Transforming political-economic structures requires concerted and coordi-
nated efforts by several institutions: the judiciary, security services,
privatisation agencies and customs service all bear responsibility for dealing
with smuggling, organised crime and related activities. The work of each of
these institutions impacts upon the effectiveness of the others. A large barrier
to dealing with the underground economy and smuggling in the territory,
especially in the early years of the post-conflict era, was an ineffective
judiciary and limited cooperation with the police. The judiciary was for
several years either unable or unwilling to prosecute certain cases brought to
it by the UCS and the initial laws regarding smuggling were often insufficient
(though these were improved near the end of the UN mission by an EU
compliant customs code). That these were not in place and implemented for
several years contributed to a failure to manage political-economic crimes in
the short term. In some cases, it appeared that prosecutors were even
unaware that the UCS had the authority to bring criminal charges. Regardless
of how successful customs is in investigating and tracking organised crime
groups or other forms of economic crime, poor cooperation or coordination
with the police and the judiciary could render many achievements of the
customs agency worthless. The cultural, operational and attitudinal barriers
between judicial, security and customs institutions need to be addressed in
order to create synergistic and thus more effective relationships. Investing
heavily in a customs agency whose successes could prove futile due to an
under-investment or delay in the creation of a properly functioning judiciary
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is problematic. This points to the need to ensure cohesive, balanced and
properly sequenced programming in international missions in order to ensure
that institutions complement each other’s work as opposed to constraining it.
Calls for Kosovo’s status to be determined by the end of 2007 forced the
UN to begin preparations for its own departure, a process which was
quickened following Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the entrance
of a less powerful EU mission. As noted in the previous two chapters, a quick
end to the mission raised concerns about the sustainability of programmes as
local institutions and actors were not given adequate training in key areas, or
given time to ‘stand on their own feet’. And while the departure of interna-
tionals from the UCS was less obvious in terms of the number of personnel,
there are concerns that the transition may have been occurring too quickly.
As one staff member admitted, ‘the oversight mechanisms don’t work . . .
We’re building an investigative capacity, but again . . . They just haven’t got
the flair for investigative work, we’re chucking them in too far into the deep
end. We’re teaching them to swim by chucking them in at the deep end, we’re
not teaching them to swim properly’ (I35). Another officer agreed, arguing:
‘Things are going quickly and I think that they are going a bit quicker than
they should . . . Especially now . . . with the establishing of these new units . . .
I think we need the international presence a bit more. They have experience
on this’ (I82). This quick exit strategy again points to the issue of sustainabil-
ity. The DSI cannot and should not remain in Kosovo indefinitely. However,
leaving institutions incomplete, in the dying months of the mission, is an inef-
fective manner in which to transform institutions. In order to create
sustainable structures which have the full capacity to deal with smuggling
and other related forms of fraud and crime, institutions require a smooth,
coherent and stable plan with a rational and well-considered exit strategy. In
the case of Kosovo’s customs services, it appears this issue was recognised and
managed with the EU transitioning in while the UN transitioned out. This does
not necessarily solve the issue of sustainability, as the new EU contribution to
KC is actually larger in terms of numbers of international staff than in the
former UCS, although with a strong focus on mentoring and advising from the
start of the EU Customs Component mission, there is potential for a longer
term impact.
Assessing the role of customs reform in transformation
The use of customs reform as a tool of global governance, underpinned by neo-
liberal attitudes to trade and modernity, has the potential to increase
smuggling and illicit trade as smaller and informal traders are unable to meet
the requisite standards put in place by the new customs and trade regimes.
Related to this, those traders already in a position of power are advantaged by
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these regimes. As many of these traders acquired their position in society
through their engagement with the war economy, these policies of moderni-
sation are justifying and legitimising such positions and consolidating the
political-economy of conflict instead of transforming it. However, in terms of
the customs service being used as a political tool, in the case of Kosovo the UN
administration was somewhat successful in creating and maintaining a polit-
ically neutral customs service. Several examples illustrate, however, efforts by
domestic actors to shape the customs service to their own ends and raise
serious concerns over the independence of the service in a post-UNMIK phase.
This threatens the long-term effectiveness of transformation in Kosovo and
has led to ongoing control mechanisms by actors such as the ICO and EULEX.
Still, it shows that preventing the capture of post-conflict reforms is possible,
at least in the short term and in some instances. That this has occurred in the
customs services is particularly telling, given that this is one of the reform
areas where capture and corruption would be most likely and would be
accompanied by quite high payoffs.
Incidents of smuggling, fraud and corruption with which the customs
services must engage, however, are never simply an issue of risk and payoff
and are rooted in both history and ongoing political tensions. The creation of
an apolitical service that is still politically aware is a goal that all areas of post-
conflict reform should seek to achieve but rarely do. What can be taken from
the case study of customs reform in Kosovo is that flexibility and creativity in
dealing with some issues from the past are possible. Achieving the same
balance in terms of current political disputes often proves more difficult, but
even in this regard there are contradictory conclusions. In the case studied
here, while dealing with ongoing internal tensions (with ethnic Serbs in the
north of Kosovo) has proved difficult for customs services, they have managed
to manoeuvre the external political tensions (with the Serbian state, border
guards and other regional actors) more effectively, increasing their ability to
address the regional characteristics of the war economy and related post-
conflict smuggling. It appears that the common ground of needing to fight
criminality and smuggling provided a context in which the Serbian state,
Kosovan government and international actors were able to put aside the
wider political disputes and cooperate to a common end. This suggests, inter-
estingly, that if the problem and legacies of war economies are effectively
presented as a common threat to competing sides, they can actually facilitate
good relations and negotiation – perhaps one of the few advantages to the war
as crime discourse.
However, what has been missed in terms of policy responses is the
addressing of the contributions of the DSI itself to war economies and their
post-conflict legacies. The scale, both geographical and temporal, of the
analysis of the political-economies of violence is extended by a discussion of
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the role of the DSI and its policies in the creation and sustaining of dysfunc-
tional political-economic structures such as smuggling. In this case, the
overall criminalising effect of sanctions during the Balkan wars, along with
the more specific activities of actors such as KFOR and large tobacco
companies, lay outside the remit of the customs services. This suggests the
need for a broader range of policies and calls into question the problem of the
DSI itself setting the transformation agenda. Regarding the agenda as it
currently stands, research on a range of generic criticisms harboured against
the development-security programming reveal a mixed conclusion. In the
case of the UCS, it appeared that some of the concerns were unfounded,
namely in terms of critiques regarding international staff diversity and
capacity, though the problem of coordination between institutions in large
post-conflict missions, as well as the problems associated with rapid exist
strategies, were still found to have a negative effect on customs operations, as
was seen in other reform areas. The solution to this last problem has been
temporarily resolved by a new robust mode of DSI intervention in the form of
EULEX, but one must question whether further technologies of control are the
most effective strategy in the long term. These findings, taken together with
the conclusions of previous chapters, point to serious problems but also inter-
esting opportunities in terms of the way the DSI is conceiving of and
attempting to transform war economies in post-conflict settings. No single
institution can be held responsible for failures to transform these economies
and as the next chapter will show, comparison of these three central reform
areas reveals both contradictions and common themes which provide both
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Table 7.1 DSI engagement with customs reform and the impacts on war economy
transformation
Plane Characteristic of DSI Impact on transformation
Ideological Customs reform as a key A key element of the agenda of control,
strategy in the installation effective customs reform a carrot/stick but
of a liberal peace as it confirms has not increased sustainable development.
traditional and desired forms
of statehood which facilitates Requirements of new modern system favour
global trade and stability. the already powerful (de factowhite listing).
Those who cannot meet new standards
pushed further towards informal/illegal
methods.
In Kosovo, limited evidence of capture but
continued efforts by operational actors to
limit this depends on short-term control
mechanisms; serious concerns over long-
term capture once missions end.
Conceptual Rational choice approach Evidence of RC approach, limits effective-
sees actors engaging in cost- ness of reform. Unresolved conflicts 
benefit analysis when threaten the gains made in anti-
making decisions on smuggling and corruption initiatives.
smuggling or committing
fraud/corruption. Kosovo case reveals some historical/
political issues effectively integrated
into policy.
This depoliticisation believed Possibility of creating common ground
to result in technocratic between conflicting parties via war
policies focused on altering economy/crime discourse.
cost-benefit/risk ratios or
increasing technological
ability to detect illegal
activity.
Operational DSI actively contributes to Sanctions/sanctions-busting increase 
political-economy of conflict. criminality of economy. Many developed 
countries implicated.
Foreign troops, MNCs and tax policy of
other  states also increase smuggling and
incentives. Calls into questions white lists
as well as tasking a local institution with
transforming international political-
economic relationships.




Plane Characteristic of DSI Impact on transformation
Operational limitations. Staffing/coordination problems limited by
lead nation approach, however, problems
in coordination with security services and
judiciary highlight need for better inter-
institutional coordination and sequencing
of priorities.
Quick exit strategies may result in the loss
of short-term gains as domestic actors lack
investigative/managerial skills needed for
long-term transformation.
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The war economy transformation agenda:
DSI approaches and behaviours
WAR ECONOMIES are resilient to small-scale, narrowly defined projects,their transformation requiring concerted and simultaneousengagement by and through a variety of actors, reforms and
processes. This range of programmes, broadly referred to in this book as the
transformation agenda, has been developed and is implemented by a diverse
network of actors, the Development-Security Industry (DSI) who work at
multiple levels in an attempt to not only sever links between economic oppor-
tunities and political violence, but also to create more just, transparent and
equitable modes of political-economic relationships within conflict-affected
societies. However, even when the DSI attempts to transform political-
economic relationships using a multi-faceted approach, war economies
remain resistant to change. The explanations for such resistance in a diversity
of cases, from central Asia to the Balkans to Latin America, are not to be found
in the minutiae of individual project evaluations but rather a more compre-
hensive analysis of the characteristics of the actors which engage in
transformation. Such analyses, undertaken in the previous three chapters on
reform processes, allow for the creation of a detailed and systematic
framework through which the collision between the DSI’s transformation
agenda and war economies can be understood. Although drawing from a
single case, the findings presented are applicable to other scenarios, as it is not
in the final outcomes or specificities of reform in Kosovo that one finds the
answers to the problems of transformation, but in understanding the
processes and the everyday technologies of aid on which the reform agenda
relies.
Building upon already existing understandings of how development and
security institutions engage with complex social, economic and political
dilemmas, the findings from previous chapters can be used to develop a
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general approach to understanding the problem of war economy transforma-
tion, with the aim of improving responses to it. In order to understand the
barriers and opportunities for building peace economies, one must address
three interdependent processes. The limitations of war economy policy can be
explained by examining the ideological foundations of the liberal peacebuild-
ing project, conceptual lenses through which the problem is understood and
the degree to which this is implemented in programming, as well as the oper-
ational characteristics of the DSI. By exploring these related characteristics of
the aid industry, one finds that whilst the critiques of liberal peacebuilding do
hold in many instances, and in ways which negatively impact upon the
capacity of actors to positively transform economies, there is also a degree of
heterogeneity in the response of operational actors.
In other words, some actors have manoeuvred within and around the
typical liberal modes of intervention and attempted to integrate more context-
specific, politically aware modes of programming with the aim contributing to
the wider aims of positive transformation defined and described in Chapter 1.
Whilst imperfect, these examples showed that innovation and attention to
social, political and economic justice are possible. This is not to say that the
specific alternative paths taken in the case studies presented in Chapters 5 to
7 should form a new model of engagement, but to highlight that progress can
be made where there is negotiation with local actors, integration of a range of
contextual issues is privileged and the goals of justice are more effectively
balanced with those of stability and growth. These diverse responses,
discussed and analysed in greater detail below, illustrate that individual
agency and institutional flexibility are also important characteristics of the
DSI and present opportunities on which to imagine alternative approaches to
transformation.
Liberal ideology, processes and transformation
In ideological terms, politically liberal and economically neo-liberal founda-
tions of the DSI have led to a strengthening and widening of the relationship
between security actors and development agendas. This has resulted in a
depoliticising of conflict analysis and programming as a (paradoxically)
political strategy for installing a distinct form of liberal peace. Distancing insti-
tutions or policy reforms from political issues serves as strategy for appearing
neutral and thus distancing actors within the DSI from accusations of neo-
colonialism. While this depoliticisation is apparent in a range of
programming, nowhere is its presence more felt than in the econometric areas
of reform such as privatisation and fiscal programming (including the
revenue collecting and tax policy arms within customs reform). These areas of
programming remain heavily influenced by neo-liberal economic ideals, with
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the promotion of private business, the severing of relationships between
public goods and private economic interests and the facilitation of free trade
across borders emerging as cornerstones of building liberal peace economies.
In these ways, removing politics from the equation has become part of the
wider hegemonic process of global governance, whereby actors seek to
remove any element or notions of power relations from policies and
programmes – the reality and struggle of the politics of the locale are masked
as technocratic governance replaces political, social contestation (Craig and
Porter, 2005). 
This ideologically biased form of conflict programming, which focuses
largely on bringing stability (or negative peace) as opposed to substantial
transformation (positive peace) to post-conflict areas, is fundamentally a tool
for creating liberal regimes in previously ‘illiberal’ parts of the world. At least
four specific impacts of this approach on transformation programming have
been exposed. First, the standard critique of the liberal peace in this regard is
that local needs become secondary to global, or foreign political-economic
goals. Creating or sustaining physical stability remains the primary aim of the
DSI, with local conflict resolution or socio-economic justice pushed to the
background. Evidence of this effect of liberal peacebuilding is mixed. At a
broad level, such a critique is justified if one considers the DSI’s propensity for
engaging in the shielding of some actors for the sake of stability and as such
legitimising former war entrepreneurs. At the same time, the DSI has proved
that it will go to great lengths to install some neo-liberal reforms such as
privatisation, a process which has been pushed through despite serious
concerns over legality, political impacts locally and regionally and potentially
sowing the seeds for future conflict. Both of these processes limit positive
transformation – with the former facilitating the growth of new conflict
economies, and the latter creating structures which favour already powerful
actors, while pushing others further towards the informal and illicit
economies.
However, what was found in this research is that while there were indeed
cases where the DSI favoured processes which promoted stability and the
development of a free market economy (regardless of their negative impact on
dysfunctional political-economic relationships) this did not necessarily come
at the expense of, or preclude the ability of operational actors to engage in,
types of programming which do not clearly fit the liberal blueprint. In some
cases, operational actors sought out forms of intervention that attempted to
engage in modes of transformation that encouraged the more progressive
forms of change outlined earlier. There can be two simultaneous tracks of
engagement, with the guiding actors of the DSI favouring policies of stability
and liberal statebuilding, and operational actors seeking opportunities to
resolve conflict and develop local capacity from the bottom up. So long as the
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operational actors do not fundamentally disrupt the overall aims of guiding
actors (as occurred when international KTA staff in Kosovo attempted to halt
the privatisation process), there does appear to be some political space for oper-
ational actors to engage in more structural or politically focused
programming (for example public information campaigns and the dismissal of
senior KPC officers for involvement in OC). In relation to this specific compar-
ison, one might consider the fact that the flexibility for more contextually
based programming occurred in instances which would further the DSI’s core
goals of stability or in no way challenged the core goal of facilitating free trade.
Compare this to the attempt to halt the privatisation process (a threat to a core
neo-liberal strategy) and one wonders if flexibility for more nuanced program-
ming is an option only when the policy either furthers or in no way challenges
core ideological goals of the guiding actors.
Thus, while there are cases when international goals appear to override
the need for local transformation, there are also examples where both aims
may be simultaneously furthered. Although there remains a substantial
power imbalance between guiding actors and operational actors which is
detrimental to positive transformation, the scope, nature and application of
this agenda is still very much in negotiation. Constantly in flux and inconsis-
tent in its application, the dominance of the liberal agenda can be and is
contested by domestic and international actors alike. Although the gains
made by operational actors in this sense are limited in relation to the control
of guiding actors and their goals, examples of challenges to dominant liberal
ideals and processes serve as starting points for changing the system. While
appearing as an overpowering process at the macro level, the liberal peace
project has not completely overtaken policy at the micro level, and thus the
ways and means by which this global discourse and set of policy prescriptions
can be challenged must emerge as a key area of research. 
This relates to the second supposed impact of the ideological biases of the
DSI – that in order to achieve the goals of liberal peace, domestic or local
actors are allowed to capture post-conflict programming. Effectively referred
to as ‘buying the peace’ (Le Billon, 2003) this describes instances where the
DSI allows those who they fear may spoil the peace (often former war entre-
preneurs) to retain positions of power or remain unpunished. Such capture
can take several forms. Former military actors may demand preferences in the
hiring of personnel for new security institutions. Elites may try and capture
the benefits of specific economic development programmes such as privatisa-
tion either to consolidate the wealth and power gained through their
participation in the conflict, or simply as a way to launder the profits gained
through illicit activity. Actors may also try and influence legal codes, customs
codes, or other regulatory codes which would advantage their social group or
political party. Criminal actors may attempt to capture development program-
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ming in the same way, utilising the connections made with political actors
during conflict. The supposed impact of this on war economy transformation
is the legitimisation of war economy participation and wealth creation
through violence, as well as the entrenchment of actors and relationships
which should be eradicated or transformed.
While there is much evidence that in some cases actors within the DSI do
turn a blind eye to this in order to ensure stability, there are also many
examples of resistance to such capture. At least three responses can be identi-
fied. First, there is indeed a strategy of acceptance; in some cases international
actors allow politicisation to occur for political reasons such as stability.
Second, negotiation may be used to limit the degree to which political capture
occurs. This often includes discussion over the number of ex-combatants that
can apply to new security institutions or negotiation over the rules of privati-
sation or licensing agreements. The final strategy is denial, whereby
international actors forbid certain forms of politicisation or capture. This may
involve prohibiting military actors from engaging in party politics or main-
taining executive authority over key areas of programming. In the case of
Kosovo we see evidence of all three strategies and a movement between them.
Consider, for example, the evolution in dealing with criminal elements within
the KPC which has seen DSI actors move from a relative strategy of accept-
ance to one of denial as both the external and internal political environment
was judged to be conducive to such a shift. Given these three policy choices
when faced with the possibility of managing capture, actors need to consider
both the costs and benefits of choosing one approach while also anticipating
and seeking out opportunities to move from one strategy to another.
Third, and also in an attempt to ensure its goals are met, the DSI tends to
introduce control mechanisms, utilising rhetoric regarding the altruism of its
goals to impose profound control at the local level. In terms of long-term
transformation, control mechanisms are deemed ineffective for several
reasons. The structure of the agenda of control results in upward accounta-
bility, with domestic institutions being accountable to international actors as
opposed to their own constituencies. This prevents the building up of
necessary socio-political relationships which the international community is
in fact trying to instil in post-conflict programming. This third ideological
impact, providing justification for an agenda of control, at first seems to be
well supported by the case of Kosovo. Ongoing executive control by UNMIK for
the entirety of its mission over key areas of Kosovo’s public sector, ongoing
pressure by the ICO and renewed executive power by the new EULEX mission
over Kosovo Customs provide evidence that the language of peacebuilding
and reconstruction is allowing for and providing a degree of cover for invasive
externally guided control mechanisms. We also see the use of the criminality
discourse, a central theme in debates over war economies, in providing justi-
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fication for such controls. Such (ab)use of the concept of criminality can be
seen in the use of ‘Al Capone’ prosecutions which illustrate the targeting of
specific individuals deemed unworthy of participating in post-conflict
Kosovo’s affairs. 
Yet concerns over an agenda of control also need to be reformulated.
While such critiques are rightly laden with negative connotations, they often
do yield results which further the aims of transformation in the short term. As
discussed in regard to the customs agency, it is the heavy-handed techniques
associated with an agenda of control which are credited with keeping some
political interests from interfering in the service and preventing corruption.
The ICO’s renewed role, and the Special Chamber’s ongoing role in privatisa-
tion was a direct response to substantial concerns over what an independent
Kosovan privatisation agency might do. These control mechanisms are an
attempt to ensure that post-independence privatisation is not captured by
elites, nor is it discriminatory against Serbs and other minority groups.
Likewise, the IJPP, while imperfect, has resulted in the effective trial of cases
which domestic institutions would have been unable or unwilling to try. In
some cases, control mechanisms may be needed and even desired by local
actors in order to deal with acute problems in the post-conflict phase. In these
cases, finding ways for the domestic actors to decide which control mecha-
nisms are necessary, and how they should be implemented, will further the
legitimacy and accountability mechanisms and therefore the sustainability of
reform. In line with this, the agenda of control needs to be further dissected
into long-term policies of control (such as installing neo-liberal economic
systems) and short-term policies of control (such as executive control over the
judiciary, police and customs). These latter forms of control are often a
necessity in terms of transforming war economies as they allow for objective
or strong responses to be formulated. And while the sustainability of these
controls has been questioned, they have also been required in the short term.
Finding ways of phasing out these forms of control, while replacing them with
sustainable internal structures, emerges as a further key area for future
research. 
Finally, the ideological foundations of DSI programming are seen as prob-
lematic insofar as they favour liberal ideals over other forms of economic,
political or social organisation. Modern liberal preconceptions about how
states and markets should and do operate are also seen as problematic for
post-conflict programming. Reform projects which attempt to transform post-
conflict economies place much emphasis on the creation of liberal models of
statehood and concomitant state-citizen-market relationships. The positive
value and benefits of these models and relationships are presented a priori.
There are limited attempts to reflect on whether the neo-liberal economic
development paradigm, and the concomitant liberal governance agenda, are
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in any way deficient or dysfunctional and may in fact be contributing to the
growth and sustainability of war economies. Related to this, the push for
formality in areas such as customs reform may also push some actors further
into the illicit and informal sectors as they are unwilling or unable to adapt to
the new formal models imposed by the international community. There is also
an ethical argument to be had related to the hypocrisy involved in some
attempts by DSI actors to install such modes of governance. The DSI in fact
uses techniques that contradict their own values and standards in order to
bring post-conflict states and economies in line with the ideal liberal form of
political-economy. They have broken their own guidance on judicial inde-
pendence, democratic decision making and transparency. In this sense,
transformation policies are in fact counterproductive to the aims of positive
transformation insofar as they encourage political manipulation, create
resistance to reforms and may push some actors further towards the informal
and illicit sectors. 
Of the four potential impacts of ideology on transformation, it is this final
hypothetical that requires the least reassessment. While there was a general
acceptance of the alternative and historically grounded manner in which
Kosovo organises itself and operates, there appeared a general consensus that
this would, and should, change with time, and that given the right tools it
would ‘convert’ to liberal forms of political-economic and social organisation.
Still, analysis should go deeper by examining the forms of liberal ideals which
are desired by some segments of the population (for example, democratic over
authoritarian policing) and therefore have a degree of legitimacy and thus are
potentially sustainable, and forms of organisation which are imposed without
local input (for example disallowing enterprises from fulfilling welfare
functions) and thus result in limited compliance by local populations. A
reform process should not be dismissed solely on the grounds that it is liberal.
It should be judged in terms of its effectiveness in meeting locally identified
needs and the degree to which it is seen as legitimate by the local population.
It is when programmes find legitimacy from above, from external internatioal
agendas, that reforms need to be questioned and local or alternative modes of
political and economic governance considered. 
The ideological bias towards liberal ideals and institutions in post-conflict
and transformation programming is strong – policies which form the founda-
tion of liberal peace or which support its installation are often pushed through
with little regard for local or long-term political-economic consequences. Yet
the ideological force of liberalism is not all-encompassing, as initial critiques
suggest. Its impact on the DSI’s attempts to transform war economies, while
destructive in the way it legitimises and even encourages dysfunctional
political-economic relationships, and often justifies severe control mecha-
nisms, is not homogenous. While evidence of all the assumed negative effects
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of liberal ideology and processes on transformation were found in the case of
Kosovo, both local actors and operational actors within the DSI have
employed numerous strategies which attempt to renegotiate or usurp the
constraints of guiding actors and liberal values of the DSI. While confirming
the strength and negative outcomes of ideology in this regard, this research
shows that the ideological impact is not static, it remains in flux, being contin-
uously challenged and renegotiated, pointing to avenues for potentially
challenging the direction of ideologically based policies and their impact on
transformation. 
Conceptualisations of war economies and the impact on practice
The failures of the transformation agenda can also be understood by address-
ing the ways in which the problem is conceptualised by the DSI and how its
analysis does or does not impact policy. Development and security actors have
two broad options when attempting to understand and address activity
related to war economies and their legacy – a Rational Choice (RC) model and
a Structural Political Economy (SPE) model. What is clear, given the
preceding analysis of reform processes in Kosovo, is that most individual
actors and institutions employ both strands of analysis in their conceptualisa-
tions of political-economies of violence. While this issue will be discussed in
detail further on, it is first worth summarising what lessons can be taken from
previous chapters in terms of what applying this latter, SPE, analysis entails. 
The case of Kosovo has proved useful in terms of refining the questions
which need to be asked in order to undertake an effective SPE analysis. The
first set of questions requires actors to think more critically on the aforemen-
tioned issue of criminality which accompanies most if not all war economy
programming. Dupont’s (1999) assertion that the role of crime is often exag-
gerated or sensationalised was echoed in the varying opinions regarding the
role of organised crime during both the war and post-conflict era in Kosovo.
More research on the scale and nature of the problem is needed to make sure
that the role of crime is neither under nor over stated, and to ensure that an
adequate amount of resources are supplied for tackling the problem. Second,
definitions of crime also need to be reconsidered in relation to local norms,
values and social structures. Criminality is a subjective term, based partly on
social and cultural perspectives but also on the legitimacy of those imposing
rules regarding criminality. In some cases, effective investigation and prose-
cution techniques fail or face serious hurdles as an agreed upon, legitimate set
of definitions and rules do not exist between the police and the policed (the
way that acts of smuggling are criminalised by some, while seen as either a
survival strategy or an act of political defiance by others is a case in point).
Alongside this, the interdependence between licit and illicit economic activity
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and actors needs to be highlighted in order to ensure all actors in and bene-
factors of illicit activity are considered in transformation. 
It is also useful for actors involved in transformation to break down
criminal activity into sub-categories as different forms of crime call for
different strategies. Three relevant forms of crime which can be identified are
politically integrated crime, regular crime and perceived crime. These are not
sociological definitions of crime, but rather categories of crime encountered
through research which each have their own distinct characteristics and
effects. The first category would highlight links between criminal actors and
political leaders. Within this first category of crime, at least two motivations
can be identified. First, actors engage with criminals to achieve acute political
goals. So for example, the KLA was not a ‘criminal organisation’ but interact-
ed with criminal structures as a means through which to further its
ideological struggle, with criminal groups benefiting economically. Second,
political actors may engage in criminal activity or align themselves with a
criminal group (which may overlap with other social networks) in order to
consolidate political power in the post-conflict phase. This may take the form
of money laundering (to legitimise profits made during the war), corruption in
the granting of licenses or the privatisation scheme, or the facilitation of
criminal activity through interference in the judicial, security or customs
sectors. In this sense there is a blurring between political and criminal moti-
vations, with criminals and politicians becoming entwined in mutually
beneficial relationships. The second category, regular crime, refers to crime
which has no direct links to the conflict, ongoing instability or political moti-
vations. In these cases there is less political analysis to be done and actors
would more usefully engage with the theories and practices found in crimi-
nology and sociology. 
In relation to transformation, rather more attention needs to be paid to
the third category, namely perceived crime, which relates to assumed but
unproved connections between criminal elements, war economy participants
and political elites. This category highlights the role of rumour and specula-
tion of criminal activity and has an equally strong, if not stronger, impact on
post-conflict programming. Rumours of political-criminal links provide a
strong justification for continued control over key areas by international
actors. Perceived crime may also provide justification for participation in
illegal activities: if the elite are acquiring wealth through illegitimate means,
why should the average citizen follow the rules? Thus, while rumours are
effective in justifying serious control mechanisms, they are also counterpro-
ductive as the failure to either quash rumours, or actually prosecute (if the
rumours are indeed true), creates an image of a crime-ridden, mafia-led state.
While providing incentives for others to smuggle, this can also affect the
ability of post-conflict states to develop and attract the foreign aid and invest-
170
Building a peace economy?
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 170
ment required to rebuild. Furthermore, rumours of ongoing criminality allow
for and create continued tensions between parties to the conflict, as sides
continue to demonise each other through accusations of criminality. For
example, the 2011 violence at northern border crossings has largely
surrounded perceptions and rumours of Serbian officers and civilians being
more involved in smuggling and customs fraud than their Albanian counter-
parts. In order to dismantle the problem of perceived criminality, two options
exist. First, if the rumours are in fact true, individuals must be properly inves-
tigated and prosecuted. If in fact the allegations are rumours, and are nothing
more, active steps must be taken to exonerate and publicise individuals’
innocence. 
A second strand of the SPE approach addresses the functionality of war
economies. In many cases, attempts at transformation focus largely on the
negative impact of activities associated with these economies including their
role in the commencement of violence or in their role in allowing violence
to continue. However, war economies, their participants and the profits
accrued also serve positive functions. This results in certain actors and activ-
ities gaining a degree of legitimacy with local populations, making
transformation or eradication policies especially difficult. The functions of
war economies can be broken down into three categories. First, these
economies and their partici-pants may serve a security function with the
emergence of some form of ‘pax Mafioso’ whereby opposing sides keep
violence to a minimum in order to facilitate trade. Conflict entrepreneurs
may also provide protection for local communities, especially when power
vacuums emerge during periods of extreme upheaval or the collapse of formal
state structures. Their presence and support for a particular group may also
ensure one actor does not gain hegemony in an area; war economies, in
some cases, may provide the capital to ensure (admittedly dysfunctional and
undemocratic) balances of power. 
Socio-political functions also need to be considered. The war economy,
and its continuance in the post-conflict phase, may lead to modes of gover-
nance, creating informal or de facto governing structures including tax
collection and the provision of social services. It might also form a fundamen-
tal part of patronage networks, allowing for a degree of political continuity or
stability. At a higher level, the war economy may be contributing to the wider
political goals of a society, such as a demand for independence. As Andreas
(2005) notes, smuggling and other related activities have at times become
seen as a patriotic duty. Of course ideally conflicts would be solved without
violence. The international community could have possibly prevented the
violence in Kosovo had they included the territory in the 1995 Dayton
agreement. However, if the international community is unwilling or unable to
help prevent conflict, there are serious moral hazards in dismantling struc-
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tures that may disallow vital resources to an oppressed population.
Transforming war economies may actually result in empowering one party of
the conflict, as it deprives resources to the other side. 
Finally, both the positive and negative economic functions of the war
economy need to be considered. Participation in these economies is not simply
an issue of greed, but a way in which marginalised individuals, groups, or
even nations can insert themselves into the competitive global market.
Engaging in these activities (both during and after the conflict) is a form of
employment when other opportunities are lacking. These economies also
provide goods and services that the formal and legitimate markets cannot.
During the conflict all groups will be faced with a collapse of formal modes of
economic exchange. International embargos and the practicalities of bringing
goods into a region may lead to an even greater reliance on underground
exchanges. It is smugglers who often provide basic goods during these times,
leading to a form of legitimacy for such actions. Finally, in the post-conflict
phase, activity often considered illegal or corrupt, such as capture of privati-
sation schemes, often provides a mechanism through which former war
entrepreneurs can ‘go legal’, allowing actors to contribute to the economic
reconstruction of their state in more just and legitimate manners. 
All of these functions taken together remind us again of Tilly’s (1985) ‘war
makes states’ dictum which can be adjusted from the above discussion to the view
that ‘war economies also make states’. Under such a view, one might want to
consider that war economies are part of a wider (and historically based) global
political-economy, in which powerful developed states and their leaders have
used similar methods to consolidate power. This again points to the need for
transformation techniques to be sensitive to the positive functions of some ‘ille-
gitimate’ activity. Approaches to some war economies have considered this – the
Alternative Livelihoods programme in Afghanistan for example has assessed the
economic function of the poppy industry and has been keen to ensure that farm-
ers are provided with other means to support their families before crop eradica-
tion begins, but such foresight is not the norm. 
Highlighting the functions of war economies both during and after the
conflict is not a way of justifying illicit activity, nor a suggestion that it should
be allowed to continue. As one interviewee aptly noted, defining something as
a coping strategy, or pointing to its role in social or ethnic cohesion, may often
be wrongly used to justify illegal or otherwise inappropriate activity (I49).
What the concept of ‘functions of war economies’ has illustrated, however, is
that when considering transformation techniques, one must consider the
multiple roles that the war economy plays in society. Once these functions are
identified, policy makers should then consider how they might be replaced
effectively and fairly, and also whether allowing certain activities may be
useful (at least in the short term).
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The third strand of SPE analysis would involve addressing the broad
geographical scope of these economies. Whilst addressing local political-
economic relationships within a conflict zone is a necessary step, positive
transformation requires us to consider a range of actors when constructing a
strategy to prevent or transform war economies. The list of supposedly neutral
or legitimate international actors in war economies is long, but several key
actors are worth further discussion. International banks are often complicit in
the transfer of money to conflict zones through accepting donations from the
Diaspora. Profits from conflict trade are also stored in international banks in
accounts set up by conflict entrepreneurs and their associates. Private
companies and MNCs can be linked to a war economy in a multitude of ways.
They may be in direct contact with armed groups (or their political represen-
tatives), providing payments to ensure their own security, or bribes in order to
be allowed to continue conducting business. They may also be complicit in
embezzlement or fraud. In other cases, they may knowingly flood a market
with a product – dumping goods for their own benefit, and in turn contribut-
ing to increased smuggling as the domestic market is too small to sustain the
deluge. 
However, in less obvious ways, external actors are also part of local war
economies. Foreign investment both before, during and after the conflict may
alter the risk-payoff ratio for actors considering engaging in violence to
capture resources. MNCs and businesses, by engaging in the sale and trade of
commodities, also become nodes of war economies at various points in the
value chain. Private security companies will profit both by being paid to help
resolve a security situation and from possible kick-backs in the form of mineral
exploitation contracts to sister companies, for example, in the post-conflict
phase. Foreign governments may directly impact upon the war economy, as
their policy of support for one side over the other alters the ability and oppor-
tunity costs for different parties to the conflict, either through the supply of
arms, the purchasing of commodities (such as oil) or military intervention.
Something as innocuous as a foreign state’s domestic tax policies may also
alter the incentive structure to smuggle, as the increased risk of circumvent-
ing policies also increases the potential payoff for actors. Furthermore,
weakness or collapse in a foreign state can either allow foreign armies to
become players in the war economy, or may create channels through which
smuggling and other war economy activity can occur. Consumers in conflict-
affected states, but equally consumers in ‘peaceful’ developed states who
purchase the goods or services produced by war economies, also constitute a
central node of the war economy. 
War economies which lead to physical violence in one country or region,
however, are not only impacted upon by external actors, but also have an
impact upon actors in other geographical locations, with the illicit (and licit)
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trade of goods, people and funds spreading criminal, security, political and
economic concerns across continents. War economies may also link up with
one another – witness, for example the connections between Afghanistan’s
drug trade and the ongoing smuggling in the Balkans. The need for widening
our geographical viewpoint is further highlighted by the impact that trans-
formed war economies may have on other locations. The ‘balloon effect’
witnessed in many drug eradication programmes warns of the dangers of
taking too narrow a geographical view in transformation projects as once
transformed, or once control mechanisms are in place, activity may shift
elsewhere in the region, leading to increased instability in neighbouring
countries. 
Finally, considering the temporal scope of a political-economy of conflict
is vital. One needs to look both backwards and forwards in time to formulate a
full picture of a war economy. Looking at historical factors will shed light on
the factors which have led to a war economy in its present form. Factors to
consider are the historical conflicts between groups over resources (both
physical and financial), land (commercial, industrial, agricultural and
domestic) and other economic goods such as access to employment opportu-
nities or credit facilities. It is important to trace how, when and why these
various resources were fought over, and also examine the responses by the
groups who lost. For example, the loss of economic opportunities (predomi-
nantly employment in the public and social sectors) by Albanians in Kosovo
led to the creation of parallel systems, a major reason for the intractability of
illicit, informal and parallel activity in the region. Likewise, there is a need to
look at the post-conflict impact, or continuance of the war economy, which
often has an impact in the political, economic and criminal realms. Politically,
many of those who rose to prominence as a result of their contribution to the
conflict are the key actors in these post-war economy activities. They are
considered to either be central political figures or have connections to such
figures. In this sense, those who profited from the war economy during the
conflict, continue to profit in the post-conflict phase. The economic relation-
ships that were based on power, violence and threats during the conflict are
thus left relatively unchanged, suggesting a high degree of continuity
between the war economy and the post-war economy. 
Analysing the war economy from a wider temporal lens is thus justified on
several fronts. First, it provides insight into why many activities associated
with war economies have become so entrenched and in some cases actively
supported by the population. It further suggests that persistence is required in
transformation as a short-term project which is due to be implemented over a
number of years cannot easily transform structures and disputes that were
created over the course of decades or even centuries. Table 8.1 is a useful tool
for actors who aim to engage in a more politically aware and structural
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approach to transformation. Asking and finding answers to the following
questions provides a vital first step in moving DSI actors towards more
favourable ‘policies of engagement’ discussed in the next section. 
Translating conceptual approaches into policy
As argued previously, there are concerns that the ideological biases of devel-
opment-security actors results in the adoption of apolitical lenses, as opposed
to a lens akin to that of Table 8.1, and that this in turn is a contributing factor
to inability to effectively transform war economies. Returning to the evidence
from Kosovo, this potential impact should be reassessed, as a concern over the
dominance of apolitical, technocratic responses may be overstated. A fairer
statement in terms of analytical lenses employed by the DSI, would be that
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Table 8.1 An SPE framework for analysing war economies
Dimension Factors to consider and questions to ask
Criminality What is the scale of the problem?  Obtain objective facts on levels of
criminality.
What are the alternative definitions of crime within a given locale?
How do these compare and contrast with the approach of the DSI?
What connections are there between crime and legal forms of economic
activity?
Can the crime be classified as ‘politically integrated’, ‘perceived’ or
‘regular’?
Functions (negative What are the effects on security?
and positive) What actors are granted legitimacy through their involvement in the
war economy?
What socio-political functions are served? (Including basic needs such
as provision of social services and higher needs such as political
freedom.)
What are the economic functions? (Including employment and the
opportunity to ‘go legal’ in the post-conflict phase.)
What will replace positive functions if the war economy is transformed?
Geographical What is the impact of the war economy on other areas?
scope What outside actors influence the war economy at the local level?
(Banks, Diaspora, private security companies, foreign armies and
governments, MNCs, foreign consumers.)
Temporal scope What are the historical conflicts over resources in the area including
non-commodity resources such as land and employment opportunities?  
How did the ‘losing’ side react to their losses?
What are the ongoing political, economic and criminal effects of the
war economy in the post-conflict phase?
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individuals and institutions employ both frameworks, creating and imple-
menting policies that represent both modes of analysis. However, it is often the
case that actors who utilise an SPE analysis are not always willing or able to
turn this into context-sensitive programming. What is important to note is
that in some instances, particularly in reforms related to more econometric
issues such as privatisation and financial policy, conceptualisation and policy
outcomes are more easily characterised as existing at the RC end of this scale,
with neo-liberal economic doctrine arguably harder to challenge than some of
the more political or social areas of programming. This is problematic insofar
as integrating and operationalising policy based more on policies towards the
SPE end of this analytical spectrum is deemed to be more effective for the goal
of positive transformation, due to its capacity to draw attention to a wider
range of features that are critical to the functioning and transformation of war
economies. 
The empirical research from the previous three chapters allows for a more
nuanced approach to understanding the relationship between the choice of
conceptual lens and the impact on DSI policy prescriptions. In terms of opera-
tional actors understanding and integrating the factors related to an SPE
analysis, several outcomes can be identified. The first can be classified as
policies of denial. In these cases, even when SPE issues are understood, policies
are implemented as if there were no conflict, and therefore no political consid-
erations need to be made (consider for example the pushing forward of the
privatisation programme in Kosovo, despite claims by the Serbian state over
SOEs and the questioning of the legality of the process by international staff
themselves). The next category represents almost the complete opposite, and
can be referred to as policy paralysis. In these cases, the political situation
prevents actors from implementing reforms for fear of engaging in political
issues. An example of such a policy is the unwillingness to set up border police
or create appropriate ministries within the PISG. 
Alternatively, evidence of political integration was found on two fronts. In
these cases, an SPE analysis appears more influential in the creation and
implementation of policy. The first can be conceptualised as policies of func-
tionality, whereby actors were willing (and able) to negotiate or manoeuvre
through the political minefield in order to allow their policy to function more
efficiently, but without addressing or attempting to resolve the wider political
issues. An example can be found in the UCS’s ability to effectively negotiate
coordination with regional counterparts. Unfortunately, these policies are
often reliant on mechanisms of control – the decision to send EU customs
guards to man border posts in the north may contribute to the ongoing ability
to manage customs crossing points, but does not fundamentally address the
ongoing tensions between the Serbian community and Kosovan government
institutions. Secondly, there was evidence of policies of engagement whereby
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contextual factors which hindered the project’s success were addressed
directly. Examples of this include the tackling of public perceptions and
attitudes towards smuggling and illegal goods through public information
campaigns by the UCS. 
The question then becomes one of identifying the factors that allow or
disallow for what can be called ‘policy moments’ – opportunities where polit-
ically grounded peacebuilding and transformation are possible, and actors are
willing to take the risk of engaging in the difficult issues found through an SPE
analysis. From occasions where DSI actors have implemented programming
that would be reflective of an SPE reading, a preliminary analysis of factors
which might allow the problem of choosing apolitical strategies to be
overcome emerges. Some initial thoughts on what might facilitate such
‘policy moments’ are worth highlighting. Changes in domestic political
context are one factor which can create the space to engage in more political-
ly ‘risky’ programming. For example, suggestions that Kosovo’s population
was becoming increasingly frustrated over the criminal linkages between the
former KLA and the post-conflict elite resulted in an environment which
allowed the international community to take a stronger stance than they
might have been able to in the immediate post-war phase, given the post-
conflict euphoria which saw the KLA elevated to the status of heroes.
Likewise, internal changes regarding the legitimacy of intervention may force
the hand of DSI actors to engage with political questions previously consid-
ered off-limits. When local populations start to question the strategy of both
domestic leaders and the DSI, actors may be forced (or finally enabled) to
implement alternative policies. The end of the UNMIK mission perhaps offered
a clear ‘break’ which may have created new spaces for institutions such as the
ICO and EULEX to implement new policy choices. 
Changes in external political context will again alter one’s ability and will-
ingness to engage in issues of politics. For example, the changing stance of the
key powerful actors vis-a-vis the status of Kosovo allowed actors within
UNMIK to push forward with key institutions such as the Ministry of Interior
and Ministry of Justice. Finally, resource changes will also shape the degree to
which international actors engage with politics, although their effect can be
varied. A decrease in resources may force international actors to rely more
heavily on local actors, increasing the possibility of engaging in or being influ-
enced by contextual factors, but might also result in the DSI actors choosing
more simplistic blueprint-type policies as fewer resources decrease the possi-
bility of creating complex, creative or sustainable programming. Likewise, an
increase in resources may come in the form of increasing the number of
experts available, or the creation of special prosecutors’ offices, potentially
widening the scope for dealing with war economies more broadly. Increases in
funding, however, could increase traditional, top-down mechanisms such as
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increasing police presence. However, what changes in resourcing will almost
always represent is a juncture at which the possibility of changing the nature
of programming reveals itself. Being able to recognise and take advantage and
shape these moments towards transformation becomes a key task for opera-
tional actors. 
The impact of conceptual and analytical lenses on DSI efforts to transform
war economies is clearly complex. There are instances where strict RC
analyses result in policies that are in tune with the individualistic and econo-
metric ideals which underpin this model. When this happens, technocratic
solutions which fail to address complex deep-rooted problems ensue.
Operational actors within the DSI, however, often undertake analyses which
are more in tune with the SPE approach, but this only rarely results in the
creation or implementation an SPE-guided policy which would fundamental-
ly alter political-economic relationships in a way that furthers the aim of
positive transformation. Despite being aware of the factors which constitute a
critical political understanding, operational actors often find themselves
unable to actively incorporate such factors into their programming. It appears
that this occurs when problems appear insurmountable (either politically or
functionally) or when incorporating and transforming complex political
realities directly challenges core interests of guiding actors (such as ensuring
basic physical stability and installing neo-liberal economic reforms). In other
cases, an SPE analysis may lead to projects which effectively manoeuvre facets
or barriers presented by an SPE approach, but these strategies still fail to
fundamentally alter the political-economic relationships stemming from war
economies. Only when operational actors are able to translate an SPE
approach into politically grounded programming is there evidence of sustain-
able and positive transformation. These ‘policy moments’ which allow an SPE
approach to be taken appear to be highly dependent on a number of internal
and external political or economic factors.
Operational features of the DSI: limits to immediate progress
The problem of transformation can be analysed finally through an examina-
tion of concrete operational barriers that stem from the tangible ways in
which the DSI engages in conflict-affected states. These hurdles are of course
functions of both the ideological characteristics and conceptual biases found
within the industry, but are nonetheless worthy of closer inspection given
their obvious and often immediate impact on war economies. To begin,
because of its contribution to conflict dynamics generally and war economies
specifically, the role of the DSI in transforming these economies is called into
question both functionally and ethically. Contributions by the DSI to conflict
economies can be specific or general. DSI actors may become directly engaged
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in criminal activity through, for example, the smuggling of cigarettes,
frequenting brothels, bribery or fraud. In more general ways, the DSI may also
increase incentives for illicit or illegal activity by increasing the demand for
certain goods such as pirated DVDs, cigarettes, telephones and other luxury
goods. Foreign investment, and the huge profits that accompany it, may also
increase the incentive for actors to engage in corrupt business practices. The
DSI can also increase the ability of actors to engage in such activity by
providing the goods (e.g. cigarettes and arms) or the mechanisms (e.g.
increased technology, banking facilities or marketplaces) through which such
activity can flourish. Finally, the DSI might actually increase the need for war
economies to operate as policies such as bombing campaigns and sanctions
regimes force populations to seek alternative ways of acquiring goods and
services. 
While the potential role of external actors has already been discussed in
terms of widening the geographical scope of analysis, the contributions of
actors within the DSI is relevant in operational terms on several fronts.
Policies of the DSI might actually contribute to the very economic relation-
ships that they are attempting to transform, and thus actors need to be aware
of when their own policies are hindering their own success. Further, such an
examination is required given the paternalistic and normative posturing of
internationals vis-a-vis conflict-affected countries in general. Derogatory
labelling of conflict actors using terms such as ‘warlord’, ‘criminal’ or ‘klepto-
crat’ is a moral judgement. And while some of these labels may at times be
somewhat accurate, those casting judgements are perhaps not well placed to
make such claims given their own contributions to these economies.
Furthermore, it is unfair and unrealistic to expect domestic institutions and
less powerful international operational actors to be responsible for the trans-
formation of political-economic structures that have in part been created and
sustained by powerful foreign actors. This is especially relevant when the
ability to transform war economies becomes a condition for sovereignty or
acceptance into international institutions and communities. In this sense,
Kosovo’s status has been somewhat unfairly linked to its ability to tackle
behaviours and relationships for which the DSI is partly responsible. 
The participation of DSI actors in the war economy is also important in
terms of creating cultures of accountability. International institutions such as
the UN and KFOR have granted themselves immunity. They have occupied
and damaged many former SOEs in Kosovo, yet are not held responsible for
this damage. This sets a poor example for future leaders as such actions
suggest that the powerful are not accountable and can expropriate resources
by claiming it is for the greater good. What this also alludes to is another
possible reason for the DSI at times favouring an RC model over that of SPE
insofar as it absolves them from responsibility. Accepting the latter would
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force the DSI to alter its own operating procedures and would also require it to
directly engage with powerful actors such as foreign governments and MNCs,
a requirement which likely does not fit with the DSI’s current agenda or
mandate. 
The second impact related to this dimension addresses basic operational
problems of the DSI, of which several stand out as particularly influential in
terms of transforming war economies. First, coordination across the mission
and staffing diversity can be seen as having several impacts. In the judicial
sector, having international jurists and legal monitors from a variety of back-
grounds may result in disjointed legal codes and systems, making
investigation and prosecution more difficult. Police training will likewise be
fragmented, creating time, space and thus room to manoeuvre for criminal
actors. The ‘lead nation’ concept is a possible option for combating such
problems. Special prosecutors’ offices for specific forms of crime such as
customs fraud or financial crime are another way of increasing cohesiveness
in dealing with particular forms of activity. One reason for poor cooperation
and coordination, however, relates to the nature of the relationships between
DSI actors which has in some cases been characterised by competitiveness and
mistrust. Development actors may be unwilling to share information with
security actors as it may threaten their relationship with local populations.
Likewise, some security actors refuse to share information and intelligence
with other actors. This again creates room for manoeuvre by groups who can
take advantage of the competition between actors.
The problem of a contract culture within the DSI is also a fundamental
barrier to transformation. Impacting on institutional memory, contract
culture is problematic in that many agreements and arenas for cooperation to
fight organised crime, collect intelligence or move towards greater judicial
cooperation are strongly linked to an individual and their informal and
personal relationships with professional counterparts. When individuals
leave, these avenues of cooperation and coordination can disintegrate, and
have been seen to do so. In the judicial sector the problem of short-term
contracts is even more pronounced as it also affects the ability to recruit
qualified staff and increases the difficulty of prosecution as prosecutors and
judges leave in the middle of important trials. These factors inhibit the
building up of sound jurisprudence. Thus, not only is the impact of contract
culture felt immediately, but it has long-term repercussions as well. This
relates to another problematic feature of the DSI – the following of trends. In
Kosovo, a delay in dealing with issues of political-economy has allowed actors
involved in these activities to become entrenched and for criminal organisa-
tions to solidify their positions and political linkages. Specifically in the
judiciary and security sectors, a delay in recognising the impact of war
economies may delay the creation of institutions or specific laws which are
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needed to fight activities such as organised crime and smuggling. This
suggests a need to re-think the sequencing and priority of programming
options. 
Due to the broadness of the peacebuilding agenda, the problem of mission
creep has also become of great concern as institutions find themselves
engaged in tasks which are neither part of their mandate nor compatible with
institutional skills and resources. As issues of political-economy are incorpo-
rated into the overall peacebuilding agenda, already existing institutions are
often tasked with transformation, increasing the scope and scale of their
mandate beyond what was originally envisioned. There has been limited
progress in enabling actors to fulfil expanded mandates. The UN and other
major donors do not have, nor likely have they wanted to have, the funding
mechanisms and the political support to supply money for items such as
phone-tapping equipment, unmarked police cars for surveillance or money for
paying informants. Peacebuilding missions are not set up to deal with these
types of problems, and the required equipment and expertise is not part of the
standard peacebuilding ‘kit’. It is not clear that peacebuilding missions should
be equipped in this way, but if they are to be tasked with the transformation of
war economies, as they have been, these issues and lack of resources need to
be addressed. The DSI needs to clearly address whether transformation is a
task it should be engaged in, and if so what resources are realistically needed
to engage in such a task. All of this can be related to concerns over the limited
capacity of, and lack of resources available to, actors within the DSI. When
mission creep sets in, the resources and skills needed to fully engage with new
mandates is lacking. Often, institutions are not provided with the resources
needed to complete their tasks. Poorly resourced police services, judiciaries
and customs services will be unable to manage the criminal elements of war
economies without proper resourcing. This includes funding for buildings,
information technology, equipment, training and staff salaries. 
Finally, the momentum felt at the beginning of missions often fades with
time as new emergencies demand both the human and financial resources of
donors, and public support in foreign constituencies dwindles. In some cases,
the local population also becomes disillusioned by the actions of the DSI and
inevitably foreign actors must disengage. Ideally, exit strategies would be well
planned and gradual. However, as witnessed in Kosovo, exit strategies may
also be forced, rushed and ill-planned – describing another operational imped-
iment found in the DSI, quick exits and rushed timelines. In all areas of reform
addressed in this research, there are concerns that the internationals are
exiting too quickly – before local institutional capacity is in place to ensure a
smooth transition and sustainable progression. 
Overall, the DSI’s direct involvement in war economies calls into question
its willingness and/or right to engage in transformation, while serious opera-
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tional limitations call into question its capacity to do so. Operational actors,
heavily constrained by the structure and nature of the industry, appear to
have neither the political clout (to deal with the way in which more powerful
actors in the DSI contribute to the war economy) nor the operational capabil-
ities (to engage with a problem which requires long-term planning, effective
coordination across regions and sectors and high levels of human and
physical resources). In order for war economies to be positively transformed,
the behaviour of powerful DSI actors would need to be addressed while simul-
taneously providing operational actors with a more substantial and effective
set of tools and procedures. 
Building a peace economy: the limits of liberal peacebuilding
Dominant critiques of the current model of international development and
security programming provide much insight into the problem of post-conflict
political-economic transformation. However, such critiques tell only part of
the story. In order to fully understand the ways in which the DSI engages with
war economies and identify the barriers to creating both positive and negative
peace economies, several additional factors, issues and questions must be
addressed. These barriers, described above (and summarised below in Table
8.2), are a function of the dominant values and approaches of the
Development-Security Industry, a complex network of actors which operates
through the liberal peacebuilding agenda. By assessing the impact of this
agenda on transformation policy, a comprehensive framework for under-
standing the difficulties of building economies based on sustainable, positive
peace and justice emerges.
The framework presented here allows for a multi-layered analysis which
finds that transformation is dependent on ideological constraints and tenden-
cies and the ability to convert various conceptual lenses into practice, as well
as structural and operational features of the DSI. Ideologically, the DSI is less
concerned with positive transformation which would focus on changing rela-
tionships of power and dominance in post-conflict settings and more
concerned with bringing physical stability and opening up markets to neo-
liberal forces. Because of this ideological focus, there is a tendency to view war
economies through a narrow model based on RC-type theories. Such analyses
tend to ignore global linkages or facilitators in the growth and sustenance of
these forms of economic accumulation. As such, an arbitrary disconnect
between ‘economies of war’ and ‘economies of peace’ is created and only the
immediate or more tangible facets of war economies are considered in need of
transformation. The wider structures and issues considered by an SPE
approach, though often acknowledged by operational actors, only occasion-
ally influence policy to any degree. This is due in part to the ideological
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foundation of the DSI but also in part to the great difficulty that operational
actors have in dealing with such complex and deep-rooted issues. Thus, even
when an SPE analysis is undertaken, operational actors within the DSI are
often ill-placed to address such complexity and as a matter of practicality or
functionality fall back into more simple models and practices. Dealing with
the complexity of the issue is further hindered by the complicity of the DSI in
the very structures they are trying to transform, as well as the modus operandi
of institutions.
Various motivations and reasons for the choice of policies can be identi-
fied, highlighting the power relations and processes within the DSI that need
to be addressed and re-negotiated in order to advance and improve responses
to war economies. In this sense, the framework, provided in Table 8.2,
provides insight into when and under what circumstances operational actors
might find themselves in a position to undertake more just and structural
transformation. In order to move forward and implement more successful
programming, DSI actors should consider a number of issues. First, opportu-
nities for challenging ideologically biased programming which favour
international goals over domestic goals should be sought. Actors should also
attempt to anticipate how programming might be captured and seek ways to
either prevent this from the outset, or to consider how they might transition
to alternative strategies as local and international contexts are altered. DSI
actors should also remain cognizant of alternative modes of political,
economic and social organisation and attempt to integrate these into policy as
opposed to relying on liberal blueprints. 
Using frameworks such as the one presented in Table 8.1, DSI actors
should analyse war economies from an SPE perspective (as many actors
already do) and then, more importantly, consider how they might opera-
tionalise the results of such an analysis in order to move towards policies of
engagement – always being aware of ‘policy moments’ which might allow
these more risky forms of policies to be implemented. Finally, the DSI as a
whole needs to reconsider the use of strategies which themselves contribute to
war economies and re-equip operational actors in such a way that allows
them to deal with the complexity of political-economies of conflict. This may
include addressing the availability of resources to operational actors – both
financial and human – and reconsidering the timing or sequencing of policies
so that projects both complement each other and are introduced based on a
thorough assessment of the situation. Likewise, there should be a stronger
focus on planning and executing exit strategies, especially in terms of finding
ways to phase out control mechanisms.
What has been detailed throughout this work are a variety of relation-
ships and processes, which when taken as a whole have been unsuccessful in
fundamentally transforming economies of war into economies based on
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sustainable peace and justice. While presenting general characteristics of the
nature of the transformation agenda, what is striking and most promising are
the moments in which policies, programmes and actors do not engage with
war economies in the ways both scholars and practitioners would expect.
Emerging as most encouraging from this research are examples of when
actors both within and outside of the DSI transcended or escaped the bound-
aries set up by the dominant features of liberal peacebuilding and engaged in
flexible, progressive and effective programming which furthered the ultimate
goal of positive transformation. Moving away from basic goals of stability and
economic growth, actors engaged in this progressive approach take the time
to integrate and negotiate local and international contexts with the aim of
promoting sustainable and just modes of peace. 
As such, this work represents a useful step forward in creating a broader
and more holistic approach to understanding international approaches to war
economies. It provides a basis through which other programmes and trans-
formation attempts can be analysed, a process which will allow for further
refinement of the transformation dilemma. At the same time, through its
inclusion of examples of when actors used their skill, knowledge and agency
to implement progressive and flexible policies, the framework offered here
both highlights the potential for effective transformation and provides a
preliminary base for addressing the factors which allow for alternative policies
to be identified and implemented. With political economic relationships
having the ability to threaten international, state and human security, the
need to transform war economies into economies of peace is great. 
The current liberal peacebuilding agenda, as formulated and implemented by
the development-security industry, has proved ineffective in this task.
However, neither this industry nor its ideologically based foundations have
complete dominance over the transformation agenda and within these insti-
tutions, actors have revealed that they possess the ingenuity, creativity and
willingness for contestation that is required to alter the dominant perceptions
and reactions to war economies.
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AP P END I X
List of interviewees
Ref Gender Ethnicity/nationality Sector
I3 M International Security
I4 M Albanian Customs
I5 M Bosniac Privatisation
I6 M Serbian Privatisation
I7 M Serbian Privatisation
I8 M International Security/Judiciary
I9 M International Security
I10 M Albanian Security
I11 F Albanian Security
I12 F International Security
I13 F International Privatisation
I15 M International Security
I16 M Serbian Privatisation
I17 M International Security
I18 M International Security 
I19 M International Judiciary
I20 M International Judiciary
I22 F International Judiciary
I23 F International Security
I25 M International Privatisation
I27 F Albanian Security/Humanitarian
I28 M International Security
I29 M International Privatisation
I30 M International Security
I31 F Albanian Privatisation
I32 M International Security/Judiciary
I34 M International Security
I35 M International Customs
I37 F International Judiciary
I38 M Albanian Security
I39 M International Judiciary
I40 F Albanian Judiciary 
I41 M International Security
I42 F International Judiciary
I43 F Serbian Customs/Humanitarian 
I44 M International Judiciary
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I46 M International Security
I47 M International Security
I48 F International Judiciary
I49 F International Judiciary
I50 F Albanian Journalist
I51 M International Judiciary
I52 M International Privatisation
I53 F Albanian Economy/Humanitarian
I54 F Albanian Security/Humanitarian
I55 M International Customs
I57 M Albanian Customs
I59 F Albanian Judiciary
I60 M International Security
I62 M Albanian Economy
I63 M International Security
I64 M Albanian Economy
I65 M International Security
I66 M International Security
I69 M Albanian Local government
I70 M Albanian Economy
I71 M International Privatisation
I72 F International Privatisation
I73 M Albanian Economy/Privatisation
I81 M Albanian Economy
I82 M Albanian Customs
I83 M Albanian Ex-KLA
I84 M International Security
I85 F International Humanitarian
I86 M Albanian Local government
I87 F International Humanitarian
I88 M Albanian Local government
I89 M Albanian Local government
I90 M Albanian Local government
I91 M International Economy
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Öniş, Z and Şenses, F (2005) Rethinking the emerging post-Washington consensus.
Development and Change 36(2): 263–290.
OSCE (2003a) Parallel Structures in Kosovo. OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Department of
Human Rights and Rule of Law.
OSCE (2003b) Re: OCSE mission in Kosovo – Spot report: Four former UÇK leaders
found guilty of war crimes. OSCE Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Vienna.
Internal document provided by contact in Kosovo 2005. 
OSCE (2003c) Tenth assessment of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kosovo: Period
covering May 2002 to December 2002. OSCE Mission in Kosovo and UNHCR.
Available at: www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUB
SITES&id=3e70b1604 (accessed 17/07/07).
OSCE (2005a) An Introduction to the Kosovo Police Service School. OSCE Mission in
Kosovo, Department of Police Education and Development, Pristina. Document
provided by contact in Kosovo, 2006. 
OSCE (2005b) Police education and development: Fact sheet. OSCE Website. Available
at: www.osce.org/publications/mik/2005/04/14272_323_en.pdf (accessed
18/07/07).
OSCE (2006a) Annual report of the Secretary General on police-related activities in
2005. OSCE Office of the Secretary General, SEC.DOC/2/06. Available at:
www.osce.org/documents/sg/2006/11/22171_en.pdf (accessed 17/06/07).
OSCE (2006b) Expropriations in Kosovo. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of
Human Rights and Rule of Law, Pristina. Available at: www.osce.org/
documents/mik/2006/12/22676_en.pdf (accessed 17/07/07).
OSCE (2006c) Kosovo: Review of the criminal justice system, 1999–2005: Reforms
and residual concerns. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights
and Rule of Law, Legal Systems Monitoring Section. Available at:
www.osce.org/documents/mik/2006/03/18579_en.pdf (accessed 17/07/07).
OSCE (2006/7) Parallel structures in Kosovo. OSCE Mission in Kosovo. Available at:
www.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/04/23925_en.pdf (accessed 17/07/07).
OSCE, KPSS and American Department of Justice (2003) 1st Annual Kosovo Community
Based Organised Crime Seminar, 5–7 December, 2003. Kosovo Police Service School:
Seminar Overview. Document provided by contact in Kosovo, 2006. 
Özerdem, A (2003) From a ‘terrorist group’ to a ‘civil defence’ corps: The ‘transforma-
tion’ of the Kosovo Liberation Army. International Peacekeeping 10(3): 79–101.
PAK (2010) Press release: Privatisation Agency of Kosovo announces the results of
45th wave of privatisation. Privatisation Agency of Kosovo, 8 September 2010.
Available at: www.pak-ks.org/repository/docs/08.09.2011–press.pdf (accessed
10/08/11).
Pankhurst, D (1999) Issues of justice and reconciliation in complex political emergen-
205
Bibliography
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:06  Page 205
cies: Conceptualising reconciliation, justice and peace. Third World Quarterly
20(1): 239–256.
Paris, R (2004) At War’s End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Patey, LA (2007) State rules: Oil companies and armed conflict in Sudan. Third World
Quarterly 28(5): 997–1016.
Paul, D (1997) Aiding and abetting. War Report 51. London: Institute for War and
Peace Reporting 51: 30–31.
Peake, G (2004) Policing the peace: Police reform experiences in Kosovo, Southern
Serbia and Macedonia. Report: Small Arms and Security in South Eastern Europe.
London: Saferworld. Available at: www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/
Policing%20PA2.pdf (accessed 17/07/07).
Peake, G (2010) Understanding international police organisations: What the
researchers do not see. Journal of International Peacekeeping 14(3–4): 425–445.
Peake, G and Brown, KS (2005) Policebuilding: The international deployment group
in the Solomon Islands. International Peacekeeping 12(4): 520–532.
Pearce, J (2004) War, peace and diamonds in Angola: Popular perceptions of the
diamond industry in the Lundas. African Security Review 13(2): 51–64.
Pegg, S (2009) Chronicle of a death foretold: The collapse of the Chad–Cameroon
pipeline project. African Affairs 108(431): 311–320.
Perritt Jr, HH (2005) Resolving claims when countries disintegrate: The challenge of
Kosovo. Chicago-Kent Law Review 80(1): 119–185.
Persaud, B (2001) OECD curbs on offshore financial centres: A major issue for small
states. The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 90(359):
199–212.
Peterson, JH (2010) ‘Rule of Law’ initiatives and the liberal peace: The impact of politi-
cised reform in post conflict states. Disasters 34(1): 15–39. 
Peterson, JH (2013) Creating space for emancipatory human security: Liberal obstruc-
tions and the potential of agonism. International Studies Quarterly 57(2): 318–328.
Pieterse, JN (1998) My paradigm or yours? Alternative development, post-develop-
ment, reflexive development. Development and Change 29(2): 343–373.
Pohit, S and Taneja, N (2003) India’s informal trade with Bangladesh: A qualitative
assessment. The World Economy 26(8): 1187–1214.
Porteous, SD (2000) Targeted financial sanctions. In: Berdal, M and Malone, D (eds)
Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars. London: Lynne Rienner,
147–165.
Portes, A (1996) The informal economy: Perspectives from Latin America. In: Pozo, S
(ed.) Exploring the Underground Economy. Kalamazoo: W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research, 147–165.
Power, M (2001) Patrimonialism & petro-diamond capitalism: Peace, geopolitics &
the economics of war in Angola. Review of African Political Economy 90(28):
489–502.
Pugh, M (1998) Post conflict rehabilitation: The humanitarian dimension. 3rd
International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense
Academies and Security Study Institutes: Networking the Social Community in
206
Bibliography
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:07  Page 206
the Information Age. Conference held in Kongresshaus Zurich, Switzerland,
19–21 October.
Pugh, M (2002) Postwar political-economy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: The spoils of
peace. Global Governance 8(4): 467–482. 
Pugh, M (2004) Rubbing salt into war wounds: Shadow economies in peacebuilding
in Bosnia and Kosovo. Problems of Post-Communism 51(3): 53–60. 
Pugh, M (2005a) Crime and capitalism in Kosovo’s transformation. Paper presented at
International Studies Association Conference, Hawaii, March 2005.
Pugh, M (2005b) Liquid transformations in the political-economies of BiH and Kosovo.
Draft Paper for TD10 International Studies Association Honolulu, March 2005.
Pugh, M (2007) Normative values and economic deficits in post-conflict transforma-
tion. International Journal 62(3): 479–494.
Pugh, M and Cooper, N with Goodhand, J (2004) War Economies in a Regional Context:
Challenges of Transformation. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Pugh, M, Cooper, N and Turner, M (eds) (2011) Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the
Political Economy of Peacebuilding. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Quirk, PJ (1997) Money laundering: Muddying the macroeconomy. Finance and
DevelopmentMarch, 7–9.
Raeymaekers, T (2010) Protection for sale? War and the transformation of regulation
on the Congo-Ugandan border. Development and Change 41(4): 563–587.
Rancière, J (ed. and trans Corcoran, S) (2010) Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics.
London: Continuum International Publishing Group.
Reno, W (1998) Warlord Politics and African States. London: Lynne Rienner.
Reno, W (2008) Mines, money and the problem of state-building in Congo. Issue: A
Journal of Opinion 26(1): 14–17.
Richani, N (1997) The political-economy of violence: The war-system in Colombia.
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 39(2): 37–82.
Richmond, O (2007) The Transformation of Peace. New York: Routledge.
Richmond, O (2008) Peace in International Relations. New York: Routledge. 
Richmond, O (2009) A Post-liberal peace: Eirenism and the every-day. Review of
International Studies 35(3): 557–580.
Richmond, O (2010) Resistance and the post-liberal peace. Millennium: Journal of
International Studies 38(3): 665–692.
Riinvest (2001) Socially Owned Enterprises and their Transformation/Privatisation: Draft
Research Report. Pristina: in cooperation with CIPE and USAID. Available at:
www.cipe.org/regional/cee/pdf/sociallyowned.pdf (accessed 18/07/07).
Riinvest (2002) Promoting economic development through civil society: Local
economic development in Kosova. International Roundtable Forum, Pristina, 16
April 2002. Document provided by contact in Kosovo, 2005. 
Riinvest (2004) Privatisation in Kosova: Forwards and backwards and the status of
social property in Kosova: Contests and privatisation. Forumi, 2015. Pristina.
Document provided by contact in Kosovo, 2005. 
Riinvest (2007) Corporate governance in Kosovo: Reforming publicly owned
Enterprises. Centre for International Private Enterprise, Feature Service. Available
at: www.cipe.org/publications/fs/pdf/013107.pdf (accessed 17/07/07).
207
Bibliography
4062 building a peace economy_2652Prelims  25/11/2013  15:07  Page 207
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